


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
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Background Studies:  
SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

By: LEON GOURE MILORAD POPOV  
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Prepared for:  
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### SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

By:

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#### ABSTRACT

This volume contains five background papers on the general subject of opportunities for extension of Soviet influence in the Third World. These papers were utilized, along with other sources, in the preparation of the summary report, "Soviet Opportunities in the Third World," SSC-TN-3115-14.

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The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other documents.

#### CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Technical Note is in partial fulfillment of Task Order 74-4 under Contract DAAG39-74-C-0082.

## FOREWORD

This volume of background papers on opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence in the Third World is an element of the WY74 program for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), Department of the Army. It is a supplementary volume to the summary report, "Soviet Opportunities in the Third World," SSC-TN-3115-14 (Task Order 74-4).

This project was under the supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, Mr. M. Mark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant Director, and Mr. Harold Silverstein, Special Assistant to the Director. The co-leaders of the project were Mr. William M. Carpenter and Dr. Stephen P. Gibert. Other members of the project team were Dr. James E. Dornan, Jr., Dr. Michael J. Deane, Mr. Arthur A. Zuehlke, Jr., Miss Anna Anderson and Miss Diane White.

Contributions to this volume were made by (in the order of appearance of their papers) Mr. Leon Goure, Mr. William E. Ratliff, Dr. Edward J. Williams, Mr. Milorad Popov and Ambassador G. Edward Clark. These papers, although edited by the SSC project team, express the views of the individual authors, which are not necessarily the same as those held by the project team, but are presented in the interest of providing the reader with a diversity of perceptions of the overall problem.

Richard B. Foster  
Director

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SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: LATIN AMERICA

By

Leon Goure

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SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: LATIN AMERICA  
SUMMARY

In the coming decade, the Soviet Union will have new opportunities to increase its political, economic and possibly military influence in Latin America. Rising Third World nationalism, rather than a growth in indigenous communism, will largely account for those opportunities. As the Soviets interpret the situation, the growing alienation from the United States will turn Latin American leaders to the Soviet Union for necessary trade and development assistance.

Attempts at rapid industrialization will unavoidably increase the state economic sector and require authoritarian reform; this reform is expected to be "socialist", even "revolutionary".

In developing relations with the Soviet Union, Latin Americans act out of economic pragmatism, rather than ideological affinity with Moscow. Although suspicious of Soviet motives, they see the value of posing the Soviet Union as a counterweight to U.S. pressure and intervention.

Certain factors will constrain Soviet influence, notably economic inability to replace the United States and the West as a market and source of investment for Latin America. Neither does the area's nationalism work entirely to Soviet advantage: if anti-U.S. sentiment is high, so is the determination to remain free of Russian control.

While the Soviet Union recognizes that the prospects for creating new communist satellites in Latin America are not good, it can be justifiably optimistic about its near term goal: to erode U.S. power in the region, thus weakening the American international position and inclining the "correlation of world forces" toward Moscow.



## I INTRODUCTION

It is not surprising that in the late 1960s and early 1970s Soviet leaders and analysts spoke of Latin America as a continent in "upheaval" and saw it as one of the most effective and promising arenas of the so-called "anti-imperialist national liberation struggle," where, according to CPSU Central Committee Secretary Boris Ponomarev, the "revolutionary process" was expected to "develop at a faster pace than in other parts of the nonsocialist world."<sup>1</sup> Of course, this optimistic view of Latin America was inspired at that time by what Moscow perceived to be especially favorable developments in Chile, Peru, Panama, and Uruguay, as well as by Soviet successes in establishing diplomatic and trade relations with nearly all of the countries in that region.<sup>2</sup>

Although Moscow's enthusiasm was somewhat dampened by the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile in 1973 and the military coup in Uruguay, Soviet analysts profess to see in Latin America an ongoing process of change. They perceive this change as leading to an intensification of the region's opposition to U.S. "imperialism" and to profound social-political and economic transformations which offer opportunities for strengthening the influence of the local communist parties and of the Soviet Union itself.

The United States has also come to recognize that a radical shift has taken place in its relationship with the countries of Latin America and their relationships with each other and with the rest of the world. Indeed

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<sup>1</sup> B. Ponomarev, "Topical Problems in the Theory of the Revolutionary Process," Kommunist, No. 15, p. 59 (October 1971).

<sup>2</sup> In 1971, only one country in South America--Paraguay--had no relations with the Soviet Union. In 1973 the Soviet Union broke relations with Chile.

Latin America has ceased to be a reliable and secure "backyard" of the United States or an assured base of support for U.S. policies.

Although conditions vary from country to country, making generalizations difficult to establish, it is probably correct to state that, on the whole, they have given evidence of a marked upsurge of self-conscious political and economic nationalism. This nationalism has been characterized by a drive for modernization, industrialization, economic reform, urbanization and growth, a breakdown of traditional social, economic and political relationships and institutions, an assertion of independence from U.S. political tutelage and economic domination, and a greater readiness to seek a place and a role in the world arena.

Those Latin American countries which have launched themselves on a course of rapid and often radical transformation have inevitably become subject to conflicting political movements and ideologies and to social forces and demands generated by rising expectations which, in turn, have led to the advocacy of different proposals for the solution of highly complex economic and social problems, each of which promotes different forms of social-political and economic organization and leadership. This process has also made these countries more sensitive to international economic and market conditions and has increased the pressures on them to seek new markets and new sources of technology. Unavoidably, this process, together with the urge to demonstrate independence from U.S. influence, has generated a tendency to ignore "ideological" considerations in these countries' foreign relations and policies, as is evidenced by the movement to reestablish diplomatic and trade ties with Cuba and to expand relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. At the same time, the destabilizing effect of rapid change has in turn given rise to an intensification of social-political conflicts and an upsurge of political violence and has led to the emergence of a growing number of military and military-dominated regimes and to a corresponding decline of democratic systems. Countries which have resisted change and have sought to preserve traditional social-economic and political systems, such as Paraguay, have tended inevitably

to authoritarian regimes, economic stagnation, backwardness and isolation from the rest of the region.

This process of rapid transformation of Latin America has been characterized by a great many frustrations and contradictions. Thus, the region's political and economic nationalism and the drive for "true independence" with its anti-U.S. overtones come into conflict with the countries' continuing dependence on external economic assistance, investments and needs for foreign technology. Urban growth, industrialization, and the emergence of a middle class have widened the gap between the urban and rural sectors of society and between the upper strata of society and the rest of the population. The rapid growth of the labor force has been accompanied by an increase in unemployment and underemployment among an uprooted segment of the rural population which flocks to the cities to improve its lot. The shanty town has become a characteristic feature of Latin American cities, providing a receptive audience for proselytizing by radical urban students and intellectuals. The modernization of the urban sector and the breakdown there of traditional relationships and institutions merely serve to accentuate the anachronism of archaic social-economic structures in the rural areas and the pressure for their radical transformation, giving rise to peasant unrest and often to violent clashes with the local and central authorities. The overall result has been the radicalization not only of those segments of society which usually take the lead in promoting change, i.e., the intellectuals and the students, but also of the traditional pillars of the status quo, namely the church, the military, and the middle class.

Instability in Latin America has been fostered by a number of factors. Among them are the continuing "benign neglect" of that region by the United States; the increases in world demand and prices of oil and other raw materials which have tended to accentuate the differences between the region's producer and have-not nations and have raised new problems in their relationships with the United States and other industrial consumer nations; and the existence of sharply differing models of development in the region,



as represented by Brazil and Peru, and to a lesser extent by Cuba and the Allende regime in Chile.

In this context, the Soviet Union sees various opportunities to "fish in troubled waters" and to attempt to increase its influence. While one can question the assertion of Uruguay's Communist Party leader Rodney Arismendi that a "revolutionary situation of a general character" exists in Latin America, the Soviet Union can seek to reinforce the anti-U.S. tendencies and attitudes of the countries in that area, give public political support to countries which have major disagreements with the United States, as for example in the case of Panama, and offer itself as a partial alternate market and source of credits and technology. Indeed, there has been a marked increase in recent years in Soviet economic relations with Latin America including countries which repress their native communists. The fact that this growth has continued despite the persistence of a highly unfavorable trade balance for the Soviet Union and Soviet purchases of relatively nonessential goods from Latin America, indicates that Moscow hopes to derive political benefits from these activities.<sup>1</sup>

Potentially, a variety of opportunities exist or may arise for increased Soviet influence in Latin America. The extent to which these opportunities can be transformed into real political influence will vary. There is no reason to believe that Moscow's current primary objective is the establishment of communist regimes in Latin America. Indeed, Soviet analysts tend to discount this possibility and to emphasize a united front strategy on the part of all leftist and progressive parties capable of forging an alliance between the workers' movements and the middle class.

A primary Soviet goal appears to be the erosion of U.S. positions and influence in Latin America in the context of an "anti-imperialist national

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<sup>1</sup> See L. Goure and M. Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, Monographs in International Affairs (Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 1975).

liberation" struggle and a corresponding increase in closer relations with the Soviet Union. It is this priority in Soviet policy that has given it the flexibility to deal with countries of the most diverse political character and orientation and to identify various types of regimes as being "progressive,"--i.e., Cuba, Peru, Ecuador, Panama. Therefore, the opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence must be viewed in terms of general trends and developments in Latin America as well as in terms of specific social-political movements and particular countries.



## II THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

All countries in Latin America seek economic growth and industrialization. They want to become less dependent on their traditional exports, to diversify their economies, and to gain increasing independence from foreign economic domination and exploitation. Generally accepted as an undisputed fact in Latin America is the thesis that foreign businesses, and especially U.S. corporations, exploit the natural resources of these countries, extract far greater profits than the amounts they invest or reinvest, do not aid in the transfer of technology or in the training of native managers and technicians, and force the countries to import manufactured goods at high prices. Given the predominance of U.S. investments in Latin America and the region's sensitivity to U.S. political domination, the United States has become the primary target of Latin America's economic nationalism. This view of U.S. interests has led to the nationalization of U.S. business interests especially in extractive industries and public utilities, controls and restrictions on foreign investments, resistance to participation of native capital and business in foreign investments, prohibitions on excessive transfer of profits, and so on.

The trend to nationalize U.S. business interests, to control subsidiaries of large U.S. corporations, is still continuing, as is evident from Venezuela's intention to take over the oil industry, or Argentina's insistence on sales by U.S. subsidiaries to Cuba. Public sensitivity to the threat of foreign infringement upon "national sovereignty" has had the effect of discouraging foreign investments and of delaying the development of various natural resources. For example, this has been the case in Brazil where even badly needed exploration for oil was delayed because the government was unwilling to grant foreign companies exploration rights.

The problem of rapid industrialization has been complicated by the fact that, as pointed out by Eduardo Frei, the former President of Chile,

Latin America "has reached the modern age without accumulated capital required for its development."<sup>1</sup> While in some instances the high price of raw materials has altered this condition (as in the case of Venezuela), it has been generally true that reliance on foreign investments has led to growing foreign debts, increasing debt service burdens, and an adverse balance of payments, and has encouraged "monopolistic competition" with domestic businesses.<sup>2</sup>

The drive for industrialization not only has been highly uneven throughout the region (with Brazil and Venezuela being the primary beneficiaries, while Paraguay and various Central American countries have shown little progress) but it has also tended to widen the gap between the industrial and agricultural sectors and thus between the urban and rural population. This situation has attracted to the cities the influx of a labor force from the countryside which is difficult to absorb. The condition has been aggravated by the development of capital-intensive industries which cater to relatively narrow markets and generate few linkage effects. At the same time, the industrial growth is held back by the shortage of a technically trained labor force. The combination of this condition with a catering to a narrow domestic market has tended to make Latin American manufacturing industries inefficient, and this intensifies with the development of export markets for manufactured goods.

Like other less developed regions of the world, Latin America believes that it has long suffered from a marked and unfair discrepancy between the prices paid by the advanced industrial countries for its raw materials and the prices which the latter countries charge for their manufactured goods.

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<sup>1</sup> Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Second Latin-American Revolution," Foreign Affairs, p. 90 (October 1971).

<sup>2</sup> "Declaration of Latin-American Economists," in J. D. Cockcroft, A. G. Frank, and D. L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment, p. 307 (Anchor Books, New York, 1972).

The inflation in the United States and the West has tended to push import prices for Latin America even higher, while the region's prices for raw materials and agricultural products, with the exception of oil, have not necessarily kept pace or have shown considerable fluctuations.

As a result, Latin Americans have demanded better trade terms and preferential tariffs from the United States and other advanced industrial countries; they have sought to open these countries to exports of Latin American manufactured goods on a preferential basis and have tried to achieve more stable prices for their raw materials and agricultural products. As against this, the region has encountered a tendency on the part of Western countries to protect their markets from cheaper Latin American manufactured goods. Neither the European Common Market nor the United States has been willing to give Latin American goods the preferential treatment that region desires. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Latin Americans were disappointed and greatly irritated by the surcharge imposed on the imported manufactured goods by the Nixon administration and the restrictions of the recently passed U.S. Trade Bill. While the restrictions adversely affected only a small segment of Latin America's exports, these U.S. actions were perceived as negating the "special relations" which the United States had proclaimed existed between itself and the Southern Hemisphere, and as being an attempt to restrict the region's economic independence.

Since none of the Latin American countries--with the possible exception of Brazil and Venezuela--feel economically strong enough to confront the United States and effectively press their demands, various efforts are under way to form producer cartels or associations and also to organize a purely Latin American economic association such as SELA in order to provide for a Latin American forum and for a coordinated approach in dealing with the United States and the West. In a speech to the Venezuelan Congress on 12 March 1975, President Perez said: "Latin American unity is the only reply to the divisive strategy which has been so successfully applied by the



great international interests."<sup>1</sup> He also declared in an interview that "we wish to talk with the government of Washington as a community and not in an isolated way."<sup>2</sup> The proposed SELA organization, which is also sponsored by Mexico, could, in Perez's view, become an alternative to the OAS.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union perceives Latin America's economic problems and desires and attitudes as a major channel for developing relations with the countries in the region and for influencing their policies. Soviet propaganda and public pronouncements fully support Latin America's economic nationalism, its desire for gaining full control over its resources, and its drive for modernization and industrialization. The Soviet Union and its East European satellites offer low-interest long-term credits, especially to the state sector of the national economies; they are ready to provide turnkey industries and generally assist in major industrialization projects as well as help mechanize agriculture; and they are prepared to transfer technology to their Latin American clients and to provide the necessary technical training for native personnel. The attractiveness of such Soviet offers is that the recipient countries retain complete control over the investments and full ownership of the industries built with Soviet aid, and the repayments are predominantly in the form of goods, including manufactured goods. The Soviets claim that their aid does not add to the countries' balance-of-payments problems or bear any of the exploitative character of Western investments. In addition, they claim that the Latin American countries can find in the Soviet Union a market and a source of technology which may be denied to them in the West. Furthermore, the Soviets at times are willing to buy surplus agricultural produce in countries with a single agricultural export, thereby aiding their economy. Thus, the Soviet Union purchased surplus coffee from Costa Rica which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

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<sup>1</sup> Radio Caracas, 12 March 1975.

<sup>2</sup> As reported in El Sol de Mexico, Mexico City (23 January 1975).

Soviet efforts to broaden economic relations with Latin America also benefit from the detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. From a Latin American viewpoint, detente means not only that there are fewer political obstacles to such relations and that the U.S. example proves that one should set aside ideological considerations in the area of economic cooperation, but also that there is no reason why what is good for the United States should not also be good for Latin America's economic interests. Many Latin Americans do not seem able to recognize that the economic and political consequences of any substantial Soviet trade with the United States differ markedly from the influence this might have on the smaller economies of Latin American countries.

The Soviet Union has also shown itself willing to give political and economic help to those countries which become involved in disputes with the United States and which, according to Moscow, have "progressive" regimes (i.e., Cuba, Panama, Peru). Furthermore, Moscow attempts to relay the impression that it will provide the necessary assistance in the event of U.S. retaliatory actions. In this respect, Cuba is held up as the example of a small country which with Soviet help has successfully defied the United States and overcome a trade embargo. The Soviet message is that no Latin American country needs to fear U.S. pressure as long as it establishes friendly political and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the establishment of such relations is claimed by Moscow to be an indicator of the real independence of the countries of that region.

Although Soviet credits to and trade with Latin America--exclusive of Cuba--have grown substantially in recent years,<sup>1</sup> this has been primarily the result of expanding Soviet economic relations with only three Latin American countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil and Peru. In practice there are a number of major constraints on significant Soviet economic penetration of this region: the Soviet Union has only a limited capacity for providing economic assistance on a large scale; it lacks the flexibility to

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<sup>1</sup> Exclusive of Cuba, Soviet credits increased from \$185 million in 1967 to more than \$1 billion in 1974, while the volume of trade rose from \$196 million in 1972 to more than \$630 million in 1974.

adapt its technology and production to the region's needs; the Latins distrust the quality of Soviet equipment and worry about the uncertainty of the availability of spare parts; and many countries are unwilling to expose their nationals to training in the Soviet Union or to allow the presence of substantial numbers of Soviet technicians in their territory. Even so, the countries have shown, in recent years, a greater willingness than before to take advantage of Soviet credits and technology, especially in connection with major development projects in the fields of dam construction, hydroelectric power, transmission lines, irrigation projects and the construction of fishing ports.



### III POLITICAL VULNERABILITIES

In his book Security, Policy and Strategy, Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Peru's former Prime Minister, Minister of War, and Army Commander, listed a number of Latin American political vulnerabilities.<sup>1</sup> Among these he included:

- A lack of identification on the part of the people with political and national objectives due to socio-economic discrepancies between leaders and the bulk of the population. "This psychological void in most Latin American countries," wrote Mercado, "is depriving state action of the cooperation of various sectors of the population in achieving these objectives."
- The great imbalances in the existing systems, particularly as expressed in unequal income distribution, sharp social differences, differences between the urban centers and the rural sectors or the coastal regions and the interior, a population rate of growth which is more rapid than the economic growth and tends therefore to absorb the major share of economic gains, etc.
- Lack of integration due to continuing political, cultural and geographic isolation of countries far from each other. In many instances, countries suffer from a lack of national integration for the same reasons.
- Discontent and loss of confidence in the governments. According to Mercado, the Latin American countries suffer from a "permanent popular discontent" which becomes translated into a loss of confidence in the existing governments. The social-economic inequalities are at the basis of this discontent, as are the failures of governments to provide adequate solutions to the people's needs and expectations. This situation, which is aggravated by the resistance to change on the part of entrenched social-economic and political interests and groups, leads to the rise of radical

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<sup>1</sup> Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Seguridad, Politica y Estrategia, (1974), translated in JPRS Translations on Latin America, No. 1254 (14 February 1975).

movements and political violence, which contributes to instability and to the political polarization of society.

- Lack of real political awareness. According to Mercado, "in most Latin American countries we observe the existence of numerous political parties lacking popular support, which in a majority of cases respond to personal or group interests," divert the citizens' attention from national issues and their solution and facilitate partisan fights and struggles that favor subversion and generate political instability.

Of course, Mercado, as a spokesman for a military regime, is contemptuous of political parties and civilian governments, but he is not entirely wrong in arguing that "in most Latin American countries, conditions are suitable for the development of extremism" of the Left as well as the Right, "because of the existence of serious socio-economic contradictions that place the great majority on the fringe of the economic and social benefits, which are reserved only for the dominant groups," and that this condition "provides the extremists with the necessary motives to justify their subversive activities." However, the extremists most often have not originated from the poorest strata of the population but from the urban intelligentsia, the students and even the church.

The frustrations felt by various elements of the Latin American societies over the rate of modernization, the issue of foreign economic influence, the scope and execution of land reforms, the uneven distribution of the benefits of economic growth and rising standards of living, the high rate of inflation, unemployment, etc., do indeed result in a plethora of radical solutions being advocated by a number of political and economic organizations. Many of these groups believe that the existing systems must be totally destroyed to permit the creation of new societies. The moderate and more balanced approaches based on democratic principles have greatly suffered in this process of increasing radicalization of Latin American politics. Among the victims have been the democratic systems which have more and more been replaced by military governments with either leftist or rightist leanings and the more moderate political parties, such



as the Christian Democrats. The process of political polarization has come to encompass even those institutions which have traditionally been the mainstay of the status quo, i.e., the army and the Catholic Church.

The Latin American armies have ceased to be the instrument of the old ruling classes. Their politicization has come about as a result of various factors. The officer corps has become imbued with the same nationalism, both political and economic, as the other elements of the population. The younger officers who emerge from progressive military schools or from training periods in foreign schools have become impatient with the immobilism, ineptitude, corruption or disorganization of the civilian leadership, and with the divisive actions of political parties which place their own interests ahead of the national good. At the same time, the military, who are often called upon to fight the terrorists, see themselves as the most potent force for law and order. Finally, the military have been caught up in a "contagiousness syndrome," in imitation of military coups and regimes in other countries. In this respect, both Peru and Brazil have come to serve as models inspiring others to emulate them.

The reformist--if not "revolutionary"--leanings or programs of military regimes have frequently been combined with strong nationalistic attitudes and certain anti-U.S. tendencies, although of a more pragmatic nature than the doctrinaire anti-U.S. positions of the intellectuals and radicals. This has been true in the case of Peru, as well as Ecuador and Panama. In all three cases the military regimes have sought to divorce themselves from the former ruling oligarchies and seek to carry out major social-economic changes.

Although dubious about the ideological position of these military regimes, the Soviet Union and the local communist parties (to the extent that they have been allowed to do so by these regimes) have shown themselves altogether willing to support them, at least as long as they maintain some form of anti-U.S. policy. The lack of ideological selectivity on Moscow's part is evident in its readiness to deal not only with Peru, Ecuador and

Panama (all three of which are said to have "progressive" military regimes) but also with rightist military governments as in the case of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay.

Soviet analysts have begun to recognize that, on the one hand, the military can be a force for change which will facilitate the eventual emergence of communist or communist-dominated regimes while on the other hand, that their neutral or favorable attitude is essential to the successful maintenance in power of leftist regimes. The lessons which the Soviet analysts have drawn from the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile are not only that a "revolution must know how to defend itself" but also that it is essential to "democratize" the armed forces. A World Marxist Review symposium on Latin America noted therefore that "the communist parties of the continent are doing much to win over adherents among the military."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, emphasis is placed on reducing the influence of the Latin American military of the West and in particular of the United States by severing the ties between them. This applies especially to the purchase of arms and equipment and the training of officers in the United States.<sup>2</sup> Apparently it is believed that a radicalized officer corps willing to cooperate with the native Communist Party can assure the success of either a military or a civilian "progressive regime." What the communist parties in turn seek to offer these military regimes is a political base in the population and if they have control over the labor unions, the essential support of the workers. Such alliances have, in fact, come about in a number of countries as, for example, in Peru, Ecuador, and Panama. (One can observe a similar development in Portugal and Syria.) Of course, in all such cases the military insist on remaining the dominant partners and are not willing to fully embrace communism as their guiding ideology.

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<sup>1</sup> "Whom Does the Army Serve?" World Marxist Review, No. 4, p. 57 (April 1974).

<sup>2</sup> "Colonel A. Leontyev and V. Berezin, "A Noose Instead of Help," Krasnaia Zvezda (3 March 1974); Captain First Rank A. Skrylnik, "A Revolution Must be Able to Defend Itself," Soviet Military Review, No. 10, p. 6 (October 1973).

The main difficulty faced by the Soviet Union is that the Peruvian model is not the only one for the Latin American military. In terms of economic and social achievements, the Brazilian model has been far more successful and is exercising a significant influence on Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay. One consequence of this has been that the nonruling Latin American military has become divided along conservative and reformist, if not radical, lines. For example, in the case of Argentina, Soviet analysts point out that the issue of whether another rightist military coup will succeed or not "will largely hinge on the extent to which the progressive forces succeed in winning over to their side those sections of the military which in the present political situation have not yet adopted definite positions and whose turn in one direction or another could determine the progressive or reactionary nature of future developments in the country."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Y. Seryogin, "Argentina Confrontation of the Forces of Democracy and Reaction," International Affairs, No. 11, p. 55 (November 1974).



#### IV THE CHURCH

The winds of change and discord in Latin America have forced the Catholic Church to abandon its traditional stance and to come out in favor of social-economic and political change. Not only has the lower clergy come to identify with the problems, frustration, anger, and aspirations of the lower classes (some priests even taking up the gun and joining guerrilla movements), but the leadership of the Church in turn has been forced to become a spokesman for change. One reason for this change has been the shortage of native priests which has led to the importation of American and European clergy whose values and traditions facilitated their more liberal orientation.

In the 1960s the Church placed its hopes in the Christian Democratic movement, both as a means of containing the spread of communism and as an instrument for carrying out the necessary reforms to meet the needs and aspirations of the population. The high point was reached with the coming to power in Chile of the Frei regime in 1964. However, it became clear that the politicization of Catholic reformism demanded politically related social development. A split developed between the progressive Catholics and the more radical Catholic organizations mainly over the issue of the speed of the changes, with the latter endorsing ever increasingly revolutionary solutions. The radical groups eventually broke away and joined the Popular Unity bloc led by Allende who defeated the Christian Democratic candidate for President in the 1970 elections, despite the latter's endorsement of a more left-oriented program. As a consequence, it still remains for the Christian Democrats to demonstrate that they do indeed hold the real answer to Latin American problems. Even so, the Frei government, by initiating the process of nationalization of U.S.-owned copper mines and by breaking the OAS embargo on trade with Cuba, as well as by establishing diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, won Moscow's cautious approval. Subsequently, in their critique of the

events that led to Allende's fall, Soviet analysts expressed regret that the more radical elements of the Popular Unity had prevented an alliance with the Christian Democrats, an alliance which appears to have been easier for the Chilean Communist Party to contemplate than its alliance with the more radical left groupings which it subsequently blamed for having alienated the middle class and provoked the military coup.

The attitude of the Latin American Church toward oppression, social-economic inequality, and foreign domination was spelled out by the Medellin Ecumenical Council which met in Colombia in 1968. While the documents issued by the Council condemned violence and did not endorse either economic determinism or Marxist doctrine, they paved the way for future militancy and socialist solutions on the part of Catholic members and organizations. Indeed, the Council led to a tempering of anti-clericalism on the part of Marxist-oriented groups. In fact, the World Marxist Review noted that "in Latin America many Catholics--from Hidalgo and Morelos to Jose A. Echeverria and Camilo Torres--have played a considerable role in the revolutionary struggle."<sup>1</sup>

Subsequently, in 1972, an inter-American meeting of "Christians for Socialism," held in Santiago, went further in asserting a commitment on the part of elements of Latin American catholicism to socialism as an alternative to capitalism and underdevelopment. The conference dismissed Christian Democracy as a "third way" for Latin America and confirmed its opposition to capitalism, "multinational firms, cultural domination, the presence of the C.I.A., the State Department, etc." The Santiago meeting evoked some strong criticism on the part of various Catholic elements and national church organizations, but it nevertheless exerted a certain degree of influence on the more radicalized Catholic groups.

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<sup>1</sup> Roque Dalton, "Catholics and Communists in Latin America; Some Aspects of the Present Situation," World Marxist Review, No. 11, pp. 89-90 (January 1968).

In practical terms, the Catholic Church has emerged as an exponent of change in Latin America and an opponent of "Yankee imperialism," as well as a vocal opponent of oppression by reactionary regimes (Chile, Brazil, Paraguay). The Church is divided and under pressure from the radical Catholic movements which have come to adopt Marxist formulas and revolutionary solutions. Thus, the Archbishop of Quito said in April 1975: "We must recognize that the Church is facing an unavoidable collision that takes the form of radical conflict" between the capitalist and communist paths of development, with the Church finding itself at a crossroad. According to the Archbishop, the "Church feels called by the revolutionary wave" because it too is profoundly concerned with the misery of the people.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> El Comercio, Quito (3 April 1975). See also El Tiempo, Quito (8 December 1974).



## V THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

In Latin America the left is highly fragmented and deeply divided on questions of ideology, strategy and tactics. The more violent elements originate predominantly from student movements. The communist parties, whose strength lies with the urban workers and their control of trade unions, have generally become bureaucratic and unadventurous. They are opposed to the radical left, which they condemn as suffering from "adventurism" and "petit bourgeois romanticism," as well as to the right. In contrast to the more radical left movements, the communists appear "conservative," which is one reason why the youth gravitates to the more radical groups and why the communists have in many countries come to be viewed as almost "respectable." The current general communist line calls for the formation of united fronts of the center-left and left because no single party of the left is strong enough to take power. The defeat of the Popular Unity coalition in Chile has not altered this line, but rather has placed greater emphasis on the need for a strategy which would not alienate the middle class and which would gain sufficient influence in the military to preclude a military coup.

The communists claim a membership of 500,000 throughout Latin America, but the estimated number of actual members, exclusive of Cuba, is far smaller.<sup>1</sup> However, in those countries where elections were held in recent years, the communists gained the support of a far larger number of voters (for example, in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela). For the most part, the parties are small and have little influence. In most countries, the communists are divided between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking parties. Furthermore, both types of parties are illegal in a number of countries, for example, in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

<sup>1</sup> See Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of Communist Party Organizations 1973, U.S. Department of State (1974).

So far, the united front strategy has yielded no significant results outside of the Popular Unity coalition in Chile. In Uruguay, prior to the military coup, the Frente Amplio, a coalition of five leftist parties including the communists, won 18.6 percent of the popular vote in 1971. The communists have also joined in an alliance with other leftist parties in Argentina (Alianza Popular or APR) in 1973 in opposition to Peron, but since then have come out in support of the Peronist government and have been calling for the formation of a coalition cabinet of all progressive movements.<sup>1</sup> The communists are also pursuing a united front strategy in Chile as a prerequisite for the overthrow of the military regime in that country. A similar effort is being made in Uruguay,<sup>2</sup> Venezuela,<sup>3</sup> and Mexico.<sup>4</sup> Given the Soviet interest in the preservation of the so-called "progressive" regimes and the communists' hope of gaining some influence with them, the communist parties have had to support, at times unconditionally, the noncommunist governments in Argentina, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, even though these regimes tend to keep them at arms' length and view them with considerable suspicion.

Although the general line of the pro-Moscow communist parties emphasizes the "peaceful road" to power, the violent overthrow of the more "reactionary" regimes in Latin America is also accepted as a necessity. At present this applies especially in the case of Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Guatemala, but the communists are also in opposition to the regimes in Brazil and Bolivia. The communist program for Chile in the event of the overthrow of the ruling military junta indicates that a successor leftist regime expects to move much further to the left than had been the case of the Popular Unity program.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nuestra Palabra as cited in Granma Weekly Review (13 April 1975).

<sup>2</sup> See Interview with Uruguayan Communist Party Secretary Rodney Arismendi in L'Unita (30 March 1975).

<sup>3</sup> El Nacional, Caracas (9 April 1975).

<sup>4</sup> New York Times (24 November 1974); El Dice, Mexico City (17 April 1975).

<sup>5</sup> See "Appeal of the Communist Party of Chile," Kommunist, No. 15, pp. 94-95 (October 1973).



The radical left, while highly fragmented, has been the source of much of the violence in Latin America. The various groups--MIR, Tupamaros, Montoneros, People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), etc.--have attempted to conduct both guerrilla warfare in the countryside and urban terrorism. Activities of this sort are to various degrees occurring in a large number of Latin American countries--i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela--with occasional uprisings and outbreaks of violence in other countries. Leftist terrorism has in turn given rise to terrorism from the right (Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala).

In his assessment of the "armed revolutionary struggle," Mercado points out that violence serves to discredit the government, polarize the political attitudes, disrupt governmental social-economic programs, force the governments to divert major resources from such programs to combat guerrillas, and force the central authorities to adopt repressive measures which are then exploited by the left to appeal to the people to overthrow the government. While the police and the military remain loyal to the central authorities, the terrorism and guerrilla activities of the radical left have little chance of actually succeeding in toppling the governments in power. Rather, these activities tend to increase the political role and influence of the armed forces which are called upon to combat the guerrillas and serve as a justification for military coups in the name of reestablishing law and order and saving the country from chaos.

Although the revolutionary warfare of the left has not succeeded in attracting large popular support, it has been very costly in political and economic terms to the government, and the police and military have not always been successful in suppressing it. Thus, while antiguerrilla campaigns have been fairly successful, as in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, they have not been able to crush such activities in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia or Guatemala.

In terms of its effects on government stability, violence by the left (Montoneros and ERP) and the right (AAA) extremists is currently having its

greatest impact in Argentina. The Argentine government was forced to proclaim an indefinite state of siege on 6 November 1974. However, neither this nor the assignment of an antiguerrilla role to the army has led to any decline in terrorism. At the same time, the greater role of the military in combating the guerrillas has increased the threat of a military coup although the armed forces remain profoundly divided, and various elements of the military fear a repetition of the fiasco of the earlier military rule. The Argentine problem has been further aggravated by the growing role in the government of Jose Lopez Rega, a close adviser of the President, who is widely disliked,<sup>1</sup> and by the new economic austerity program which has led to increasing tensions between the trade unions (normally one of the mainstays of the Peronist government) and the government of President Maria Estela Martinez de Peron. Given the extremely high rate of inflation (over 400 percent) and the marked deterioration of Argentina's economic situation, the trend toward political violence and instability is likely not only to continue but even to increase. While the armed forces remain divided, there is a strong possibility that conditions in Argentina may deteriorate to the point of civil war.

Violence by radicals also forced the Colombian government of President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen to impose a state of siege in June 1975 and, at the same time, to ask for the resignation of army Commander-in-Chief General Alvaro Valencia Tovor amidst rumors of a threatening military coup. In Mexico, guerrilla and terrorist activities, which led to the kidnapping of the President's father-in-law, appear to have had the effect of increasing President Echeverria's leftist leanings. The latter has expressed the hope that in the forthcoming presidential elections--July 1976--the candidate of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party will continue the "revolutionary" work of the present administration. It is possible, however, that public protest against terrorism may force Echeverria to choose a more conservative candidate to succeed him.

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<sup>1</sup> Jose Lopez Rega resigned in July 1975 and is now living in exile in Spain. The political and economic situations, however, have continued to deteriorate.

In general, despite the current swing to the right (as in Chile and Uruguay), leftist violence in Latin America has by no means run its course and is likely to continue to affect the region's political stability. Although the orthodox communist parties decry terrorism as a means of struggle, it is unlikely that any leftist regime can come to power without their support.



## VI INTER-LATIN AMERICAN CONFLICTS AND THE ARMS RACE

A variety of territorial disputes (for example, those between Chile and Peru, Venezuela and Colombia) as well as rivalries between individual countries (for example, between Argentina and Brazil) and between groupings of countries with different political leanings (for example, a group led by Brazil and including Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile, as against the "progressive" countries such as Peru and Ecuador) have tended to generate tensions and fuel the arms race. Argentina has accused Brazil of harboring "imperialist tendencies" in Bolivia and Paraguay.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, some countries, such as Venezuela, give evidence of an interest in increasing their role and influence in Central America and the Caribbean. Indeed, Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad-Tobago has warned of the threat of "re-colonization of the Caribbean" by a number of Latin American countries, especially Venezuela.<sup>2</sup> "The whole question of Spanish-Portuguese (i.e., Venezuela, Colombia vs. Brazil) rivalry in Latin America," said Williams, "is being revived today."

The arms competition, which has involved various nations in the purchase of sophisticated armaments abroad, and in some cases in the development of native arms industries (notably in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), is threatening the region's stability and providing possible opportunities for the Soviet Union to become a supplier of arms. To date, with the exception of Cuba, the Soviet Union has succeeded in selling tanks and helicopters to Peru, thereby raising fears of a possible attempt by Peru to capture northern territories in Chile. Concern has also been voiced about the acquisition by various Latin American countries of French Mirage aircraft and the tendency of a number of nations to engage in a race for the

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<sup>1</sup> Jornal de Brasil, Rio de Janeiro (17 December 1974).

<sup>2</sup> Miami Herald (16 April 1975).

acquisition of modern military planes.<sup>1</sup> Although eight Latin American countries (Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, and Panama) agreed in December 1974 to limit their acquisition of armaments and to halt the purchases of offensive weapons, the arms competition has by no means come to an end. Brazil, for instance, announced in March 1975 its intention to increase the size of its army as well as to further develop its arms industry and has been selling arms to Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Venezuela has announced long-range plans for the rearming of its military.<sup>3</sup> Both Argentina and Brazil appear interested in developing nuclear capabilities which may lead to the production of nuclear weapons.

The reestablishment of relations with Cuba by a number of Latin American countries has led to visits to Cuba on the part of military delegations to inspect Soviet armaments supplied to the Cuban armed forces. Visits to the Soviet Union by such delegations have also increased in recent years. Thus, if the arms competition in Latin America persists, the Soviet Union may, either directly or through Cuba, become a supplier of arms to countries other than Peru. Guyana may be an early candidate for such aid. Such arms sales would be very much in line with the Soviet contention that the "democratization" of Latin American armies requires their becoming independent of the United States as their source of arms and training. Commenting on this situation, the Ecuadorean journal Vistazo notes that "among the majority of weapons being bought" by Latin American countries, "the offensive ones predominate," and that:

The problem is made more complex by the fact that some countries are building up their arsenals to defend themselves from guerrilla groups which someone else is going

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see El Diario, La Paz (18 March 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Jornal de Brasil (30 March 1975); O Estado de Sao Paulo (26 April 1975).

<sup>3</sup> El Nacional, Caracas (16 December 1974).

to equip. In other nations, where strict dictatorships are in power, the arms are used to snuff out and suppress any citizen's protest. The scenes of Hungary and Czechoslovakia have been reenacted in the streets of Latin America: Russian tanks rolling in the streets to intimidate anyone who dares to disagree with the current tyrants.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "Latin America, the Next Vietnam?" Vistazo, Guayaquil, p. 17 (May 1975).



## VII THE "LEFTIST-REFORMIST" STATES

In South America, apart from Guyana, three states have at present regimes displaying leftist-reformist tendencies: Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. They also happen to be currently the three oil-producing states in that area.<sup>1</sup> None of these three regimes are Marxist, but they espouse to varying degrees socialist programs. For example, President Perez of Venezuela has declared that he favored socialism: "if by socialism you mean the control of the means of production by the state to place them at the service of the people."<sup>2</sup> All three regimes have carried out nationalization programs of U.S.-owned oil and other extractive industries. They seek to expand the state sector of the economy, to carry out land reforms, and to display what the communists would call "anti-imperialist" tendencies.

In other ways, however, they differ greatly from each other. Peru and Ecuador have military regimes, while Venezuela is a democracy. Of the three, only Peru has extensive relations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets participate in major development projects. So far, only Peru has purchased Soviet arms. Venezuela is by far the largest oil producer and a main beneficiary of high oil prices, while Ecuador, although a member of OPEC, has only a limited oil production capacity and a relatively small oil reserve. Peru is still largely in the oil prospecting stage, and actual oil discoveries to date do not indicate that Peru will become a major oil exporter. Of the three countries, Venezuela is in the strongest economic position as an exporter of oil as well as iron ore and is more industrialized than either of the other two. President Perez seeks to promote the development of a large petrochemical industry. By contrast, Ecuador, aside from its

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<sup>1</sup> Colombia, although producing some oil, has become an oil importer. Brazil is prospecting for oil and may become a significant producer although not in the near term. Mexico is also a significant oil producer.

<sup>2</sup> El Sol de Mexico (23 January 1975).

limited oil production, has essentially an agrarian economy, while Peru is primarily a copper exporter and thus suffers from the fluctuations of copper prices on the world market. All three nations suffer from rather high inflation rates (about 20 percent for Venezuela, 30 percent for Ecuador, and 16 to 18 percent for Peru), but much lower than in a number of other Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Chile. All three had a 6 to 8 percent increase in GDP in 1974.

Politically, each government faces a variety of problems. More specific details are given below.

A. Peru

In late August 1975 the military government of Major General Juan Velasco Alvarado was overthrown by the man predicted to be his successor, Francisco Morales Bermudez. Velasco's government had been in power since October 1968, enjoying the support of the Christian Democrats and of the Communist Party (PCP/S) which also controls the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP). The CGTP, however, has a rival in the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) which is controlled by the main opposition party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), whose leader, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, has been demanding free elections and criticizing the government for pursuing "false socialism."<sup>1</sup> There is also a government-supported Confederation of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP) which has sought to establish itself at the expense of other unions. The government is further supported by the Revolutionary Labor Movement (MLR) largely composed of fishery workers who are strongly anticommunist. To date, the government has not organized its own political party, nor has it come to a decision concerning the formation of a one-party state.

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<sup>1</sup> Ultima Noticias, Lima (11 December 1974).

The Velasco government faced opposition both from the extreme left, such as the pro-Chinese Communist Party (PCP/C), as well as from the APRA and conservative civilian as well as military elements. A serious recent crisis indicative of the changing tide of support for Velasco was the revolt, on 3 February 1975, of the paramilitary civil guard and police which struck for higher wages and better conditions. The government crushed them by military force, provoking civilian riots against the armed forces and the government. It was widely believed in Peru that the strike and riots represented an attempt to halt the leftward drift of the regime and to undermine the role of the radical officers within it. The government had earlier shown evidence of its sensitivity to criticism by closing a number of newspapers, arresting and deporting a group of lawyers, and passing censorship laws. A 30-day state of emergency was proclaimed following the riots; President Velasco blamed the instigation of the riots on the APRA and on agitators from the extreme right and left and indirectly on the CIA.

In the aftermath, the Velasco government attempted to broaden its popular support by authorizing the initiation of two movements: the "Regional Committee for Popular Coordination," to be made up of workers and farmers, and the "Movement of the Peruvian Revolution," to be made up of journalists. In principle, the government planned to gradually transfer decisionmaking powers to the Regional Committee for Popular Coordination.

Velasco's successor, Morales, is generally considered to be a moderate who is rumored to favor elections. His ascent to power seems to be favored by those who fear undue communist influence on the radical elements in the government, a fear which was expressed earlier by the editor of Eyepreso, Cronica, and La Prensa and in fact prompted the call for the foundation of the "Movement of the Peruvian Revolution." It is unlikely, however, that Morales, who helped to engineer Velasco's programs, will significantly alter the premises of Peruvian domestic and foreign policy.



Divisions among the military over the issues of the formation of a single-party system, free elections, and a radical versus a moderate course are likely to intensify with Velasco's replacement. A further turn to the left will probably increase Soviet involvement in Peru and the latter's need for Soviet assistance and communist support. Much will depend on the success or failure of the government's ambitious long-range development plan (Plan Inca), and whether inflation can be kept at a level which will not cause major discontent among the population. The combination of recession and inflation in the West is particularly harmful to Peru's economy. Although the government places great hopes on oil as a solution for its economic and, therefore, political problems, it is so far unclear how much actual benefit Peru will derive from its oil discovery. The ability of the Peruvian regime to attain its own peculiar non-Marxist, noncommunist form of socialism is very much in doubt.

B. Ecuador

The military regime which took power in February 1972 under the leadership of General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara has as its stated aim to "create a new society" in which all Ecuadoreans will enjoy an acceptable standard of living, justice and democracy.<sup>1</sup> In a test of his power in September 1975, Rodriguez crushed a revolt led by his Chief of Staff, General Raul Gonzalez Alvear. The Gonzalez faction represented rightist dissatisfaction over alleged mismanagement of oil production and revenue.

The discovery of oil is seen as the economic salvation of Ecuador, giving the country a favorable balance of trade and a growing foreign currency reserve. This has also been helped by higher prices for agricultural products in recent years.

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by Government Minister Rear Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano in El Universo (6 December 1974).

However, as a result of a landslide in February 1973, a break in the oil pipelines which was not repaired until May slowed down Ecuador's oil exports, and consequently a trade deficit is forecast for 1975. Ecuador is a hardliner on oil prices, asking \$2 per barrel above Venezuela's prices, and is one of the OPEC members calling for further oil price increases. As a result, demand for Ecuadorean oil has declined, but an agreement was reached to sell substantial amounts of oil to Peru and Chile.

The government's policy toward foreign oil companies has fluctuated between threats of nationalization and demands for higher royalties and taxes (especially under the former Minister of Natural Resources Jarrin Ampudia) and a desire for assistance in further exploration and development of resources. Furthermore, the United States has absorbed 35 percent of Ecuadorean export. In May 1975 the state petroleum corporation--CEPE--signed a \$150 million association agreement with the U.S. company Northwest Pipeline for exploration of natural gas in the Gulf of Guayaquil, presumably as a slap in the face of the multinational companies. In view of the current glut on the oil market, Ecuador has had to moderate its attitude somewhat vis-a-vis foreign corporations. The rather precarious position of Ecuador was pointed out by the critics of the government according to whom the latter, given the small volume of the country's oil production, would do better to speak softly and act more cautiously vis-a-vis the oil-consuming nations.<sup>1</sup> President Rodriguez was also criticized in the press in connection with his trip to Algiers to attend the OPEC meeting in 1975.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Ecuador has persisted in its dispute with the United States over its claims to jurisdiction over a 200-mile zone of coastal waters and the resulting "tuna war."

So far, Ecuador has not joined the Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UPEB) which was formed in Panama on 18 September 1974 and which includes

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<sup>1</sup> J. Veliz Litardo, "Commercial War," El Universo, Guayaquil (9 December 1974).

<sup>2</sup> Julio Pradox Vallejo, "Three Censurable Acts," El Tiempo, Quito (18 March 1975).

Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. However, a UN-sponsored meeting of UPEB took place in Quito in February 1975 to discuss the overproduction of bananas and their international marketing. The Soviet Union has given public support to the demands of the UPEB for higher banana prices and to its dispute with U.S. corporations regarding that question. As the world's largest exporter of bananas, Ecuador is likely to wield considerable influence in the UPEB if it decides to join it.

Despite its announced aim to enact sweeping reforms, the government has so far not succeeded in carrying out the expected major nationalization programs or any extensive land reforms. It has encountered opposition on the part of the large landowners and industrial interests, and resistance from conservative political parties.

The government has the support of the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCE), which is quite small; it also has the support of the communist-controlled Confederation of Ecuadorean Workers (CTE). However, the latter is surpassed by the noncommunist labor confederation, CEOSL. Even so, the communists do have some influence in the government and the Party's Secretary General, Pedro Saad, meets periodically with the President and is the government's "in house radical." The communist influence in the government has been denounced by the Conservative Party, which stated in April 1975 that "the sinister presence of communists at high government levels is obvious, with its advocates functioning as advisers, counselors, and friends of the administration," and which blamed them for the "disastrous measures that are so seriously affecting the economy."<sup>1</sup>

Opposition to the government also comes from the Radical Left: the pro-Chinese Communist Party (PCE/ML) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSRE), both of which are small but advocate the violent overthrow of the government. In addition to the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic

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<sup>1</sup> El Tiempo, Quito (30 April 1975).



Party (PDC) has been critical of the government for its failure to pay attention to social problems and to the agrarian sector and has accused it of not being "even reformist."<sup>1</sup>

Another group, the Democratic Left (ID), has called for an end to the "present dictatorship" and for more radical solutions to the country's problems.<sup>2</sup> An obvious source of general dissatisfaction is the high inflation rate with no indication in sight that it will soon decline.

The government has shown its sensitivity to the criticism by issuing warnings that it is prepared to deal with "subversion," and the President has asserted that he has no intention of turning over his power to "entrepreneurs of national dissolution."<sup>3</sup> When, despite the government's ban on all political activity, the Conservative Party held a secret national convention in May, which was attended by delegates from all parties except the communists, the government ordered the arrest of the party leader, Julio Cesar Trujillo, who is also the vice-rector of the Catholic University.

The Ecuadorean government has been more reluctant than Peru to enter into extensive relationships with the Soviet Union, but some movement in the direction of greater Ecuadorean-Soviet cooperation has nevertheless become apparent with the announcement in April 1975 of an agreement to establish a joint space observation station in Ecuador.<sup>4</sup>

The issue of Ecuador's claims to jurisdiction over fishing within 200 miles of its coast and the restrictions on trade with OPEC members in the U.S. Trade Bill are major irritants in U.S.-Ecuadorean relations. Although the Soviet Union does not endorse the claim to 200 miles of territorial

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by Oswaldo Hurtado, PDC Chairman of the 8th Party Congress, El Comercio, Quito (2 March 1975).

<sup>2</sup> El Tiempo, Quito (21 May 1975).

<sup>3</sup> El Comercio, Quito (11 April 1975).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. (18 April 1975).

water, it has generally supported Ecuador's dispute with the United States over tuna fishing, condemned the Trade Bill, and expressed strong approval of Ecuador's restrictions on foreign investments and actions to gain control of its oil resources and their exploitation. Moscow publicly describes the Ecuadorean regime as "progressive" and as struggling against U.S. "imperialism." Despite the support of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), the ruling junta is suspicious of the Soviet Union and reluctant to accept substantial Soviet credits or to become involved in trade with it. President Rodriguez Lara has indicated that he wishes to diversify his markets, particularly with Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Holland, Great Britain, China, and India. However, CEPE has signed association contracts for oil exploration not only with Argentina but also with Poland.

Despite political opposition, the military appears to be in firm control; they are not united on policy, however, with the navy in particular being more nationalistic and anti-U.S. than the other services. Aside from the opposition of various parties to military "dictatorship", the main issues revolve around the high rate of inflation, the failure of the government to pay sufficient attention to the rural sector and agriculture, and disagreements on how to use the oil money as well as over the country's policies in dealing with foreign oil companies and the speed with which reforms should be implemented. Ecuadorean officials have acknowledged that the "revolution" is in a period of transition, struggling against the "negative remnants of the old regime" and the "deficiencies generated by the revolutionary process."<sup>1</sup> The present trend, however, suggests that Ecuador may become somewhat more moderate rather than radical in its policies.

Soviet prospects in Ecuador appear limited. Short of a sharp decline in oil prices and a continued decrease in the demand for oil, Ecuador is unlikely to have to turn to the Soviet Union for major economic assistance although there may be increasing cooperation with other East European nations.

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<sup>1</sup> El Universo, Quito (6 December 1974).

While the government may welcome Soviet support of the Third World raw material producers and of OPEC, it is more likely to seek to align its policies with Venezuela and to look to the latter to form a common front against economic-political pressure from the United States.

C. Venezuela

The overwhelming electoral victory of the Democratic Action Party (AD) in December 1973 and the election of President Carlos Andres Perez have launched the country on a mildly socialist course which has expressed itself in the drive to nationalize the iron and oil industries and in the re-establishment of relations with Cuba.

Oil has been both a boon and a problem for Venezuela. The high prices of oil have helped give the country the highest per capita income in Latin America; this income, however, is badly distributed as it favors the upper and middle classes in the urban centers and does not benefit the rural population, which continues to live on the margin of subsistence. One consequence has been a massive flight of the population from the rural areas to the urban centers--about 78 percent of the total population is in or around cities--and the inability of the cities to absorb the influx and provide adequate housing and services. Furthermore, this migration has led to declining agricultural production and to unemployment (about one-third of the labor force). Government efforts to move people back to rural areas are resisted and have not been successful. The economy is also plagued by a high rate of inflation (20 percent projected for 1975) and a shortage of trained manpower to support an ambitious industrialization program. Nevertheless, Venezuela has maintained an 8 percent growth of real GNP in 1974; it has greatly increased its foreign currency reserve, and it has benefited from higher oil prices despite a decline in oil production.

The government is determined during 1975 to carry through its nationalization program of oil resources. Primary dispute over the law now before Congress revolves around Article 5 which provides for the participation of



private foreign oil companies in association with the government in the exploitation and refining of heavy crude. Dissatisfaction with the government's policies on the part of businessmen, in particular the Federated Chamber of Commerce (Fedecamaras), revolves around the price freeze which the government has instituted on "essential" goods, the government-ordered pay increases to labor, and the prohibition on firing workers without proper justification. These laws are likely to hurt the private business sector. At the same time, Venezuela's imports have continued to grow as the urbanized upper and middle classes seek in many ways to imitate the U.S. standard of living.

Perez and his government assert that "this is the last chance for democracy," i.e., that if Venezuela fails to solve its urgent problems, it may once again find itself under authoritarian rule. For the present, President Perez is in a strong position, controlling a majority in the Congress, while the main opposition party, the Christian Democrats (COPEI), appears to lack issues around which to rally public opinion. The leftist parties are also in the opposition. The Communist Party is small and received only 1.10 percent of the popular vote in 1973. The more radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) is even smaller and received less than one percent of the vote. More significant is the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) which resulted from a split in the Communist Party in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the December 1973 elections, MAS received 5.20 percent of the vote, thus making it the Third Party in terms of votes and congressional seats. Two radical leftist groups, the FALN and Bandera Roja, have been engaged in guerrilla warfare against the government but with no success.

On the whole, the Perez government's reformist and nationalistic policies have succeeded in shutting out the extreme left and the communists. The COPEI has also fared badly, while MAS, by stressing inflation, unemployment, and other social issues, appears to be gaining, although it has a long way to go before it becomes the main opposition party. The efforts

of other left groups, such as MIR and the communists, to organize a United Front of the left have not as yet borne fruit.<sup>1</sup>

Under President Perez, Venezuela appears to seek an active and possibly leading role in Latin America as well as in OPEC and in the confrontation between industrial raw material consumers and Third World raw material producers. Together with Mexico, Venezuela is sponsoring SELA as an exclusively Latin American economic organization which would strengthen the region's ability to deal with the United States and Western Europe. Venezuela is also promoting various regional integration projects and joint ventures; it is providing price support for the Central American coffee producing countries and apparently seeks to expand its influence into the Caribbean. A certain degree of tension also exists between Venezuela and Colombia as well as Guyana over disputed territorial questions.<sup>2</sup> Periodic rumors of possible armed clashes have remained just that, but Venezuela's rearmament program is likely to make its two neighbors, as well as Trinidad-Tobago, uneasy. Finally, Venezuela has been one of the sponsors for the lifting of the OAS embargo on trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Although the Communist Party has no influence in the government, at least one minister, Gumers Rodriguez, Minister of Planning, is a "former" Marxist and is believed to be largely responsible for the leftist economic policies of the Perez administration. The Soviet Union itself has little influence in Venezuela. Soviet representatives have long urged Venezuela to look to the Soviet Union as a source of oil technology and had called for the development of trade between the two countries, which at present is insignificant. Cuba is interested in obtaining Venezuelan oil, possibly by means of a triangular trade scheme involving the Soviet Union, in view of Cuba's inability to pay for the oil in hard currency and the fact that it would have to pay more for Venezuelan than for Soviet oil.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> El Nacional, Caracas (9 April 1975).

<sup>2</sup> See joint Declaration of the Colombian and Venezuelan Communist Parties, Radio Havana, 3 May 1975.

<sup>3</sup> El Comercio, Quito (25 February 1975).

While Venezuela generally appears united on the issue of nationalization of its resources, including oil, and probably also of its major utilities, there is less unity, even in the AD party, over the leftist leanings of the present administration. Nevertheless, the Perez government does not appear to face any serious internal political threats, although failure to reduce the inflation rate could cause significant popular dissatisfaction and slow the development programs.

In its foreign political and economic relations, Venezuela is likely to pose some serious problems for the United States. Whether SELA will become a reality remains to be seen, but if it does, with Cuba as one of its members, it is likely to lead to a series of economic confrontations with the United States. The same can be said of Venezuela's position in OPEC and of the oil price question, and also of its support of the formation of other producer cartels. The Soviet Union will no doubt voice its approval of President Perez's "anti-imperialist" policies, but so far at least, Venezuela has not been described by Moscow as a "progressive" country.



## VIII SOME PROSPECTS

During the coming decade, Latin America appears likely to offer the Soviet Union new opportunities of increasing its political, economic, and possibly even its military presence and influence in that region. Such a development need not be a direct result of the growth of the communist movement on the continent; indeed, the Latin American communist parties may not gain appreciably in size and importance. Rather, Soviet influence may be a byproduct of the continuing wave of political and economic nationalism sweeping not only Latin America but the entire Third World, which is further fueled by what it senses to be the weakening of U.S. and Western influence. Latin America--or most of it--will probably join the general demands of the Third World for a new international economic order. Soviet opportunities will also arise from Latin America's search for shortcuts to rapid modernization and industrialization, and from the resulting political and social breakdown of traditional values, class relations, institutions and systems. Such conditions unavoidably lead to the growth of the state economic sector and to reforms being instituted from above, more often than not by authoritarian regimes promoting their own brand of "revolution" and "socialism." It is this mood which apparently has led President Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica to predict that Latin America will be dominated by socialist systems by the end of the century.<sup>1</sup>

With the increasing tendency of Latin American countries to pursue independent foreign policies, and with their identification, at least in the short run, with the Third World as against the advanced industrial nations, future Soviet-Latin American relations may be relatively immune to any adverse development in the U.S.-Soviet detente, even while the expansion of these detente relations weakens internal political opposition in the countries of the region to closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.

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<sup>1</sup> Miami Herald (31 January 1975).

It is quite apparent that in developing relations with the Soviet Union, the Latin American countries are motivated primarily by economic considerations rather than by any sense of ideological affinity with or liking for Moscow. Indeed, regardless of their type of regime, the countries tend to see in the Soviet Union and the other communist countries a market for their goods and a source of credits and technology which pose less of a threat to control of their own resources. To a lesser extent, they see the communist bloc as a counterweight to the United States which, as the Cuban case has demonstrated, may protect them from direct U.S. intervention and indirect economic-political pressure.

Although none of the recent Latin American experiences with leftist regimes (as for example, Cuba, Chile, and Peru) have been particularly successful, the leftist tendencies displayed by a number of authoritarian as well as democratic governments in that region are likely to persist in one form or another. Indeed it is possible that some countries may see the rise of more pronounced left coalition governments; such may be the case in Mexico or Argentina, or it may result from the collapse of rightist military regimes in such countries as Bolivia, Chile or Uruguay. The emergence of such regimes in some key countries could pose serious problems for the United States while offering the Soviet Union opportunities to develop strong relationships with these countries.

Naturally, developments in Latin America will be influenced far less by the actions of the Soviet Union than by those of the United States and by world economic conditions in general. Whether the United States succeeds or fails in developing a reasonably stable economic modus vivendi with Latin America will be particularly important; much will depend in the next decade on the duration of the present economic recession in the industrially developed countries and whether another and possibly even more severe economic crisis will occur in that period. It is also likely that the successes or failures of leftist regimes in Western Europe, such as in Portugal, will have some influence on political perceptions and programs of some of the regimes in Latin America. Finally, although Moscow is

encouraging the unity of Latin American countries in their opposition to U.S. economic and political domination, in terms of direct influence, it is more likely to benefit from a division of the continent along political-ideological lines which may encourage the more anti-U.S. "progressive" countries to look to the Soviet Union for economic, political, and military assistance. The possibility that the Soviet Union may, as a result of an ongoing arms competition, become a supplier of arms to a number of nations in the region may have a particularly adverse impact on the stability of Latin America and may provide Moscow with a sought after opportunity to gain some influence in the armed forces.

Soviet exploitation of opportunities perceived in Latin America, however, is likely to be constrained by a number of factors. While Moscow has shown evidence of being willing to provide substantial economic assistance to other countries in the region where it sees the possibility of a significant political payoff, despite the drain on its resources due to its need to support Cuba, the Soviet Union is not in a position to replace the United States and the West as a market and source of investments in the case of the larger and more developed Latin American nations. At the same time, these countries still view the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as more desirable sources of investment and of advanced technology. Cuba to date has not proved an appealing model for the Latin American countries, most of which are well aware that Cuba has had to pay for Soviet assistance with growing political and economic integration into the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, Latin America is suspicious of Soviet intentions and fearful of coming under Soviet domination. If the communist parties today do not appear as threatening as the more radical revolutionary movements, their persistent loyalty to Moscow makes them suspect in Latin American eyes as agents of a great foreign power which has repeatedly shown callousness in its treatment of smaller and weaker states. The current cry of "Latin America for Latin Americans," while motivated in large measure by anti-U.S. attitudes, also means that the area wants to keep the Soviet Union at arms' length.



Moscow is not unaware of the obstacles it faces in Latin America. However, its near-term objective is not to acquire new communist satellites in the area. Rather it is to encourage a process there which leads to the erosion of U.S. positions, influence, and interests and consequently, as the Soviets see it, to contribute to the weakening and isolation of the United States and to the shifting of the "correlation of world forces" in favor of the Soviet Union. Seen in this light, Moscow's prognosis for Latin America is optimistic. According to a Soviet analysis:

The struggle on the continent of Latin America is not dying down. Opportunities exist for a broad counter-offensive by the democratic forces. This will have consequences not only for North America, Australia and Oceania, but also for all the rest of the world.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ernst Genri, "The Continents are Moving Toward the Left," Literaturnaia Gazeta (6 November 1974).

SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD:  
PERU, VENEZUELA, ECUADOR

William E. Ratliff

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Soviets will have good prospects for increasing their influence in Latin America over the next five years, but not chiefly because of the strength of indigenous communist parties or as the result of Soviet interference in domestic affairs. These will play a role, but the crucial factors are the international correlation of forces and the growing Latin American movement for independence from the United States. The Soviets did not create Latin American nationalism, but they will use it to erode the traditional dominant U.S. position in Latin America.

Currently the Soviets concentrate on the transformation rather than the overthrow of existing governments. In more developed countries they are likely to accelerate the process, while in the less developed nations they will probably move more slowly, recognizing that they cannot assume primary responsibility for impoverished countries in an area that is still, to some degree, a U.S. sphere of influence. Specifics of the Soviet program must be surmised through individual analysis of each country.

### Ecuador

Extreme poverty and an ineffective communist party make it unlikely that Soviet strategists would anticipate or want a communist takeover in Ecuador in the near future. The anticipated recognition of Cuba by the Ecuadorean government will open the country to greater Soviet influence; this may provoke an anticommunist reaction in the armed forces. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba will praise any actions by the Ecuadorean military aimed at increasing the nation's independence vis-a-vis the United States.

## Peru

The situation in Peru is more complex than in Ecuador. Former President Juan Velasco Alvarado avoided excessive commitment to either the communist or capitalist powers, but it is unlikely that his successor, President Francisco Morales Bermudez, can continue this indefinitely. If recent trends continue--extension of state control and socialist management, experiments with "social property" and worker-participation, repression of dissidents--then Peruvian leaders may increasingly find their inspiration and examples in the communist world.

## Venezuela

Venezuela is more sophisticated politically than either Ecuador or Peru. Although the Soviet Union would like to draw Venezuela under its aegis, it is unlikely to do so in the next few years, despite the widespread criticism of the United States in the country. But the Soviets can attain lesser advantages: greater Venezuelan alienation from the United States and the possible disruption of markets, and/or the creation of a more hostile center of anti-American agitation with easy access to the Caribbean, Central and parts of South America. President Carlos Andres Perez seems to realize that his country can gain more from the United States than from the entire Soviet bloc, but some of the opposition may think that a "true independence" is worth the sacrifice of American advantages. The Soviet Union will capitalize on these tendencies.

## I BACKGROUND ON SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

For more than four decades after the October 1917 revolution in Russia, Soviet leaders displayed only sporadic interest in Latin America. Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959 was one of the major factors involved in increasing Soviet interest over the past decade and a half. The Cuban success seemed to disprove the law of "geographic fatalism" and showed that a national revolutionary struggle could be successful in the very shadow of "United States imperialism." Soviet leaders were further encouraged by the electoral victory of Janio Quadros in Brazil (1960) and by what they regarded as a rapidly increasing anti-Americanism in the area.

Throughout the 1959-75 period, Soviet doctrinal pronouncements asserted that no single road to national liberation could be advanced for all countries in Latin America. Soviet spokesmen (and Latin American communist leaders) repeatedly stated that local communists were free to carry out armed or nonarmed ("peaceful") struggle, or a combination of the two, as deemed appropriate according to national conditions. In general the Soviet Union envisaged the nonarmed road to power in Latin America, emphasizing the need to increase party influence among organized workers and to create broad national fronts. Any sharp juxtaposition of this nonarmed road and an armed Sino-Cuban way, however, obscures an important degree of flexibility in Soviet policy. During the 1959-75 period the Soviet Union clearly acknowledged the need for armed struggle in Latin America under some circumstances. This acknowledgment, in some countries a calculated response to the apparently more revolutionary proposals of the Cubans and the Chinese, was stated most openly in the mid-1960s.

After an immediate and hostile Latin American reaction to statements by a Soviet leader at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in



Havana, the Soviet Union began to actively cultivate conventional relations with most countries in the area, playing down armed struggle in most cases. At the 34th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1971, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said that "great changes" were taking place in a number of Latin American countries, referring in particular to Bolivia (under General Juan Jose Torres, overthrown in August 1971), Chile (under President Salvador Allende, overthrown in September 1973), and Peru (under General Juan Velasco Alvarado (overthrown in August 1975)).<sup>1</sup> On 5 December 1973, Izvestiia produced a theoretical justification for closer relations with Latin American military governments of a "new type" (such as those then and now existing in Peru, Ecuador, and Panama) which were, in the Soviet view, attempting to eliminate imperialism's "degrading domination and effect profound socio-economic transformations." The article noted that the "ruling circles in many Latin American countries [were] demanding a fundamental reexamination of economic and political relations" with the United States.

A wide variety of factors and considerations will contribute to the formation of and prospects for Soviet policy in Latin America over the next 5 to 10 years. They are often complementary, but sometimes contradictory, and sometimes within, but often in part or entirely beyond, the scope of Soviet control. A brief review of these factors will put general Soviet policy into perspective and lay the groundwork for the subsequent discussions of conditions and opportunities in Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

These factors include:

- Long-term objectives, such as the establishment of world socialism and the defeat of "U.S. imperialism;"
- Medium and short-term interests, such as greater international prestige (within and outside of the communist

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<sup>1</sup> World Marxist Review Information Bulletin, No. 7-8 (1971)

world), an enhanced position among Third World countries, and the need for new energy resources;

- The general international setting, within both the communist and noncommunist worlds, including the state of the Sino-Soviet dispute and detente;
- The domestic and international policies of Latin American nations in general and Peru, Venezuela, and Ecuador in particular; and
- The Soviet evaluation of Latin American conditions and politics during recent years, augmented by "lessons" learned in other parts of the world, such as the development of communist-military relations now in Portugal.

The fourth point requires brief elaboration. The conditions in Latin America which most affect the growth of Soviet influence in the area are as follows:

- Rising nationalism and the drive for political and economic independence, particularly from the United States, by countries individually and in cooperation with each other, the latter manifested in the downgrading of the OAS and the formation of such regional groupings as the Andean Pact and the proposed Latin American Economic System (SELA);
- Increasing criticism of the United States, based on real and imagined events of past and present, the result of such factors as frustration with the gigantic problems existing in Latin American countries, political demagoguery, communist originated and/or encouraged anti-American propaganda, and ignorance;
- A widely accepted Marxist outlook on such subjects as underdevelopment and imperialism;
- Recognition of and contacts with the communist world, in particular the increasing acceptance of Cuba by Latin American governments and the latter's willingness to have relations with Soviet-bloc countries; and
- The level of political development in individual countries--the extent of "class struggle"; the strength of leftist thought and groups; and the freedom of operation accorded to leftists, especially Marxist-Leninists,

in political parties, universities, unions, the army, the church, and other influential positions.

The basic Soviet objective in Latin America over the next 5 to 10 years will be the weakening and, ideally, the elimination of the U.S. role and influence in the area. To the extent that this objective is achieved, the international position of the United States will be diminished vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the latter (ideally) will have increased influence in and access to Latin America and its products.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Soviet Union can be expected to seek improved relations with any receptive government, whatever its ideological orientation. Relations have already been established and maintained with such contrasting governments as those in Cuba, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil; the ferocity of the Soviet campaign against Chile has its own unique antecedents.

In particular, the Soviet Union will promote what Soviet leaders regard as nationalistic and "progressive" governments, whether military or civilian, these characteristics being determined in large part by the degree of independence the regime seeks and achieves from the U.S. government and private investors. Soviet leaders expect most changes in the next few years to occur through transformation, not immediate overthrow, of the existing order. Their own policies will be directed toward radicalizing Latin American politics, raising the level of anti-Americanism, encouraging the nationalization of U.S. interests, and denying the productive potential of private investment, in the process eliminating U.S. control over and access to markets, raw materials, energy resources, allies, and strategic advantages. In pursuit of their anti-American policy, the publications, spokesmen, and sympathizers of the Soviet Union will report (and invariably exaggerate) anti-American actions of governments, organizations, or individuals in Latin America; will praise national and regional criticism of the United States (on such issues as the 1974 trade bill and the Panama Canal Zone); and will stress and distort real or alleged U.S. interference in Latin American affairs by such organizations as the Peace Corps, the CIA, or ITT.



## II PERU

In late August 1975 the leftist military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado was overthrown by the man predicted to be his successor, Francisco Morales Bermudez. Velasco's leftist military government had been in power in Peru since the coup of 1968 which overthrew the popularly elected but no longer popular government of president Fernando Belaunde Terry. It is unlikely that Morales, who helped engineer Velasco's programs, will significantly alter the basic premises of Peruvian domestic and foreign policy. The government's long-term program to transform Peruvian society (the so-called "Plan Inca") envisages a political and economic system which is neither capitalist nor communist. Spokesmen for the regime, which has appointed itself the "guide" in the revolutionary process, have often identified the fundamental features of its concept of development: the compatibility of economic growth and the accumulation of capital with social change and increasingly dynamic popular participation in the revolutionary process.<sup>1</sup>

The government's philosophy was explained in a document released several weeks after the February 1975 riots in Lima.<sup>2</sup> Official policies were said to be inspired by "revolutionary humanism" and grounded in Christian, libertarian, and Socialist thought. The document stated that a truly participatory political system could not be achieved by "institutionalizing the revolution in the form of a party," and continued with a recognition of the right of all Peruvians to disagree with and criticize the government and an assertion of the "legitimacy of the existence of groups and parties which offer different political alternatives."

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<sup>1</sup> Proceso, Lima (December 1974); also see Andean Times (2 August 1974)

<sup>2</sup> "The Ideological Bases of the Peruvian Revolution," issued in Lima on 26 February 1975

As of mid-1975 this political line had resulted in:

- Greatly increased state control over facilities previously owned by Peruvian and/or foreign nationals, chiefly in the areas of industry and resource production;
- Centralization of power in the hands of the state, accomplished by the elimination of other sectors of power or influence, ranging from the once privately owned coastal sugar estates (now cooperatives) through the once-free press (progressively eliminated during 1974 and early 1975) to the institution of the formerly democratic political system (with its parties, legislature, courts, etc.);
- Efforts to establish "social property," which is distinct from that owned by private individuals or the state.

Social mobilization programs have brought a minority of the large Indian population into the mainstream of national life and have set into motion a variety of plans intended to assure popular participation in and influence on industry, the press, and other elements of society.

On the whole, government programs have neither materially benefited the majority of the population nor developed a mass base in support of national policies. The disillusionment of many of the government's sympathizers was increased by such policies as the elimination of the opposition press. The lack of popular support was strikingly evident early in February 1975 after a strike by Peruvian policemen led to rioting in Lima and decisive suppression by the army. (According to official figures, 86 people were killed, over 100 wounded, and 1,000 arrested.) The Paris paper Le Monde reported on 8 February that no sector of the civilian population demonstrated in favor of Velasco's government except the communist-controlled General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP).

Government officials have warned that the next few years are likely to be difficult ones for the Peruvian people. As 1975 began,

the economy was plagued by a variety of problems: food shortages, pricing, lack of private investment, and skyrocketing foreign debts. In April the country was "saved" (and not for the first time) by an international agency when the World Bank announced that it would provide U.S. \$3,500 million for development projects between 1975 and 1977, during which period oil and copper production are expected to double and resolve many of Peru's financial problems. Much depends on an increase in oil and copper production, however, and as the Wall Street Journal reported on 14 July, oil exploration has not gone well in recent months. Contradictions between central planning and popular management persist.

The events of February constituted the most serious crisis yet faced by the government, pointing up more clearly than ever before some of the existing and potential problems faced by the military leaders. If the revolutionary process in Peru is to remain as relatively nonviolent as it was prior to February, the government is going to need a broader and more active base of support than it had in the past. For most of the 1968-75 period nonmilitary support came from some Christian Democrats, a branch of the splintered Popular Action Party (which was overthrown in the 1968 coup), the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCP), and scattered leftist parties, organizations and individuals. To broaden this support, the government must either significantly improve the standards of living of the Peruvian people (which it has not done in the past and does not expect to do in the next two years) or give the people enough sense of participation to make them willing to wait several years for the material rewards. In the absence of such measures, popular discontent will certainly increase, and increasingly authoritarian and repressive measures will be inevitable.

The government has several obvious choices for the forthcoming period, each with several variations: an appeal to a broader spectrum of society by an opening to the "right," particularly to the Aprista party; a more successful program of mobilization to attract the populace; or an increasing level of reliance on cooperation with the Marxist and



Marxist-Leninist left, including the pro-Soviet Communist Party. Complicating matters is the existence of differing and sometimes conflicting tendencies within the military itself.

The next six months should give some indication of the direction the Peruvian government will try to take in the next few years. Former President Velasco, whose poor health on several occasions briefly removed him from the limelight, proved to be a flexible, durable and never quite predictable leader. His successor, General Francisco Morales Bermudez, is a moderate when compared with radicals like General Jorge Fernandez Maldonado (minister of energy and mines) or conservatives like General Pedro Richter Poggi Moran (labor minister). Competition between the conservative, moderate, and radical members of the military was effectively minimized by President Velasco; it is not clear that his successor will be similarly successful. As conflicts between segments of Peruvian society become more intense in the difficult years ahead, tensions within the military will increase correspondingly. At present it is impossible to determine which tendency within the military will emerge victorious, though it should be added that the radicals command troops while the conservatives do not. Today there are indications that both the radicals and conservatives are on the move.

Conservatives (and perhaps moderates) in the military seem to favor an opening to APRA, the nation's oldest and most important revolutionary party, still led by its 80-year-old founder, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre. Such a move is discouraged by the longstanding antipathy between the Apristas and the military and by charges from top government officials that APRA was involved in the "counterrevolutionary plot" which precipitated the February strike and confrontation in Lima. At the same time, APRA has a wide following in the labor sector (particularly the Confederation of Peruvian Workers; CTP) and other classes and has long advocated substantial revolutionary changes in Peru. (Indeed, APRA programs have strongly influenced other Peruvian political parties and even the policies of the Velasco government.) An understanding with APRA would give

the government broader support in the country as a whole, but would alienate many of the military's present supporters and almost certainly activate the government's now generally nonviolent critics on the Marxist-Leninist left.

President Velasco and other military leaders would rather increase support for their programs without turning to APRA or the Marxist-Leninist left, though up to the present they have been unable to do this, as shown by the general ineffectiveness of the government-sponsored agency for promoting popular participation in the revolution (SINAMOS) and the Central Organization of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (CTRP). When several groups supporting the government responded to the February riots by forming the "Regional Co-ordinating Committee of Popular Organization," President Velasco warned supporters of the revolution to "remember that political leadership of the process rests solely with the government." In reaction to the regional committees, government advisors formed the Movement of the Peruvian Revolution (MRP), though continued lack of response to government-formed organizations suggests that the military will not soon gain a mass base by going it alone.

The position of the radicals within the government basically rests on the military go-it-alone line, the distinguishing feature being a determination to push rapidly ahead with mass-oriented organizations and activities, in the belief that such a program will eventually provide a popular foundation for the regime. Experiments along this line have not been successful thus far, however, as mentioned above, though the radicals attribute the failure to half-hearted efforts of implementation. This line is unlikely to succeed if pushed in competition with both the communists and the Apristas, and to the extent that it did work, it would increase the probability of substantive opposition from a variety of sources, some from within the military itself. If the government were to cooperate more closely with the communists--a tactic resisted by a considerable number within the government today--the popular following would be augmented, while the intensity of resistance from the Apristas and some others would increase markedly.

The Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) is one of several important vehicles for Soviet influence in Peru. According to U.S. State Department estimates, the PCP had some 2,000 members in 1974. Members come mainly from the ranks of workers, with substantial numbers of students and professionals. At its Sixth Congress in November 1973, the PCP reported that the average age of party members was 34 years, indicating an important degree of support from Peruvian youth. The party split in 1964 into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, the former exercising considerable influence among workers through the CGTP and increasing influence on peasants as well, with the latter playing a dominant role in university politics. After early criticism of the coup led by General Velasco, the PCP "discovered" that the policies of the military leaders were usually just what they would expect from a "popular government." Consequently, beginning in 1969 the pro-Soviet communists began to support actively the "anti-imperialistic and anti-oligarchic revolution" launched by the Velasco regime. Wide-ranging PCP support for the military government (though not for SINAMOS or the CTRP) was restated at the 1973 Congress and continued into 1975. The communists do not recognize the government distinction between socially owned and state property, however, insisting that state property is simply the "most perfect" form of social property.

According to PCP secretary general Jorge del Prado (and Soviet commentators), the events of early February marked a new phase of the revolutionary process, prompting the party to further develop and restate its positions. The strike and riots were labeled a "counter-revolutionary escalation, carefully prepared and executed by domestic reaction and imperialism," showing beyond any doubt that "the only language counter-revolution understands is the language of force and violence."<sup>1</sup> Del Prado added that the events showed clearly that the most significant weakness of the revolution was its lack of effective popular support and mass

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<sup>1</sup> Unidad (7 February 1975).



participation.<sup>1</sup> An article in Unidad<sup>2</sup> urged the government-sponsored MRP to avoid becoming isolated from other revolutionary organizations. (The communists favor a united front of organizations, thus allowing them to exercise influence while maintaining their own independent structure and organization.) Speaking to the PCP Central Committee in mid-March, del Prado warned against the influence of counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries in the government and called for a deepening and intensification of the revolutionary struggle, chiefly through mobilization of the masses behind government policies.<sup>3</sup> Over the years, the PCP has placed members and sympathizers in a number of Peruvian organizations and institutions, including the military, though without anything like the success of the Communist Party in Portugal.

The Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet PCP are challenged in their policies generally, and in their support for the Velasco government specifically, by a variety of other Marxist-Leninist parties, including the pro-Chinese PCP (most importantly the Patria Roja faction), the castroite Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and National Liberation Army (ELN), the Maoist-castroite Revolutionary Vanguard (VR), and the Trotskyist Revolutionary Left Front (FIR). These groups regard the Velasco regime as something between inadequate and hopeless; elements within them might well consider armed resistance if the government made a serious opening to the Apristas. If they were to turn to armed struggle, it is probable that already established contacts with the Junta of Revolutionary Coordination (JCR) would be expanded.<sup>4</sup> At present the VR is active, with other ultraleftist groups, among the peasants, operating through the outlawed Peasant Federation of Peru (CCP) and its affiliated organizations. The

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. (20 February 1975); also quoted in Pravda (8 March 1975)

<sup>2</sup> Unidad (27 February 1975)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. (20 March 1975)

<sup>4</sup> The JCR, formed in early 1974, includes the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (MLN, the Tupamaros), the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN).

Maoists lead student bodies at most major universities and, together with the Trotskyist FIR, have a strong position among teachers. The 1975 congress of the Single Union of Education Workers of Peru (SUTEP), which claims to represent 80 percent of Peruvian teachers, voiced strong opposition to the Velasco government and generally aligned itself with Maoist positions.

Soviet influence in Peru is only in part channeled through the local communist party. In recent years, particularly since the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile in September 1973, Peru has hosted meetings of several Soviet-sponsored international front organizations and provided a base of operations for others. The following are representative: (1) the Permanent Congress of the Union of Latin American Workers (CPUSTAL), the unofficial Latin American arm of the Soviet Front World Federation of Trade Unions, is based in Lima; (2) the Soviet-front World Peace Council held a preparatory meeting for its 1973 congress in Lima; and (3) the Soviet-front International Organization of Journalists set up the Information Center for Latin America (CIPAL) in Lima. The PCP said of the latter that its purposes are to coordinate trade union activities of Latin American journalists, publicize the "progress made by the Peruvian revolution," and develop "support for journalists persecuted by anti-popular governments in Latin America."<sup>1</sup> In general the meetings and organizations in Peru extend Soviet and pro-Soviet contacts with Peruvians while also promoting broader Soviet objectives in Latin America, particularly (at the present time) the campaign against the governments of Chile and the United States.

Finally, the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries have direct contacts with the Peruvian government. Soviet relations with the Velasco regime are encouraged by the general policies of the military leaders and by other more specific factors. The Peruvian military has been unfriendly toward the United States since before the coup because of what

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<sup>1</sup> Unidad (30 April 1974)

it regards as discriminatory U.S. policy toward Peru in the 1960s. Further, U.S. congressional restrictions on aid to Peru, on top of the Peruvian interest in broadening its ties with the socialist world, resulted in the acquisition of an assortment of Soviet bloc infantry weapons, medium-heavy tanks, helicopters, and military and other advisors. (COMECON arms specialist Professor Jaroslav Venek is reportedly among the advisors to Velasco.) Peru is the chief recipient of communist economic and technological aid in Latin America (aside from Cuba), most of which thus far has come from Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia). According to informed sources, the Peruvian intelligence service (PIP) receives some aid from Soviet intelligence. Peru's last independent journal (Caretas) was closed down in March 1975 just after it had published long articles on the Aprista party and "The KGB: Big MAMA of Espionage."

Not all has gone smoothly in Soviet-Peruvian relations, however. The Peruvian government leaders continue to insist that their revolution does not follow any foreign model. President Velasco has been critical of the Soviet position on off-shore fishing limits and, in early 1974, told a reporter of the Nvosti Press Agency that he saw little difference between U.S. and Soviet behavior in the Third World. The USSR has not provided the level of assistance originally expected for construction of the Paita fishing port project (nor for the Olmos hydroelectric undertaking), possibly because the Peruvian government may have been reluctant to give the Soviet Union authorization to use the new facilities as a submarine base. Finally, though the Peruvian government has allowed itself to become dependent upon the Soviet Union to some extent, the military leaders undoubtedly realize that Soviet aid and assistance, often of inferior quality, can increase or cease altogether with the blowing of unpredictable political winds. Finally, the Allende experience in Chile suggests that the Soviet Union is not yet willing and/or able to develop a satellite (with all that that implies) on the South American continent.



At present the Soviet Union seeks to push the Peruvian revolution toward the left without precipitating a rightist coup. Whereas Soviet leaders (quite unrealistically) considered Chile a model for Latin America in the early 1970s, Peru has become a much more reasonable model for the mid-1970s. The activities of the "progressive" military leaders in Peru provide "lessons" for other military officials around the continent while the Peruvian openness toward Soviet and pro-Soviet (including Cuban) organizations makes the country an ideal launching ground for Soviet activities in other parts of South America.

### III ECUADOR

With typical instability, Ecuador in the past decade has moved from military to civilian to military leadership. When he seized power in February 1972, General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara did not even have to dissolve the legislature--President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra (elected in 1968) had done that during 1970 in the course of assuming dictatorial powers for himself. In September 1975, Rodriguez crushed a coup attempt led by his chief of staff, General Raul Gonzalez Alvear. The Gonzalez faction represented rightist dissatisfaction over alleged mismanagement of oil production and revenue.

Ever since the military resumed power in 1972, observers have been trying to decide whether it is following a Peruvian or a Brazilian road. The answer would seem to be neither, though some of its policies have drawn praise from the local communist party and the socialist world. The Rodriguez government has at times adopted assertively nationalistic positions in international affairs--in the recurrent skirmishes of the "tuna war" with the United States (over the 200-mile offshore territorial limit) and as a member (since 1973) of OPEC. The 1974 U.S. trade bill, which denied preference for Ecuadorean manufactured goods in the United States because of Ecuador's membership in OPEC, resulted in new bilateral tensions early in 1975. The regime has been less aggressive in agrarian reform, fiscal matters, foreign investments, and most other domestic matters. The outgoing international stance is what gives the government moderate "revolutionary" credentials with the socialist world; at the same time, it distracts attention from some of the problems at home.

Ecuador's future does not seem quite as dismal today as it did in 1967 when a prominent Latin American historian wrote: "Only a hardy prophet would dare to project the future of a country so chaotic, so

unmanaged and unmanageable, so economically indefensible, so poor and hungry as little Ecuador."<sup>1</sup> Oil and industrialization may help to make the future a little more secure, though this still remains to be seen.

Exports in 1974 increased by 100 percent over 1973, and by 300 percent over 1972, due to gains in all major export products, but particularly petroleum. In the first four months of 1975, however, exports were down in all categories (except bananas, of which Ecuador is the world's leading exporter); petroleum was off 52 percent from the same period last year. High production costs for Ecuadorean oil made sales difficult and by mid-1975 led to a production decline, a budget imbalance, and falling foreign reserves. One price cut came in July and others may follow, despite OPEC restrictions on independent pricing. Inflation is running at about 30 percent in the cities, unemployment is increasing, and agriculture is not producing well. On the more optimistic side is the oil potential and the economic promise implicit in programs of industrialization already under way. As one of the two most underdeveloped countries in the Andean Pact (the other is Bolivia), and thus eligible for special tariff concessions, Ecuador may become a favorite for foreign investors. Early in 1975, Ecuador received loans from three Middle Eastern countries valued at nearly U.S. \$1,300 million.

In recent months, Ecuador's traditional political parties (except for the communists) have been calling for elections, and the Quito Chamber of Commerce has charged that "Marxist elements have cleverly infiltrated the government."<sup>2</sup> The government has responded that it does not intend to rule forever, but that it will not turn the country back to the same politicians responsible for previous inefficiency and corruption.

The Communist Party (PCE) is the only party which has not called for elections to replace the military government. It is a small

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<sup>1</sup> H. Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 588 (1968 edition)

<sup>2</sup> Latin American Report (June 1975)



organization (with about 500 members, according to recent State Department estimates) with little or no impact on most sectors of society, the main exception being the proletariat. In a country where less than 10 percent of the work force is unionized, the PCE controls the Confederation of Ecuadorean Workers (CTE), for some years the largest labor organization in the country, with a claimed membership of some 60,000. The CTE, a member of the Soviet-front World Federation of Trade Unions, invited President Rodriguez to its 13th Congress in February (the president sent his regrets) and issued a statement in support of many government policies. The congress was attended by delegations from Cuba, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. The PCE, like the CTE, gives "critical" support to the military government, praising the policies it supports and criticizing those it opposes. A "confidential circular" signed by PCE secretary general Pedro Saad (which may be apocryphal, but which nonetheless seems to present the party line with accuracy) called for communists to support the military government but added that party members should (among other activities) infiltrate the military at lower and middle levels and carry out acts of sabotage which would be blamed on "counterrevolutionaries."<sup>1</sup>

The "ultraleft" is not so well developed in Ecuador as it is in Peru and many other Latin American countries, though Maoist students are (and have long been) powerful in the universities. The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE), probably the most important of the militant extremist groups, joins the small pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador (PCMLE) in opposing the Rodriguez government. A number of ultraleftists have been arrested since 1972, including PSRE secretary general Fernando Maldonado.

The Soviet Union has taken a positive attitude toward the military government, and the most important Soviet papers have carried friendly articles about the country in recent months.<sup>2</sup> As is true in the case of

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<sup>1</sup> El Tiempo (17 April 1975)

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Pravda (14 June 1975); Izvestia (25 February 1975).

Peru, Soviet trade with Ecuador provides for reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and other special benefits.<sup>1</sup> In fact, trade between Ecuador and the USSR has been limited, though steady, since 1968. Foreign aid, never extensive, has come more from Eastern Europe than from the Soviet Union; Poland, Romania, and the Soviet-bloc countries have been actively involved in the development of extractive and manufacturing industries and other economic affairs. Now that the OAS has lifted sanctions on Cuba, Ecuador will probably recognize Castro's government within the next few months, thus providing the USSR with another base through which to carry out activities in the country. In April, General Rodriguez warned that domestic and foreign forces were trying to subvert the government, charging that the "extreme right" was making common cause with "the international extreme left for the purpose of subversion." It is not clear who the "international extreme left" is precisely.

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<sup>1</sup> Goure, Soviet Penetration of Latin America, p. 151 (1975)

#### IV VENEZUELA

Although Venezuela has had a long history of military interference in or control over national affairs, it is today one of the few countries in Latin America with a functioning democracy. Over the past year, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (elected in December 1973 for a five-year term) has emerged as the most outspoken nationalist president and advocate of regional autonomy in Latin America. This position of prominence derives in part from Perez's impressive personal style, but above all from his nation's recently acquired wealth as a result of the oil-price boom.

Perez has taken the leading role in pushing for a Latin American Economic System (SELA) to coordinate Latin American economic policies outside of what he foresees as a restructured Organization of American States. Venezuela's efforts to strengthen Latin America in its relations with the United States, thereby objectively diminishing traditional U.S. influence in the area, are of immense importance for the future structure of hemispheric relations. Venezuela is suddenly competing with Mexico and Brazil for leadership in Central and South America. Though many Latin American countries expect to benefit from Venezuela's affluence, several governments have already directly or indirectly expressed their concern over the nation's rapidly expanding influence. For its own reasons, the Soviet Union has expressed its full support for all such efforts to reduce the U.S. role in Latin America by the development of regional organizations.

In purely financial terms, no country in Latin America today, and few in the history of the world, have had such excellent opportunities for development. Oil revenues came to almost U.S. \$10 billion in 1974 for a land of 11 million people. The government has sought to prevent excessive inflation and distorted development through elaborate and extensive investment schemes at home and abroad. The Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela (FIV), which will receive half of the oil income each year,



is in charge of diversifying the economy. In May, President Perez told the 31st annual assembly of Fedecamaras, the federation of chambers of commerce, that all sectors of society would be employed in the development of Venezuela, but that private capitalism would have to be modernized and humanized for the benefit of the masses. In practice this has already meant that areas previously in the private sector have been taken over by the state.

The most important single domestic issue of the year--indeed, in some respects, of the century--has been ownership of and control over the nation's vast resources of oil. After long and unsuccessful efforts to gain multipartisan support for his nationalization bill, Perez recently used his party's majority in both houses of congress to push the bill through over widespread opposition. Though the opposing forces (from the Christian Democrats through the Communists) considered one article of the bill too favorable to the oil companies, the government decided to reserve the right (with congressional approval) to undertake limited and strictly controlled ventures with foreign private capital. Perez correctly insisted that Venezuela could not yet handle the international marketing and distribution on its own, and that the nation needed foreign technology, particularly in the rich and undeveloped Orinoco tar belt.

Despite its immense wealth--in some cases because of this wealth--Venezuela has many domestic problems. Inflation is at 20 percent, agriculture is still underproductive, and many new programs announced by the president are (sometimes unavoidably) slow in producing positive results. Major problems of another sort are the lack of able administrators and serious bureaucratic and political corruption. The country's active political parties can be expected to take full advantage of these and other national problems, whether or not they are a result of President Perez's policies or inactivity.

The leftward drift of political ideologies and parties, evident in many countries, is particularly strong in Venezuela. Since 1959 the

left-reformist Democratic Action (AD) party has produced three presidents--- Romulo Betancourt, Raul Leoni, and, after one term out of office, Perez; the left-reformist Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) has furnished the other--Rafael Caldera. Perez received 48.8 percent of the vote in 1973 to 36.7 for his slightly more leftist COPEI rival. During his first year in office, Perez, with majority support in the legislature, moved increasingly to the left, taking over and implementing the policies of the reformist opposition, chiefly COPEI. As of mid-1975, the Christian Democrats were virtually without a program of their own, caught between the AD and the traditional left, the latter now represented mainly by the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). If the AD is able to maintain its unity (there are rumors of some dissension), its actions threaten to render COPEI superfluous. In the next few years the Christian Democrats may find their position as chief opposition party taken over progressively by the MAS, a reasonably successful breakaway from the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV).

The PCV was at its peak of power between 1958 and 1960, immediately after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez. At that time, party influence on the press, workers, students, and some other sectors was considerable. Subsequently, communist hostility toward the moderate reform government of President Betancourt, together with the influence of the Cuban Revolution, led the PCV to adopt armed struggle in cooperation with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), radical dissidents from the president's own party. This policy, which the party progressively abandoned beginning in 1967, greatly diminished communist influence everywhere but in the universities. The PCV was torn by internal dissension in the late 1960s, and in 1970 a large group of dissidents broke away to form the MAS. In 1974 the PCV split again and a group of dissidents formed the Communist Vanguard (VC), the latter immediately calling for nationwide unity of all Marxists and Leninists.

The MAS is the only Marxist-Leninist organization in the past decade to win a significant following among the Venezuelan people in national elections. Born amidst violent attacks against the Soviet

Union for the latter's invasion of Czechoslovakia and condemnations of "stalinist" members of the PCV, the MAS assumed an independent and strongly nationalistic communist stance. Prior to the 1973 elections it was estimated that the MAS would get 15 percent of the vote, though it actually took only about 6 percent. In mid-1975 the MAS moved from critical support for the government to open opposition, condemning the AD effort to develop Venezuela in cooperation with the "capitalists and imperialists." If the Perez administration encounters serious economic problems, the MAS may find its positions increasingly acceptable. At the same time, with respect to the MAS commitment to legislative democracy, it may be worth recalling that MAS founder Teodoro Petkoff said in 1968 that electoral policies had been adopted by the PCV only because the public had not supported armed struggle in the mid-1960s--in the end, "armed action is still the main way, for no revolutionary or democratic change can be attained without it."<sup>1</sup>

The guerrilla activities which were so common in Venezuela during much of the 1960s diminished at the end of the decade and virtually disappeared in the early 1970s. Some armed actions occurred in 1974, however, and a major jailbreak, involving 23 imprisoned guerrillas, took place in January 1975, leading to widespread speculation that guerrilla warfare might soon be on the rise. Efforts to achieve unity among the guerrillas are reportedly underway. In February the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), one of the oldest guerrilla groups in Venezuela, denounced President Perez as "the principal agent of imperialism and reaction in our country," and called upon the "exploited and oppressed minorities to train intensively for armed struggles." For years, Venezuelan guerrilla groups have included foreign members and there can be little doubt that some of the thousands of immigrants pouring into Venezuela from Chile, Uruguay, and other countries will wind up fighting beside Venezuelan guerrilla leaders like Douglas Bravo and Carlos Betancourt.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview in World Marxist Review (April 1968)



Though it would be against the openly declared foreign policies of the Soviet Union or Cuba to encourage these groups, it should not be forgotten that Cuba gave active support to these same groups (or their forerunners) in the early 1960s when the Venezuelan democratic experiment was just getting under way. Recent articles in major Venezuelan papers<sup>1</sup> have warned against the threat of international communist subversion in general and Cuban subversion in particular. According to Ultimas Noticias, official representatives of the Cuban government had made contact with all legal and illegal communist groups in the country even before the new Cuban ambassador (with an espionage record of his own) had presented his credentials to the president.

Formal Venezuelan contacts with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and communist Asia have thus far been mainly superficial, and relations with Cuba have only recently been resumed after more than a decade of open hostility. President Perez has publicly stated his interest in Soviet markets, science, and technology, and noted Venezuelan support for world peace and detente (interview broadcast on Moscow radio to Latin America, 28 April 1975). The AD-controlled Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV) has made top-level contact with the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC) and most Venezuelan youth groups have met with leaders of the Cuban Communist Youth (JCV); relations between these and other groups are expected to expand rapidly. (Venezuelan Communist Party organizations of youth, workers, journalists, and others have long maintained contact with their Soviet counterparts.)

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<sup>1</sup> El Universal (8 May 1975); Ultimas Noticias (19 May 1975)

## V CONCLUSIONS

The prospects for increasing Soviet influence in Latin America during the next five years are good, but not chiefly because of the strength or capabilities of Latin American communist parties, on the one hand, or as a result of direct Soviet interference in domestic affairs of individual countries, on the other. Though these will assuredly play a role, the more crucial factors are the international correlation of forces (if U.S. moral and military strength continues to decline) and the development of the present Latin American movement for independence from the United States. Nationalism is not a creation of the Soviet Union, but at present it is the main force eroding the traditional U.S. position in Latin America. Predictably, the Soviet Union and other communist countries (in cooperation with local parties, at times) will encourage its growth in the immediate future. Ultimately, of course, untempered nationalism would impede Soviet efforts to increase its own power in the hemisphere. Thus, while the primary objective of the Soviet Union in Latin America will be to promote anti-American nationalism, it will at the same time try to create stronger local communist organizations, and a reservoir of good will, to facilitate its own long-term hegemonic ambitions.

Country by country, Soviet strategists will have to weigh national conditions and prospects, taking into consideration the factors mentioned in the introduction to this paper. The countries examined here, for example, call for three different lines of attack. What "progressive" forces can be forged into a united front against the "imperialists and reactionaries" and what reluctant sectors must be isolated? It is essential to avoid antagonizing the intermediate sectors and driving them into the camp of the principal enemy (as happened in Chile under Allende and as may be happening today in Portugal). At the same time the progressive forces must not move too slowly and let the enemy take the

initiative. And, in the key phrase of the day, reactionary violence must be met with revolutionary violence, as in Portugal. The practical application of these generalities, however, is never easy, and "rightist" and "leftist" errors abound. "Lessons" drawn from the Allende years in Chile, for example, are sometimes contradictory or impractical. Thus, predictably, not all Marxist-Leninists, much less all "progressives," agree on the proper tactics, leading to the conflicts within the left which have so hampered communist plans in some countries.

In general, the Soviet Union is most likely to step up the time table in more developed, more nearly self-sufficient countries and to be more patient in the least developed, realizing that the USSR cannot assume primary responsibility for poverty-stricken lands on the other side of the world in what is still to some degree a U.S. sphere of influence.

Thus Soviet strategists do not look for or particularly want a communist takeover in Ecuador in the near future. The communist party in Ecuador certainly is in no position to take power, even indirectly. The present government is not likely to take a strongly reformist or nationalistic line on many more issues than it does today--that is, chiefly on the offshore territorial limit and oil. The expected diplomatic recognition of Cuba will open the country to greater Soviet influence which may, before long, provoke an anticommunist reaction in the armed forces. Although the Soviet Union and Cuba will continue to praise any nationalistic actions by the Ecuadorean military, neither country is willing or able to assume a dominant role in such a poor land.

The situation in Peru is clearly more complex than in Ecuador. Soviet influence is already considerable and could either increase substantially or be retarded, depending on whether the government moves to the right or the left for its mass support. The Velasco government has acted with caution over a period of seven years and has made some substantive and probably irreversible changes. Velasco avoided excessive commitment to either the so-called capitalist or communist worlds. It



it not likely that Morales, his successor, will be able to continue this policy with success indefinitely. And if the trends of recent years continue--extension of state control and socialist management, experiments with "social-property" and worker-participation, the silencing of dissenting voices--then Peruvian leaders will increasingly find their inspiration and examples in the communist world. Opposition has already been seriously weakened, step by step, though important anticommunist individuals and groups remain within the government as well as outside. Though Peru is hardly a developed country, with a cooperative leader (not a Castro of the 1960s) it would fit more easily into a Soviet sphere of influence than Ecuador.

Venezuela is a more politically sophisticated country than either Peru or Ecuador. Unlike Chile during the early 1970s, where the major political groupings were on the right, center-left, and left, in Venezuela today they are all on the left. One problem with the recent policies of the Perez government is that they drive the opposition to extremes from which it is difficult to retreat. If complications should arise with the oil companies under the much-disputed Article 5 of the oil nationalization bill, the opposition might suddenly win the day and the policies which would result could at the very least create problems for the oil industry, and at worst create a state of political confusion which might well lead to a military coup. In either case the U.S. market might be disrupted, at least temporarily. The Soviet Union would certainly like to bring Venezuela under its sway, but it is not likely to do so in the next few years despite the widespread criticism of the United States in the country. At the same time, there are a number of lesser advantages which are more attainable, including greater Venezuelan alienation from the United States and the possible disruption of markets, and/or the creation of a more hostile center of anti-American agitation with easy access to the Caribbean, Central and parts of South America. President Perez seems astute enough to realize that his country has much more to gain from the United States than from the entire Soviet bloc; some of the opposition may realize this as well, but feel that the country has tolerably little to lose if "true

independence" is to be gained. The Soviet Union, particularly through a Cuban proxy, will capitalize on these tendencies in the Venezuelan political scene.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND LATIN AMERICAN LEFTWING  
MILITARY REGIMES: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

by

Edward J. Williams



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#### SUMMARY

Much of the concern over Soviet influence on Latin American leftist military regimes appears to be unwarranted. The quality of Latin American nationalism, the actual as opposed to the rhetorical politics of military rulers, and the continuing U.S. influence limit the Soviet potential for control in the region.

Latin American nationalism is neither the creation nor the exclusive tool of Soviet interests. The military leaders of Ecuador, Peru, Honduras and Panama are anxious to break their dependence on the United States; they are not anxious to replace it with dependence on the Soviet Union. In terms of commercial benefit, the growing independence from the United States has been far more profitable for capitalist nations, notably Japan, than for the Soviet Union.

Despite vehement anti-U.S. rhetoric, the leftwing military regimes are reformist, not radical. Panama's General Torrijos, for example, has curbed student militancy on the issue of control of the Canal, counseling patient and orderly negotiations. Socialist programs do not necessarily imply Soviet control: in Peru both Velasco and his recent successor, Morales, have stressed the indigenous origins of their reforms.

In spite of possibly justified resentment of many U.S. policies toward the area, the United States is still the strongest foreign influence in Latin America in every area from trade and military training to education and aid.

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## I INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the left-leaning, modernizing military is the most intriguing and potentially significant dimension of present-day Latin American politics. The proponents of that new departure have already gone a long way in changing the continent's political power equation by reversing the ideological posture and policy position of the region's most potent political actor. To differing degrees, regimes influenced or dominated by the modernizing military have launched significant initiatives in both domestic and foreign policy. On the home front, they have nurtured the industrialization processes, pushed for substantial agrarian reform, introduced innovative educational programs, improved transportation and communications, and even attempted to mobilize their once dormant fellow citizens to support wide-ranging social programs.

In the area of foreign policy, the modernizing military posits flamboyant nationalism as its first principle. At the most obvious level the military's nationalism manifests itself in a clearly defined anti-American posture that frequently descends to unseemly Yankee-baiting. Foreign policy is also designed to increase intercourse with Western Europe, Japan and other noncommunist areas as a means of diminishing U.S. influence. Still further along the continuum, the Latin American modernizing military actively seeks and/or clearly welcomes interaction with the Soviet Union, the East European nations, Communist China and other communist regimes.

This last foray has evoked concern in the United States. Both scholars and policymakers have started to ferret out its meaning for relations between the two Americas as well as its implications for relations between



the United States and the Soviet Union and East-West relations in general.<sup>1</sup> It is the purpose of this paper to add to that literature by describing and analyzing Soviet relations with nations ruled by the leftwing military. The nations selected are those defined by the Soviets as exhibiting "progressive" characteristics; they include Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru. The Bolivian regimes about the turn of this decade also fit the mold and they will be included in the analysis because they are recent enough to be pertinent.

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<sup>1</sup> Among some of the more recent books and articles, see Jose Ramon Estella, "Rusia y America Latina: Hacia una Nueva Relacion," Vision (19 de Junio de 1971).

Herbert Goldhammer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

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## II THE MODERNIZING MILITARY: POSTURES AND POLICIES

The historical evolution of Latin America's modernizing military might be dated as far back as the 1890s when sectors of the Argentine military rebelled in support of the middle-class revolution usually associated with that nation's Radical party.<sup>1</sup> The Soviets recognize the longevity of the tradition in pointing to several historical precursors of the present-day movements--the Brazilian "tenents" of the twenties and early thirties; the radical officers who established Chile's short-lived "Socialist Republic" in 1932; Bolivia's "Military Socialists" of the late 1930s; and, of course, the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in the early 1950s.<sup>2</sup> Most scholars would certainly add the first Peronist period (1943-55), and at least a half dozen other governments or movements could be included without stretching the point too far.

The most salient of the contemporary examples of that tradition is the Peruvian regime which assumed power in October 1968. Although the Peruvian regime has always been more than a one-man show, General Juan Velasco Alvarado was officially the President of the Republic and, in fact, clearly the most powerful and important component of the Peruvian leadership group for several years. However, in late August 1975, Velasco's government was overthrown by the man predicted to be his successor, Francisco Morales Bermúdez. It is unlikely that Morales, who helped engineer Velasco's programs, will significantly alter the basic premises of Peruvian domestic and foreign policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Among other sources to be identified, some of this introductory material is from Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright, Latin American Politics: A Developmental Approach, pp. 107-109, 203-204 (Palo Alto, California: Mayfield Press, 1975).

<sup>2</sup> For several of these historical references, see Gouré and Rothenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

The present Panamanian leftist military government followed the Peruvians to power by less than two months. General Omar Torrijos has since risen to a position of influence in Latin America owing to frequent demonstrations of rabid anti-Yankeeism in a nation where one of the most hated manifestations of U.S. power continues to exist--the Panama Canal. By September 1969 the Peruvians and Panamanians had been joined by a left-leaning military regime in Bolivia where General Alfredo Ovando Candia came to power. Ovando quite consciously declared his solidarity with the Peruvian line. One year later he gave way to General Juan José Torres, who carried the military leftist position to its most radical extreme before evoking the wrath of his more conservative military brethren. They overthrew him in August 1971, thus ending Bolivia's two-year experiment with military leftism. In early 1972, General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara administered a coup in Ecuador and rather hesitantly joined the ranks of the "progressive" military regimes. In September 1975 he crushed an attempted coup led by his chief of staff, General Raul Gonzalez Alvear. The Gonzalez faction represented rightist dissatisfaction over alleged mismanagement of oil production and revenue. The status of the final member of the "progressive" foursome--Honduras--is really rather in doubt because of the transitional situation evolving from the ouster of General Oswaldo López Arellano in April 1975. López had been a major factor in Honduras politics since the mid-fifties but only in his most recent incarnation (since December 1972) did he assume a modernizing position and earn the approval of the Soviets. Pending an official disclaimer from the Soviet ideologues, however, Honduras is herein discussed as a leftist military nation.<sup>1</sup>

The basic explanation for the emergence of these new regimes is that the present-day military men differ from their conservative predecessors who dominated (with few exceptions) in the past. They are change-oriented,

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<sup>1</sup> As of late July 1975, indications were mixed, but there seemed to be movement to the left in Honduras. For the unfolding positions of the new military regime, see Latin America (2 and 30 May, 20 June and 18 July 1975).



concerned with improving the lot of the popular classes, favor socioeconomic development and are intensely concerned with national independence. The social composition of the contemporary Latin American military is also significant. The officer corps is more frequently drawn from the middle and lower-middle sectors than in times past. They are also better educated and their education often includes extensive work in the social and developmental sciences. They have traveled more, in the process gaining a concrete understanding of the relative underdevelopment of their own societies.

In the last analysis, self-interest is also part of the explanatory package. Latin America's military establishments had seen their brothers put to the wall in Cuba and learned their lessons well. They concluded that the existing socioeconomic and political structures had become so corrupt or inefficient that both their nations and their own security might well be in jeopardy. A high-ranking Peruvian officer sets out that part of the explanation:

When one is pursued by a herd of maddened bulls, one has three options. One is kneel, close the eyes, and pray. The second is to fight the bulls, which is as good as the first option. And the third is to lead the stampeding herd into terrain that is more advantageous to be pursued.

The masses in Latin America are starting to stampede. We, the military, are the only ones who are capable of leading them--and us--unto safe ground.<sup>1</sup>

The postures, policies and programs designed to seek the "safe ground" can be roughly defined as populist, statist, and nationalistic. All three of those characteristics have evoked favorable response from Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> Howard J. Wiarda, "The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular Support" Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, 7 November 1970, p. 17.

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ideologues who have been hard at work weaving an ideological apology for the Soviet Union's increasing affinity for the leftwing generals.<sup>1</sup> "Military Populism" is a tag sometimes utilized by Soviet commentators to define the new regimes, all of which have pursued popular reforms to some degree. Agrarian reform is the most crucial of several popular initiatives. The Peruvian reform is now well-advanced and most students agree that it has wrought significant change. In backward Honduras, General López built his radical reputation (and a substantial power base) by courting the peasantry. He promulgated that nation's first meaningful agrarian reform law in January 1975.<sup>2</sup> In Ecuador, General Rodríguez pushes for more rapid implementation of agrarian legislation, and Panama's Torrijos is evolving a grand scheme based on land that the government is acquiring from United Brands and other foreign-owned agribusinesses.

The ideological direction of the leftwing military is also manifested by their relationship with the local communist parties. On the whole, the fortunes of the parties seemed to have improved somewhat under the military. In Peru, the Communist Party is officially outlawed, but the regime permits it to function. Indeed, according to a leading communist militant, "the government displays respect for the communists and cooperates with them indirectly in revolutionary projects where our views coincide." In Panama, communist fortunes were threatened immediately after the 1968 coup, but things have gradually improved and the party has regrouped. The Ecuadorean

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<sup>1</sup> Though differing somewhat in both definition and nuance, these three characteristics also come very close to some tendencies which the "Rockefeller Report" feared might emerge among the new military regimes when the team surveyed the Latin American situation in 1969. "The crucial test, ultimately," said the Report, "is whether the new military can and will move the nation, with sensitivity and conscious design, toward a transition from military control for a social purpose to a more pluralistic form of government which will enable individual talent and dignity to flourish. Or will they become radicalized, statist, and anti-United States?" (emphasis supplied). Rockefeller Report, "Quality of Life in the Americas," p. 19 (Washington: Agency for International Development, 1969).

<sup>2</sup> The law is reproduced in Comercio Exterior (Mexico, D.F.), pp. 130-135 (Abril de 1975).

situation is even one step better; the Partido Comunista del Ecuador has been legalized since the present military government assumed power in 1972. In Honduras, finally, the party remains illegal, but in the words of a recent survey, "has been able to operate more openly than before."<sup>1</sup>

Shades of even more radical populism have emerged in several instances in the form of popular assemblies and popular militias, but the generals have been cautious in that arena. The Peruvian workers councils have some characteristics of popular assemblies, but they have been tightly controlled. Panama's Torrijos has called for the creation of such an assembly, but up to the present taken no action in that direction. Torres' Bolivia was really the only instance in which a mature Popular Assembly was formed at governmental initiative with full official support. Popular militias were also organized during that period with implicit, although not with formal, governmental sanction.<sup>2</sup>

The second major policy direction of the leftwing military regimes--statism--is, again, best exemplified by the Peruvian experience, although clear indications have also emerged in the other nations ruled by leftwing military governments. The Peruvian policy position was proposed as early as 1971 by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, the then Minister of Economy and now Velasco's successor. He first declared that "[socialism] is clearly not the model we aspire to for the new society." He then continued in positing the statist propensities of the leftwing military ideology:

Nevertheless, we can affirm, and we refer to the structure of investments, that in the new Peruvian society the State will play a much more important role than in

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<sup>1</sup> For the quotations, see Richard F. Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1974, pp. 255, 339 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1974).

<sup>2</sup> See Gen. Omar Torrijos, La Batalla de Panamá, p. 106 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria, 1973); and "Los Campesinos Bolivianos Organizan un Ejército Privado," Excelsior, p. 2A (Mexico, D.F., 23 de Julio de 1971).

the past. In mentioning 50 percent of the total investment (it could be 40 or more) as a possible, tentative number in the hands of the public sector, leaving the rest for the private and cooperative sectors, I am giving voice to the express will to restore to the State its principal and dynamic role.<sup>1</sup>

In Peru, and elsewhere, that philosophy has been consciously implemented in recent years. In his now famous 1974 message to the nation (in which the Plan Inca was revealed), General Velasco proudly emphasized that several months previously the government had signed an agreement with the United States stipulating that "fourteen important enterprises became the property of Peru. With this measure," he continued, "the presence of the State is amplified in industrial development and the national character of the economy is affirmed."<sup>2</sup> The same policy is being promulgated in Panama. The North American Power Company has been nationalized, and the government has taken an increasingly large role in sugar production.

Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprise is, of course, the direct concomitant of increased state activity in the economic sector, and it is in that area where the leftwing military regimes have become best known. Beginning with the Peruvian nationalization of the International Petroleum Company in 1968, a long stream of similar actions has followed. In Bolivia, Gulf Oil was nationalized; in Panama, the government has already begun to take over the holdings of American-owned United Brands and within several years will entirely control the banana industry. United Brands and Standard Fruit properties are also in jeopardy in Honduras, especially since the bribe scandal broke in the spring of 1975. In Ecuador, finally, the oil companies and the government are engaged in a sensitive tug of war over concessions, taxes and royalties--a situation fraught with the possibility of wholesale nationalization.

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<sup>1</sup> See "The New Peruvian Society," in Joseph S. Tulchin, Problems in Latin American History, p. 377 (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

<sup>2</sup> See Plan Inca ... Mensaje a la Nación, p. 14 (Lima, Peru: 1974).



All of those measures are obviously related to the more general theme of nationalism, the most salient characteristic of the leftwing, modernizing military regimes. Although the military governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru differ on their commitment to populism and statism, they all share a clearly defined nationalistic posture.

The foreign policy outlook of the leftwing military regimes has two dimensions. The lesser nexus has a certain positive proclivity to it and looks to cooperation with other poor nations in such things as commodity organizations like OPEC and similar groups concerned with bananas, copper, sugar and tin. In an institutional sense, this Third World direction of the regimes' foreign policy is best illustrated by the 1973 conference of Non-Aligned Nations in which Peru gained official membership and Panama achieved full observer status.

Whatever the weight of positive commitment to Third Worldism, the more crucial element of the military's nationalism is clearly the negative commitment to anti-Yankeeism. Examples come readily to mind. In addition to the nationalizations previously discussed, they include such things as the expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers; inflammatory speeches concerning possible violence in the Canal Zone; reduction or elimination of U.S. military advisory teams; seizure of tuna boats; reduction of the operations of U.S.-owned airlines; and such odd-ball circuses as General Torrijos' declaration of an "Anti-Imperialist Week."

All of those policies, programs, and arbitrary harassments (along with many others) add up to some serious problems for U.S. relations with leftwing military regimes. Near-crisis episodes have developed in several cases with Bolivia, Panama and Peru, and the entire tone of day-to-day relations with all of the governments is a solid step below what it was before they assumed power. Ideologues and policymakers in the Soviet Union have been sensitive to this erosion of relations between the leftwing governments and the United States, of course, and have become more and more interested in framing new policy frameworks and ideological justifications to pave the way for increased intercourse with the leftwing military regimes in Latin America.

### III THE SOVIET UNION: POSTURES AND POLICIES

Serious Soviet interest in Latin America is very recent, with 1960 a watershed year for analytical purposes. Although communist parties operated in Latin America as early as 1918 and Soviet diplomatic relations with some nations in the southern hemisphere began in 1924, the region was traditionally of little concern to Soviet policymakers. The United States was firmly in control, and Soviet policy posited a resigned acceptance of U.S. hegemony--sometimes referred to as "geographic fatalism."

Some minimal changes began to appear after Stalin's death, but not until Castro dragged the Soviet Union into the Western Hemisphere was there a major policy shift. A temporary setback and a more moderate tone in Soviet policy resulted from the Missile Crisis of 1962, but as the sixties evolved, Soviet interests revived and, indeed, became more intense. By the beginning of the present decade, a seemingly permanent commitment had matured characterized by some degree of guarded optimism.

If Soviet interest in Latin America generally was late in coming, official sympathy with military regimes was even more retarded. Traditional ideological pronouncements declared the military to be tools of the local oligarchies or U.S. imperialism. Initial Soviet response to the Panamanian and Peruvian coups in 1968 followed that line, characterizing Torrijos' takeover as a run-of-the-mill putsch and even more bombastically describing Velasco and his cohorts as "gorillas who established in the country a regime of ferocious military dictatorship." By late 1969 that attitude had changed to a sympathetic posture vis-a-vis military leftists, and since that time the Soviets have embraced a series of military nationalists in Bolivia, Ecuador and Honduras. With recent events in Portugal, it appears

that the Soviet ideologues and policymakers have gone even further in their praises of the "progressive" tendencies of some military governments.<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the pronouncements of approval issuing from Moscow, Soviet affinity for leftwing military regimes is also reflected by the positions assumed by the several communist parties in Latin America. In all four nations presently ruled by the "progressive" military, local communist parties have declared their support of the regimes. In both Panama and Peru, communist backing is almost unqualified. The parties in Ecuador and Honduras are rather more reserved, with the Ecuadorean party typifying its position as "critical support."

As is often true in deciphering communist policy, the motives for the present reversals include realism conditioned by ideological revisionism. At one level, Soviet interest in Latin America is quite simply explained by the fact that the Soviets are now rich and powerful enough to have global interests. The Soviet economy is strong enough to be able to import bananas, coffee and other Latin American commodities. Some of the interest in Latin America, therefore, is a genuine effort to buy needed commodities and foodstuffs.<sup>2</sup> A different nuance of the same point centers on strategic rather than economic possibilities. The Soviet Union has become a world power and, therefore, must pursue its interests worldwide. Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev sets out the principle in stark terms in declaring that "no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might."<sup>3</sup> One manifestation of that policy is the rapid growth of the Soviet navy and merchant marine and, in this context, its recent appearance in Latin

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<sup>1</sup> The quotation is from Gouré and Rothenberg, op. cit., p. 82. On the events in Portugal, see Wohl, op. cit.

<sup>2</sup> The argument for economic motives is presented in Glen A. Smith, Soviet Foreign Trade: Organization, Operations and Policy, 1918-1971, p. 247 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973); and Valkenier, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Gouré and Rothenberg, op. cit., p. vi.



American waters. The places where the flag is shown tend to define the areas of economic and political presence and concern.

Beyond considerations of Soviet national power, the Communist ideologues also claim to divine progressive characteristics in the Latin American leftwing military regimes. Compared with other less developed areas, the Soviets perceive a more mature socioeconomic and political substructure in Latin America, making the area, in their view, more open to revolutionary change. The intensity of Latin American economic nationalism, for example, "leaps over Asia and Africa in Soviet theory about revolutionary possibilities in the Third World, because its more advanced stage of socioeconomic development creates better prerequisites for the transition of the anti-imperialist struggle to a higher plan of revolutionary struggle." Underlying that phenomenon, the Soviets also depict a more mature class situation in the region positing that "the class contradictions... are sharper and more clearly expressed in Latin America than in other underdeveloped areas."<sup>1</sup>

With specific reference to the modernizing military, Soviet ideologues believe that those regimes are accelerating conditions necessary for ultimate communist control. In a very basic way, the leftwing military is praised for introducing ferment into the socioeconomic sphere. More concretely, Soviet scholars and policymakers praise measures designed to reduce the power of the traditional landed oligarchies thereby freeing revolutionary forces within the Latin American nations. The industrialization efforts of the generals are also depicted as important contributions to a more revolutionary ambience as are a host of socioeconomic programs like agrarian reform, economic redistribution, and efforts at social mobilization.

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<sup>1</sup> For the quotations, see *ibid.*, p. 13; and Roger P. Hamburg, The Soviet Union and Latin America, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, pp. 49-50 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Madison, 1965).

Concentration of state power is also much favored in Moscow. The road to socialism, goes the ideological line, is paved by the expansion of the public sector characterized by "gradual occupation of the dominant positions in the basic branches of production, nationalization of financial and banking concerns, mineral wealth, means of transport and communications [and] broad economic planning."<sup>1</sup>

However nicely drawn those extrapolations from Marxism-Leninism that focus on the domestic scene, the Soviets are most interested in the leftwing military's anti-Yankee nationalism. That posture of the leftwing military is unquestionably the raison d'etre of Soviet "revisionist" policy toward the regimes. The "anti-imperialistic" (i.e., the anti-U.S.) struggle is thus the key to Soviet friendship with the revolutionary generals. Domestic social reform may fit neatly into communist dogma, but nationalizations of U.S.-owned industries, increased taxes on U.S. business, seizures of tuna clippers, and expulsion of Peace Corps volunteers and U.S. AID and military missions are the facets of Latin American policy that draw the warmest accolades from Soviet ideologues and policymakers. The old "weak link" theory is said to apply to U.S. interests in Latin America. In the long run the so-called "correlation of world forces" will incline in Moscow's favor as the leftwing military regimes weaken the U.S. economy and strategic position by nationalizing copper and oil companies, taxing banana operations, reducing military advisory missions, and forcing concessions on the Panama Canal.

In a more proximate sense, Soviet friendship with leftwing military regimes also evolves from a series of practical considerations deriving from past experience with less developed nations and a changing international environment. Moscow appears almost entirely to have repudiated its goal of immediate full-scale revolutionary change. The Soviets have substituted the via pacifica based on government-to-government trade and aid arrangements within the context of formalized diplomatic intercourse.

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<sup>1</sup> Professor R. Ul'ianovskii quoted in Hamburg in Kanet, editor, op. cit., p. 193.

Although Soviet gains are certainly visualized as the ultimate end of such a political strategy, they are to be incrementally achieved over the long run. A recent analysis captures the point:

As the Soviets appear to see things, they stand to gain a great deal more from dealing with and attempting to win influence with governments than from involving themselves in futile efforts to overthrow them. Peru is, again, a case in point. In a country where Castro-supported guerrillas were decisively defeated in 1965, Soviet [formal governmental] tactics, in contrast, have paid off. The Soviets find themselves on the scene and able to play a role through their embassy in Lima. It is, to be sure, a limited role, but they can cogently argue that in the long run their efforts to "influence" the Peruvians should have more impact than the guerrillas had in attempting to force the issue at the point of a gun. (They could hardly have less).<sup>1</sup>

Focusing rather more on ends than on means, a Latin American commentator comes to similar conclusions in stating that Soviet "objectives are today more modest and limited (some call them 'intermediate'); they seek simply to dissipate the lack of confidence which Moscow has inspired and to stimulate an independent attitude in Latin America with respect to the United States."<sup>2</sup>

An element of the realistic policy is manifested in the substitution of established governments for guerrillas as the connecting point of foreign policy. The present visage of Soviet policy is concretely centered on narrowly defined Soviet national interests worked out in formalized diplomatic relations. In Latin America the policy has evolved even further than in other less developed areas. While the official Soviet line continues to express support for effective "liberation" movements in Afro-Asia, it quite clearly looks to formalized state-to-state relations in Latin America.

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<sup>1</sup> Wayne S. Smith, op. cit., pp. 1139-1140.

<sup>2</sup> Estella, op. cit., p. 26.



The Latin American communist parties also mirror that same moderation. The word has gone out from Moscow to forsake the guerrilla strategy and to assume a limited policy of infiltrating existing populist governments. The latest catchwords are "anti-imperialistic fronts" in which the local parties play a rather subdued role in support of the nationalistic military.

The factors informing such a conservative policy are not difficult to discern. In the first place, the region's guerrilla movements have all but disappeared from the scene. The Che Guevara fiasco dramatically symbolized the failure of the revolutionary left in Latin America, but, in truth, it was only a small part of a larger scenario that encompassed the U.S. and Latin American governments working effectively to curtail the guerrilla movement. From that perspective, the Soviet policymakers simply recognized a losing cause and revised the policy to fit the facts. The cautious, incremental tone of Soviet policy is also influenced by failed attempts in other nations where the Soviets were far too quick in forcing themselves on governments with leftist propensities. Moscow courted Egypt, Ghana and the Sudan too enthusiastically and, like the spurned suitor, now assumes the diminished role of correct friend. Other experiences support the value of gradually evolved relations. In India, for example, Soviet ideological posturing and political machinations have been minimized and formalized state-to-state relations emphasized. The Soviets count their growing friendship with India as their most successful foray in recent years and may well be transferring the same strategy to Latin America--which, in its level of overall development, is closer to India than to most of the other Afro-Asian nations.

Finally, Soviet policy has made a virtue of a vice in coming to terms with the fact that the Chinese communists have outflanked them on the left. Moscow's fear and hatred of the Chinese needs no discussion here except to note that it extends further than mustering troops along the Sino-Soviet border. Recognizing that Soviet national interests and/or waning ideological commitment prohibit them from assuming the flamboyant postures of old,

the Soviets have calculated that they can make political hay of opposing irresponsible (and fruitless!) romanticism in the form of guerrillismo.<sup>1</sup>

Strong indications suggest as well that the Soviets are achieving some success in Latin America in several important areas. During the 1960s, for example, diplomatic relations were established with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Venezuela. Since 1970, gains have been more difficult for the Soviets, but they have managed to achieve diplomatic intercourse with Costa Rica. The number of Soviet accredited diplomatic personnel in the southern hemisphere more than doubled during the 1960s.<sup>2</sup>

With more particular reference to governments ruled by leftwing military regimes, the picture is incomplete, but some data suggest warm relations with the Soviet Union. As in practically every indicator of military leftism, Peru stands out. The Velasco government has been especially close to the Soviets and has relations with all of the East European nations and even with Communist China. The short-lived Torres regime in Bolivia also evidenced especially strong ties with Moscow; in 1971, reports had it that there were nearly 100 accredited personnel in the Soviet embassy in La Paz.<sup>3</sup> Beyond those two instances, however, the picture is uncertain. Ecuador has formal diplomatic intercourse with the Soviet Union, but they are not especially close and there are no official relations between the Soviet Union and Honduras or Panama.

The Soviets have also nurtured increased trade with the Latin American nations and, again, the record shows some qualified success. The Soviet Union is involved in trading a wide array of goods including automobiles,

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<sup>1</sup> For an example of Soviet invective on Chinese policy anent the developing nations, see K. Brutents writing in Pravda, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 25:8-9 (26 September 1973). On the general theme of Soviet reactions to Chinese ambitions in the Third World, see Hamburg in Kanet, editor, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>2</sup> Goldhammer, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 203. For discussion of Soviet relations with Peru, see Theberge, op. cit., p. 86.

television sets, tractors and trolley cars in exchange for numerous kinds of foodstuffs and a few other raw materials like cotton, leather and wool. The statistical data are somewhat misleading because they include trade with Cuba, but the figures do indicate marked increases in trade during the 1960s, growing from less than 2 percent to over 5 percent of the total Latin American column. Writing in 1971, a Spanish source seemed to indicate more of the same for the future:

In reality, commerce between the Soviet Union and Latin America, although still small in monetary terms or in percentages of total interchange, has grown uninterrupted in a significant form in the course of the last three years.<sup>1</sup>

Looking to the nations ruled by the leftwing military, the scenario is, again, uncertain with inconclusive evidence pointing to several special relationships. As always, the Peruvians are out front; from 1968 to 1972, Peruvian exports to the Soviet area increased from 2.5 percent to fully 11 percent of that nation's total exports (although still only 0.5 percent of its imports came from there). At least in Bolivia and Peru, moreover, the Soviets seemed to have gone to extremes in pandering to the revolutionary generals. In mid-1970, for instance, Moscow paid in dollars in a deal involving the purchase of Bolivian minerals--a move characterized by one commentator as "an important departure from the barter deals preferred by the Soviets." In Peru, the Soviets have demonstrated equal generosity in negotiating straight cash transactions and signing a trade agreement that called for payment in "freely convertible currencies."<sup>2</sup> Again, however, the story ends with those two nations (and Bolivia's, of course, is no longer applicable). As late as 1972, there was no Soviet trade with Ecuador and Honduras and inconsequential commercial interchange with Panama.

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<sup>1</sup> Estella, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> See Goldhammer, op. cit., p. 215. The trade data are from Kenneth Ruddle and M. Hamour, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1968, 1970 and 1973 editions (Los Angeles: Latin American Area Center, University of California).



Not surprisingly, the same circumstances influence Soviet aid programs in Latin America. As preface, it should be noted that the Soviet Union offers precious little aid in the first place, and the entire concept is rather distorted because of total state control of the Soviet economy. The distinction between trade and aid, that is to say, is rather arbitrary and basically dependent on the economic restraints and political purposes of Soviet policymakers. With that reservation, Peru is the only nation in Latin America (save Cuba) that has received any substantial Soviet aid. As early as 1971, Moscow had granted the Peruvians monetary and technical assistance for the nation's fishing industry, including the construction of a new port terminal in the north. Even more significantly, in late 1973 the Soviet Union and Peru evoked both surprise and anxiety in the United States when Peru became the first Latin American nation (again, save Cuba) to receive military assistance. The agreement called for the delivery of an estimated 200 tanks, some heavy artillery and other equipment "on extremely generous, concessionary terms." Ominously, the arrangement also specified that a team of Soviet military advisers were to come to Peru.<sup>1</sup>

To supplement those clearly defined political activities in Latin America, Moscow also sponsors a number of initiatives designed to improve its rather negative image. The Soviet Union encourages the region's leading politicians to visit in Russia, and it has become pro-forma for practically every stripe of Latin political figure to appear in Moscow. In recent years such leading centrists or moderate leftists as Chile's Eduardo Frei, Mexico's Luis Echeverría, and Venezuela's Carlos Andres Pérez have made the trek. The Soviets have sought reciprocity, of course, and on any given day a leading Muscovite can be found paying his respects and manifesting the new Soviet position in one or more of the area's nations. In addition, the Soviet Union has also vigorously pursued a series of cultural

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<sup>1</sup> Theberge, op. cit., p. 87.

exchanges involving the usual covey of artists, literary figures, ballet troupes, circus groups and whatnot.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the Soviets are also active in educating students in radio-broadcasting in Latin America. Although as many as half of the students come from Cuba, the Soviet Union ranks second only to Spain among non-Hemispheric nations in that field. Radio Moscow, moreover, ranks first in broadcasts to Latin America with nearly 2,000 hours per week in Spanish, Portuguese and Quechua. Radio Peking is in second place.<sup>2</sup>

All of those Soviet initiatives combined with the anti-Yankee posturings and policies of the military regimes in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru indicate some revision of the usual equation of superpower influence in Latin America. The Soviet Union has achieved some measurable gains and the United States has suffered some clear setbacks. With that proposition established, a larger perspective featuring the interplay of the three major actors--the leftwing military regimes, the United States and the Soviet Union--considered in the context of the dynamics of change in Latin America should exaggerate neither the profundity nor the unilateral dimension of that change. Many factors and tendencies exist, in short, which moderate, condition and set limits upon Soviet gains and U.S. losses.

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<sup>1</sup> For a list of Soviet and Latin American dignitaries who have exchanged visits, see Sizonenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. See the same source for a longish discussion of cultural exchanges (pp. 43-62).

<sup>2</sup> Goldhammer, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

#### IV THE RELATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND LEFTWING MILITARY REGIMES IN CONTEXT

##### A. The Soviet Union

The possibility for significant Soviet gains with Latin American leftwing military regimes is moderated by a series of considerations that pertain to self-defined policy goals, limited economic intentions, the present disarray of world communism, and the continuing negative image of the USSR in Latin America. In the first instance, the Soviets have made it clear that they are aiming for incremental achievements over the very long run. The general policy is cautious and the specific efforts self-consciously prudent. The Soviet Union is quick to play down domestic changes of Fidel Castro's Cuba, emphasizing instead Castro's success in freeing Cuba from Yankee domination. Diplomatic relations, trade, aid, and cultural exchanges are more concerned with upgrading the Soviet image in Latin America than with wielding political influence. A better Soviet image in Latin America should be counted as a gain for Soviet diplomacy, of course, but it can hardly be interpreted as a fundamental change in the basic position of Latin America in the world arena.

Soviet policy with leftwing military regimes focuses on long-range evolutionary change. In the words of a scholar, they "perceive a long transitional period from coalition government to communism during which Latin American radical nationalism--with its anti-foreign and anti-North American bias--will play a dominant political role." A Latin American communist has offered some idea of how long that "transition" will last. He listed several prerequisites: the end of U.S. economic influence, the nationalization of the core areas of the Latin American economies, and the development of a broader popular base for the region's communist parties.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Raymond Duncan, editor, Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries, p. 3 (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970); and Becerra's analysis discussed in Wayne S. Smith, op. cit., p. 1133.



Some signs point to incremental gain in the first two criteria, but the Soviets themselves caution that the changes are only a beginning (even assuming that the criteria have any real validity).

The communist ideologues have promulgated those basic considerations in dogmatic form. They declare unequivocally that the changes now pursued by the leftwing military regimes are not socialistic. The Peruvian and Panamanian generals, that is, may be able to pave the way for a future fundamental change, but their anti-imperialistic policies and programs should not be construed as anything other than initial steps. Indeed, the Soviets have identified only five nations in Latin America where authentic conditions exist for socialistic revolution--Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay. None of those countries, it should be noted, are governed by a leftwing military regime.<sup>1</sup>

At core, the cautious policies and limited ideological frameworks are founded on solid practical considerations. The basic economic factors in the situation are crucial. The Soviet experience with Cuba has cost them dearly and Soviet leaders are not about to be dragged into another economic fiasco. The Cuban relationship, in fact, has developed into an onerous task for the USSR, featuring challenges to Soviet ideological and political leadership from the mercurial Castro--not to mention several purges of Soviet favorites.

Soviet policies of detente also condition their aggressiveness in Latin America. If U.S. friendship is not necessarily the highest ideological good, U.S. trade and technology are valuable in the short run and the Soviets fear jeopardizing those arrangements by pushing adventuristic efforts in Latin America.

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<sup>1</sup> See Gouré and Rothenberg, op. cit., p. 14.

Many of these prudent inclinations and limiting factors are crystallized in the area of Soviet trade and aid in the Latin American context. At the outset, the political implications of Soviet trade are probably overestimated. Economics, pure and simple, is every bit as important as political machinations. Soviet aid and trade, says one commentator, "have shed their haphazard, politically motivated character and have evolved into a purposeful program intended to be economically beneficial to the USSR."<sup>1</sup>

At any rate, Soviet trade is very limited in Latin America, particularly with leftwing military regimes. Excluding Cuba, less than 2 percent of Latin America's trade has been with the Soviet Union (about equal to Sweden) and most of that was accounted for by Argentina and Brazil, neither of which boasts a leftwing military regime. It is true that Soviet-Peruvian trade has grown markedly under Velasco, but latest figures do not reveal similar trends with Ecuador, Honduras or Panama. The generally primitive quality of Soviet goods and the awkward terms of trade partially explain the low level of commercial exchange, but the larger limitations imposed by Soviet policy and economic restrictions are also important.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, trade has been far more favorable to Latin America than to the Soviet bloc. In 1972 the Peruvian generals were able to peddle 11 percent of their goods in that area, but compelled to buy only 0.5 percent of their imports. In 1973, Latin American exports to Eastern Europe exceeded imports by more than three to one.<sup>3</sup>

At core, furthermore, it is not at all clear that trade and aid can be readily translated into political influence. In a recent study, grave

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<sup>1</sup> Valkenier, op. cit., p. 44. See also Goldhammer, op. cit., p. 53; and Glen A. Smith, op. cit., p. 228 for the same interpretation.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviets are conscious of their reputation for inferior goods. For a defense of the quality, see Sizonenko, op. cit., pp. 40-42.

<sup>3</sup> Latin America, p. 181 (13 June 1975).

reservations are stated anent the inclination to equate trade and aid with influence. Such a relationship may exist, but little hard proof has been mustered to validate the proposition.<sup>1</sup>

Another contextual focus for analyzing and evaluating Soviet intercourse with Latin American leftwing military regimes involves evolving relationships within the contemporary communist movement. One part of that context centers on the self-perceptions of Latin American communist parties, their relationship with Moscow, and their interaction with the leftwing military. In varying degrees, and assuming differing forms, national communism is present in Latin America. Cooperation between Moscow and the local parties has also been jeopardized by attitudes among some Latin American communists that support of the military, no matter what stripe, is violation of Marxian tenets.

The relationships between the local parties and their respective military regimes, moreover, have been precarious. Some gains have been achieved, but an aura of mutual distrust is the more usual situation, and in every nation discussed here the military regimes have moved against the local parties on more than one occasion. Recent membership figures demonstrate that no Communist Party has grown under leftwing military regimes. Indeed, a slight decline in membership suggests that some problems are being encountered, at least insofar as that index reflects the position of the local communist groups.<sup>2</sup>

As part of the total context it is also necessary to consider the rise of Chinese communism and the role of myriad bastard strands of New Leftism in Latin America. To reiterate an earlier point, the Soviets have, to a certain extent, been outflanked and can no longer count on the support of

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<sup>1</sup> See Rubinstein discussed in Hamburg in Kanet, ed., op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> For the membership figures see, for the several years, The Yearbook of International Communist Affairs.



significant sectors of the Latin American revolutionary left. In many quarters, in fact, the Soviets are usually depicted as having sold out the revolution.

That entire picture, finally, is cast on the larger screen of a continuing profound distrust of the Soviet Union in Latin America. The basic philosophical tradition depicts the Soviet Union as a sort of alien culture inferior to Western civilization. The disreputable history of Soviet intrigue and brutality is well known and such events as the 1930s purges, the Hitler-Stalin pact, and the rape of Czechoslovakia are often the focal points of Latin American distaste for the Soviet Union. The history of Soviet-Latin American relations, furthermore, has witnessed literally hundreds of controversies often resulting in the breaking or reduction of diplomatic intercourse. Soviet vessels have recently been involved in disputes with the countries of the region, adding even more problems. The Cuban experience has been a mixed blessing. While many praise Castro for breaking the Yankee yoke, just as many condemn him for delivering himself into the grasp of the Russian bear.

Popular suspicion of the Soviet Union was well-documented in Uruguay, one of the region's most liberal nations, in 1968. The Uruguayan Institute of Public Opinion's survey came up with some intriguing data. Only 20 percent of the respondents expressed a "very good" or "good" opinion of the Soviet Union. (The United States counted 63 percent.) Conversely, 33 percent of the Uruguayans polled held a "bad" or "very bad" opinion of the USSR. (The United States scored only 7 percent negative.) If that sort of distrust existed in relatively "liberal" Uruguay, it is safe to assume that attitudes in the more traditional nations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru (and probably in Panama) would reflect even more negative proclivities.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Goldhammer, op. cit., p. 258.

In sum, Soviet policy designs, ideological formulations, continuing suspicion of the Soviets in Latin America, and other factors combine to moderate the compilation of marked successes which the USSR has achieved with leftwing military regimes. Some gains have been attained, but neither present achievements nor future possibilities should be exaggerated. Gains have been limited, and future ambitions are moderate. A consideration of the leftist military regimes and their environment, moreover, adds another set of restricting circumstances to the scenario.

B. The Leftwing Military Regimes

An analysis of the characteristics and political ambience of the leftist military also tends to diminish exaggerated fears of imminent Soviet penetration in Latin America. Those elements include the military's nationalism, and the authenticity of its "radical" reputation, as well as other contextual factors such as possible changes in policies and governments, and the activities of nations in Latin America and elsewhere.

Nationalism is the point of departure in attempting to understand the new military. The entire matter is confused by dubbing those regimes as "leftist." That quality is only a secondary characteristic. The crux of the matter is that the military governments in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru are primarily nationalistic in orientation. Latin American nationalism is anti-American, but that does not suggest that there is any genuine pro-Russian, communistic orientation to it.

Furthermore, it is nonsense to imagine that the Soviets are responsible for Latin American nationalism. A recent scholarly article makes the point in proposing that anti-American nationalism and domestic reform are essentially:

... a function of Latin America's search for political identity and economic well-being, not of communist (and certainly not of Soviet) machinations or presence. Moscow did not create Castro, for example, and can take

precious little credit for Allende's electoral victory in Chile. Not only did it not help bring the progressive military government to power in Lima, but it persisted for months in attacking the new government as a typical "gorilla junta."<sup>1</sup>

Some Latin American nationalistic leaders find advantages in relations with the Soviets, but that is only one chapter in a longer story. They are also reviving old ties with Spain and France, for example, and forging new links with Japan and Australia. Additionally, a strong dose of Third Worldism informs Latin American nationalism and is growing more rapidly than any other quality.<sup>2</sup> The nationalistic direction of the left military's foreign policy, furthermore, has calculating and tactical elements about it designed to achieve limited goals. A German professor sets out the argument:

The governments of Latin America are trying to intensify their political and economic relations with the Soviet Union to the end of bettering their position with the United States. Putting the two world powers into a competitive situation, they propose to take from each of them all possible advantages just as other developing countries in other continents are doing.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, to make the obvious point, nationalism is a bulwark that diminishes foreign influence from whatever source. Substantial independence is just as strong a block to incipient Soviet imperialism as it is to the continuation of U.S. influence.

In the second place, the so-called "radical" reputation of the left military regimes merits some fundamental reservations. Indeed, the embryonic state of Soviet scholarship on Latin America is dramatically exemplified by the ideological trivia and wishful thinking that have seduced

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<sup>1</sup> Wayne S. Smith, op. cit., pp. 1123-1124.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of Latin American adhesion to Third World nationalism, see Edward J. Williams, The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations, Chapter IV, pp. 131-156 (Belmont, California: Duxbury Press, 1971).

<sup>3</sup> Estella, op. cit., p. 24.



Moscow's policymakers into their recent courtship of the Latin American military. The Soviets, to put the case bluntly, are mostly wrong. A survey of the nations involved elucidates the point. Bolivia's Juan José Torres was a real radical, admittedly, but he is no more, and conservative military have been in control there for nearly four years. In Ecuador, another Soviet favorite, a mid-1975 report calls into question the entire idea of a "progressive" regime:

The government does indeed seem to have no clearer an idea about what it is supposed to be doing in its internal policies than when it took power in February, 1972. No real departures have been made that could even remotely compare with actions of the Peruvian military regime; General Rodríguez may have been following the latter's practice of blaming all problems on the oligarchy and the middlemen, but, unlike the Peruvian government, he has done nothing to challenge their power.<sup>1</sup>

Rodríguez Lara's major concern is political survival and his time is mostly spent in manipulations designed to "surround himself with ministers and military commanders of conservative views who have little to recommend them but their unconditional loyalty to the President." By mid-1975, indeed, the so-called "Brazilian" tendency was gaining on the Peruvian group within the Ecuadorean government.<sup>2</sup>

Although Rodríguez had made much of his anti-Yankeeism, recent reports generate doubt concerning his "leftist" tendencies. He has assumed a moderate stance in negotiations with the oil companies and opposed the extreme demands of Ecuadorean labor unions in their confrontation with foreign-owned oil. There is little of the radical in any of those policies and the whole idea of depicting the present Ecuadorean regime as "progressive" is essentially based on some anti-Yankee posturing in previous years. With

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<sup>1</sup> Latin America, p. 159 (23 May 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 364 (22 November 1974); and p. 173 (6 June 1975).

the passing of that posturing, little remains of military leftism in Ecuador.<sup>1</sup>

In Honduras the historical evidence is mixed and the present transitional situation confused, but there is no convincing case for the position that military leftism has become entrenched. Lopez Arellano was largely a political opportunist. From 1972 until his recent overthrow he assumed a populist stance and pushed for agrarian reform. His foreign policies mirrored a slight strain of anti-Yankeeism, but it did not entail any initiatives to cement relations with the Soviet Union.

At present, several forces within the military are jockeying for power. One group is "radical" or "peruanista," but it seems not to be the most influential. The president, in fact, is a representative of the "conservative" wing of the military. The struggle revolves about the implementation of the agrarian legislation. The agrarian reform has been characterized as "a reformist rather than a radical measure" and has official U.S. support, which offers an idea of its basic moderation.<sup>2</sup> In sum, neither at home nor in foreign policy have the Hondurans pursued initiatives that should merit accolades from the Soviet Union.

Despite a lot of bombast, Panama's General Torrijos may be less a wild-eyed radical than often assumed. Moves toward minimal nationalization on the domestic scene are far outweighed by the continuation of a moderate position favoring basically conservative economic policies. The local Communist Party has criticized the control still exercised by the Panamanian oligarchy and North American monopolies and the Party has been especially troubled with Torrijos' five year plan that programs a dominant role for the private sector. Beyond the communists, furthermore, rumblings are surfacing that depict Torrijos as "just another caudillo employing

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion, see Latin America, pp. 173 and 183 respectively (6 and 13 June 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 220-221 (18 July 1975).

revolutionary nationalistic rhetoric to mystify the people while he uses the time to line his pockets..."<sup>1</sup>

On the potentially explosive issue of the Canal Treaty, Torrijos has assumed a rather moderate position. He has counseled patience and forbearance featuring a "step-by-step and orderly process of demilitarization and neutralization of the canal." One of his ministers reflects the official position by damning as "fascist" the extremists who seek immediate, total nationalization of the Canal. A recent report, indeed, suggests that his moderate hand has been crucial in restraining Panamanian students from creating a crisis.<sup>2</sup>

The Peruvian situation, finally, presents more for the Soviets to nurture, but even here the opportunities are limited. Excepting Castro, Peru has wrought closer relations with the Soviet bloc than any other Latin American nation. Trade has increased, the Peruvians have received Soviet military hardware and advisers. Genuine nationalism, the concentration of state power, and populist reform have also advanced further in Peru than in the other nations. Nevertheless, the radical propensities of the Peruvian generals ought not to be exaggerated.

With reference to overall ideology and structural reform, both the Peruvian leadership and scholars have quite clearly denied "communistic" tendencies. The generals insist that they are creating a new departure rooted in Peruvian historical reality and not in foreign ideology. General Velasco, for instance, argues that the regime is pursuing "a scheme of economic organization radically distinct from those prescribed by statist models which our Revolution rejects." One description is that Peru has a "progressive and modernizing bourgeois regime, not a socialistic one."

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<sup>1</sup> For the party's critique, see Staar, op. cit., p. 349. For the comment on Torrijos, Latin America, p. 102 (28 March 1975).

<sup>2</sup> See Time, p. 30 (28 July 1975). Also Latin America, pp. 168 and 204, respectively (30 May and 4 July 1975).



Probably closest to the mark is the claim that "recent developments in Peru smack heavily of an updated form of corporatism."<sup>1</sup>

In a more concrete sense, the specific policies of the regime deny its radical reputation. A World Bank report, for example, notes that the agrarian reform will leave fully 43 percent of the arable land in private hands. As the communist critics, themselves, complain, the labor and industrial reforms are basically cooperative in nature and look to class reconciliation rather than the sharpening of class conflict. In the universities, furthermore, the generals have routed radical opposition and imposed a heightened sense of discipline. The government has been tough on leftist opposition, and even relations with the moderate Communist Party are tense.<sup>2</sup>

Despite some stresses and strains, moreover, Peruvian-U.S. relations have improved as the revolution progressed. Peru has pressed Washington for the renewal of arms agreements, and U.S. private investment is again increasing after a period of readjustment. In the 1975-76 period, in fact, Occidental Petroleum projects an investment of some \$340 million in Peru--the largest sums allocated by the company anywhere in the world.

In mid-1974, indeed, relations were much improved with the signing of a treaty settling a number of matters. General Velasco highlighted that fact in his annual message to the nation, noting that "this treaty has put

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<sup>1</sup> Plan Inca ... Mensaje a la Nacion, p. 11; Martin C. Needler, "Detente: Impetus for Change in Latin America?" Journal of International Affairs 28:222, No. 2 (1974); James M. Malloy, "Peru Before and After the Coup of 1968," Journal of Inter-American Studies 14:452, No. 4 (November 1972).

<sup>2</sup> See Latin America, p. 196 (27 June 1975); and Michael Locker, "Perspective on the Peruvian Military-Part Two," NACLA Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 6, p. 15n (October 1969). For two examples of cogent and sharply phrased denials of the progressiveness of the Peruvian generals, see two Peruvians close to the scene, Anibal Quijano, Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); and Victor Villanueva, "Nueva Mentalidad Militar in el Peru?" in Tulchin, Problems in Latin American History, pp. 365-369.

to an end a period of undeniable tension in the relations of Peru with the United States, fulfilling with it the objective of maintaining cordial relations with all of the world's nations."<sup>1</sup>

In sum, the policies, programs, and postures of the so-called leftwing military are not nearly so radical as the Soviets seem to imply. The Bolivian regime was, in truth, quite radical, but it has been deposed. The Ecuadoreans and Hondurans are not much beyond mildly reformistic. Panama's Torrijos postures from time to time, but has operated in a basically responsible manner. The Peruvian government has developed a noncommunist ideology and continues to maintain equitable relations with the United States, despite increased contacts with the Soviet bloc.

The same message is also implicit in a comparative analysis of two other contextual factors--the policies of other Latin American nations; and the increased activity of other non-Hemispheric, noncommunist powers. The first point is simple enough. The policies and programs pursued by leftwing military regimes do not differ in kind from similar initiatives pursued by other Latin American nations both now and in the past. In 1969, for example, Nelson Rockefeller's study group was denied admission by a leftwing military government in Peru, but it was also rejected by Christian Democratic governments in Chile and Venezuela. If Peru's generals nationalized the International Petroleum Company in 1968, Mexico's populists had nationalized much more comprehensive petroleum holdings fully 30 years before. If Ecuador's General Rodríguez legalized the Communist Party in the 1970s, Venezuela's former president Rafael Caldera had preceded him by several years. Several of the generals in Ecuador and Peru have established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but so have more of the civilians in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela. United Brands is in trouble in Honduras, but it is not much better off in Costa

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<sup>1</sup> "U.S. Arms Sales to Latin America," Christian Science Monitor, p. 7 (5 July 1973; Latin America, p. 83 (14 March 1975); and Plan Inca ... Mensaje a la Nacion, p. 14.

Rica. The Peruvian regime is bent on climbing to a level of 50 percent state investment, but the Chilean government of Eduardo Frei had achieved fully 70 percent some 10 years ago.<sup>1</sup> Peruvian trade with the Soviet area has increased dramatically, but not much more rapidly than Colombia's, and it still involves considerably less money than Soviet trade with either Argentina or Brazil.

To reiterate, the point is simple enough and demands no detailed description and analysis. Whatever indices are utilized to typify governments as "progressive" (and prone to Soviet influence), they are in no way limited to Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru. In any sort of comparative context those regimes (with the exception of Peru) are less "progressive" than most of their fellow nations in Latin America.

The same conclusion, furthermore, must be drawn from putting the rise of Soviet influence in the context of the increasing presence of other non-Hemispheric, noncommunist nations. The diminution of U.S. control has benefited Western Europe, Canada, and Japan more than it has the Soviet bloc. Even admitting the special characteristics of the Soviet ingredient in the mix, it is only one of the new elements. A Peruvian leftist makes the point in discussing "the discontinuities and the tensions between the imperialist extractive companies... As soon as the American monopolies withdrew, the Japanese and the European monopolies immediately stepped in."<sup>2</sup> The Canadian and the British have had significant roles in new Peruvian mining ventures and have been joined by private firms and governmental agencies from Belgium, France, Japan, Romania, Sweden and Switzerland. The Soviets have offered assistance to the fishing industry in Peru, but so have groups from the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Poland and Yugoslavia. Neither Ecuador nor Panama has received Soviet military hardware, but both have received arms from Canada, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany. The Peruvian generals want nothing of the Soviet ideology, but they have

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<sup>1</sup> Quijano, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 105.



been mightily influenced by the Yugoslavs and, to a lesser extent, by the Israelis and the Swedes.

The case of Japan, of course, exemplifies the point. Japanese trade has grown by leaps and bounds in Latin America and far outstrips commercial exchange between Latin America and the entire Soviet bloc. In 1972, for example, Japan accounted for 10 percent or more of imports and/or exports in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua.<sup>1</sup>

The conclusion is clear: the Soviets have taken advantage of the erosion of U.S. influence, but really less so than other nations. If the context for analysis were an East-West dichotomy, the West has slipped little in percentage terms of trade, aid, or private investment. The converse, of course, is that the Soviets have gained precious little.

A final part of the analysis of the regimes in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru focuses on possible changes in policy directions or, more fundamentally, changes in governments. The Soviets are sensitive to those possibilities and their cautious attitude probably flows from that factor. The recent Soviet expulsion from Egypt demonstrates that nationalistic regimes are capable of a very real independence despite considerable reliance on the Soviets. The 1971 ouster of Bolivia's radical General Torres teaches the same lesson in a rather different way.

Taking a historical perspective, it is worth recalling that in 1959 the Soviet ideologues defined a number of nations as "national democracies on the noncapitalist path to socialism." They included Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Iraq.<sup>2</sup> Guatemala and the Sudan also have evoked Soviet interest in recent years. If Soviet influenced communist revolutions is the measure of the success of the policy of the USSR, the record demonstrates that Moscow has been none-too-perceptive in its analysis of

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<sup>1</sup> See Ruddle and Hamour, op. cit. (1973 edition).

<sup>2</sup> Wayne S. Smith, op. cit., p. 1134.

political trends in the Hemisphere. The Kremlin, moreover, seems to have learned a few lessons from its failures, and the present policy expresses reservations about the reliability of Third World nationalists.<sup>1</sup> They are, on the whole, a mercurial lot given to unpredictable changes in behavior and policy or, even worse, subject to overthrow by anti-Soviet forces.

The dreary history of Latin American political instability ought to concern the Soviets, and the last decade is especially relevant. While the ideologues in Moscow have been revising doctrine to praise new developments in military progressivism, the actual events belie much of the doctrine. Conservative to reactionary military governments have come to power in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay.

Without attempting to prognosticate further governmental policy change or power transfers, a survey of the leftwing military governments lends credence to Soviet caution. Of the five "progressive" regimes defined by Moscow, two are already gone. Bolivia's Juan José Torres, the most radical of all, lasted less than a year. In Honduras, López Arellano is in disgrace and several factions are vying for power. Present trends do not necessarily favor the leftist (or "peruanista") wing of the armed forces. In Ecuador, General Rodríguez has lost his reformistic zeal and, indeed, is threatened by several groups who have grown weary of his incompetence. The recent coup attempt was a forceful demonstration of that impatience. The fourth member of the group--Omar Torrijos--is in a position not unlike Ecuador's Rodríguez. He has retreated from his earlier posturing and assumed an increasingly moderate stance as he preaches patience both to the left and the ultranationalistic right in Panama. His personal integrity is increasingly questioned, and he appears running scared. In

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<sup>1</sup> For the analysis, see Hamburg in Kanet, ed., op. cit., p. 189. Significantly, the same propensity was identified by the "Rockefeller Report." "Above all, authoritarian governments, bent on rapid change, have an intrinsic ideological unreliability and a vulnerability to extreme nationalism. They can go in almost any doctrinal direction." "Quality of Life in the Americas," op. cit., p. 18.

a recent interview he expressed fears for his life in proposing that he was "caught between the students who want action and the oligarchs who would like to get rid of me."<sup>1</sup>

The Peruvian generals, finally, are in a much stronger position, but even there some signs exist which may bother the Soviets. In the first place, the worst is over for Peruvian-U.S. relations and a rapprochement is evolving. Secondly, as a sympathetic Mexican source reports, in 1974 "certain political and social events took place which constitute a threat to the continuity of the Peruvian process." The most widely published of those "events" was the February police mutiny that triggered a pitched battle between police and military and widespread rioting and looting. One source states that "there can be little doubt that there was a rightwing conspiracy afoot." Furthermore, the military has been split on many aspects of the "revolution," and the Peruvian Navy has been unhappy with the regime and continues to operate as the focal point for military opposition. Leftwing predominance may now be jeopardized by the loss of Velasco's unifying influence. Underlying all of those particular problems, finally, is the fact that the Peruvian experiment has really not worked extremely well. The economy has moved sluggishly, and the next two years may be even more austere than usual. In the political sphere, the same sympathetic Mexican source quoted above comments that "the absence of a bond between government and masses ... tends to create areas of conflict that are becoming the Achilles heel of the whole transformation process."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On the Ecuadorean situation, see "Civilian Coup on the Way?" Latin America, p. 150 (16 May 1975). For the Torrijos interview, David Binder, "Ford Stalling, Says Panama's Chief," Arizona Daily Star, Tucson, p. A2 (28 July 1975).

<sup>2</sup> The quotations and concomitant analysis are from Comercio Exterior, pp. 97-98 (Abril de 1975); Theberge, op. cit., pp. 87-88; and three numbers of Latin America (14 February, 21 March, and 4 July 1975).



In conclusion, the position of the Latin American left-military in the mix--military, Soviet Union, United States--also demonstrates that care should be exercised in predicting increased Soviet influence. The picture is too complex and imponderable to permit much confidence in prediction. If it be true that some indications seem to augur well for more Soviet presence, it is equally true that just as many factors exist that put strict limitations on Soviet expectations in Latin America. The role of the United States, finally, also ramifies significantly onto the Latin American scene.

C. The United States

The United States exercises an overwhelming presence in Latin America. The success or failure of the Soviets in achieving good relations or increased influence with leftwing military governments depends on more than the intentions and activities of those two political actors; the United States has an important role. In the first place, the very existence of such regimes is partially explained as a reaction to the United States; anti-Yankee nationalism is the major definitional characteristic. Nationalism once unleashed is not always amenable to redirection, but insofar as it is, and insofar as it is based on valid complaints, U.S. policies and programs will influence the leftwing military-Soviet relationship.

In fact, Latin American leftwing military regimes think that they have had just charges to file. In Peru, for example, the International Petroleum Company had earned a deplorable reputation and was the symbol of insensitive, overbearing and exploitative foreign capital. When the United States rushed to the aid of the IPC and threatened the imposition of the Hickenlooper Amendment, the Peruvians, perhaps correctly, charged the United States with a promiscuous foreign policy that made no effort to understand their position. Peru has also been engaged in an ongoing dispute with the United States over tuna fishing for the last decade and obviously feels that it has been badly treated. That problem led to the imposition of the Pelly Amendment, partially explaining Peru's search for

arms in Europe and, ultimately, in the Soviet Union. A recent analysis of The Soviet Presence in Latin America makes the point:

There was a great deal of resentment against the United States in Peru at the time of the military takeover. U.S. policies in the 1960s had created strong anti-American currents within the armed forces. Washington refused to sell supersonic aircraft to the Peruvian Air Force, while at the same time pressuring the Belaúnde government not to purchase French Mirages. Little money was allocated to Peru under the Alliance for Progress; and in general, Washington adopted a cool attitude toward the military junta in 1968. The suspension of all military sales and economic aid as a result of a fisheries dispute and the seizure of the assets of the International Petroleum Company (IPC) only made matters worse. Many Peruvian officers and civilians felt a sense of betrayal by a traditionally friendly country.<sup>1</sup>

The Ecuadoreans are also involved in the tuna controversy and, like the Peruvians, were subject to the Pelly Amendment. More recently, the 1974 Trade Act refused Ecuador and Venezuela trade advantages (granted to every other Latin American nation) based on their OPEC membership. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have damned that aspect of the legislation and it is, of course, easy to understand Ecuadorean resentment. Direct cause and effect is more difficult to discern in Honduras, but the Hondurans have nurtured the belief that the United States did not offer adequate support in their "Football (soccer) War" with Salvador in 1969. In the contemporary period, the anti-Yankee, leftwing military group is feeding on the United Brands bribery scandal. In Panama, finally, the Canal controversy is well-known. The Panamanians think that the Canal is theirs and General Torrijos took advantage of that issue to earn the support of his people and the approval of the Soviet Union. Thus, the perception of U.S. policy has contributed to the assumption of a leftist political posture by the military regimes.

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<sup>1</sup> Theberge, op. cit., p. 83.

If reaction to U.S. policies has contributed to the anti-Yankee positions of the left-military, revision of those policies may alleviate some complaints and weaken the potential for Soviet influence. This is not to say that the Latin Americans are about to embrace the United States. Latin American nationalism has matured too far for any return to dependence. Moreover, the Latin American left-military is perspicacious enough to recognize the advantages of playing off the superpowers against one another. Nonetheless, a more sympathetic response to the demands of the Latin Americans is bound to diminish the possibilities for Soviet intrusion into the Hemisphere.

One further point about U.S.-Latin American relationships demands emphasizing--the United States remains the overwhelmingly dominant power in Latin America. Whatever talk there may be of growing Soviet intercourse or increasing Japanese economic presence, no single nation or logical combination of nations comes anywhere near exercising the influence of the United States. Every conceivable index illustrates the proposition--the United States has more trade, aid, and private investment; it trains more military men and educates more students; its television shows are omnipresent; its movie stars adulated; its culture mimicked; its language well-known; its military hardware more frequently utilized; its tourists more numerous; and so on, ad infinitum. All of that may change in the future, of course, but clearly not for a long time.

Furthermore, both the Soviets and the leftwing military are conscious of that fact. "Geographic fatalism" may no longer be the focus for the Soviet conceptualization of Latin America's place in world politics, but much of the policy substance of the past remains. The Soviets have apparently introduced no offensive weapons into the Western Hemisphere; in 1970 they backed off from the construction of a submarine base in Cuba. Moscow played a careful game with Chile's Allende, and more recently assumed a low-key posture at the 1973 Security Council meeting in Panama. The policies of the left-military are equally circumspect. Torrijos argues for reason on the Canal issue; Rodríguez Lara backs off from confrontation with the United States; the Honduran generals seek U.S. approval; and



even the Peruvians herald the improvement of relations with the United States.

An analysis of the U.S. role in the triangular relationship suggests that Soviet courting of the left-military is of little consequence in the context of international politics. The U.S. presence in Latin America suggests that there are severe limitations on the evolution of any significant or substantial relationship between the two forces. Whatever tendencies exist, furthermore, can be reversed if the United States is willing to meet the governments half-way in resolving outstanding issues.

## V CONCLUSIONS

The salient aspects of this description and analysis have been crystallized throughout and need no detailed reiteration here, but several summary propositions seem useful. Burgeoning anti-Yankee nationalism created a more dynamic quality in Latin American international politics. Combined with increasing Soviet power and the growing global role of the USSR, that fact has evoked Moscow's interest and the Soviets have increased their intercourse with the region. On the Latin American scene, the last decade has seen the rise of the leftwing military, characterized by anti-Yankee attitudes and some domestic reformism. Those two phenomena--Moscow's global pretensions and left-militarism--have catalyzed new Soviet ideological formulations, featuring the image of a natural alliance between the USSR and the new regimes and resulting in some degree of Soviet courtship. The United States has manifested concern over these Soviet activities.

As this paper demonstrates, such concern is relatively ill-conceived. No significant changes have been effected, nor are there any in the offing for the foreseeable future. Both Soviet resources and policy ambitions in Latin America are limited; indeed it appears that in at least one instance Moscow would like to reduce its stake (and expenses) in Latin America by diminishing its support of Fidel Castro. Moreover, the Soviet ideologues have overplayed the "radical" characteristics of the military regimes in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama and Peru. Finally, an overabundance of alarming predictions has misrepresented reality by positing a pessimistic scenario that overemphasizes the erosion of U.S. presence and power.

A valid characterization of the situation might be outlined in three propositions: (1) Soviet gains in Latin America since Castro have been inconsequential; (2) the leftwing military regimes are reformistic, not radical; and (3) U.S. power and influence remain manifestly predominant.

SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD:  
COMMUNIST PARTIES, INDIGENOUS INSURGENT GROUPS  
AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR GROUPS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

Milorad Popov



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## SUMMARY

Loyalty to orthodox Marxist views of history has often blinded Soviet analysts to the realities of African politics. Although the class structure is rudimentary and there is no working class or industrial proletariat, the Soviets still predict that Africa will enact the blueprint for communist victory: the repressed proletariat will rise and overcome the repressive bourgeoisie. Soviet analysis of African political development has, admittedly, become less rigid over the years, but it continues to insist on the crucial roles of the proletariat and its vanguard (or communist) party.

The problem for the Soviet Union is that the impact and potential role of Marxist-Leninist organizations in Africa is marginal at best. Sub-Saharan Africa has simply not been a fertile area for the development of orthodox pro-Soviet communist parties. Out of the 75 parties that attended the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969, only five were from sub-Saharan Africa. The Sudanese Communist Party, which was the only relatively powerful Marxist-Leninist party in the area, suffered a severe reversal in its participation in the abortive coup of July 1971. Pro-Soviet Nigerian communists are being increasingly outflanked by a growing anti-Soviet New Left. A number of pro-Chinese groups have appeared to counter Soviet influence. Similarly, the activity of pro-Soviet individuals and groups in noncommunist movements has not, as yet, brought any notable gains for the Soviet Union.

The unusual relationship between African governments and their trade unions has determined Soviet tactics of union influence. From the outset, African unions have assumed the role of an extraparliamentary political pressure group in cooperation with the nationalist parties--against the colonial power and, after independence, in support of the new government. Thus the trade unions have evolved into little more than adjuncts of single-party-ruled states.

The Soviet tactic for influencing the trade unions has been twofold: the provision of training, primarily political, to selected African trade unionists; and the support of radical governments in their attempts to exert influence in pan-African organizations, most notably the All-African Trade Union Federation. Most training has taken place in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, with mixed results. The centers are still active, but students have expressed dissatisfaction with excessive political indoctrination, and racial and disciplinary problems have arisen. Ghana was formerly the Soviet proxy in pan-African organizations, but has now been replaced by Dahomey. The Soviet influence in the international trade unions is increasingly evident in the appearance of the Soviet-backed World Federation of Trade Unions on conference agendas.

U.S. options to counter Soviet influence in sub-Saharan Africa are limited. The American response should be primarily at the information level, for example, in exchange of intelligence where feasible with countries which are targets of Soviet action through local communist parties, insurgent groups, or labor organizations. Information on Soviet actions and strategies can be provided through government channels, or sometimes more advantageously, through the U.S. side of labor organizations, such as the AFL-CIO.



## I INTRODUCTION

### A. Background

Until the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet foreign policy had largely ignored the African continent. Class structure in Africa is rudimentary and Soviet theoreticians adhered to the orthodox Marxist view that the triumph of communism was to be achieved through a convulsive struggle between the repressed proletariat and a repressive bourgeoisie. Even though Lenin had emphasized the key role that would be played by anti-colonialism in defeating capitalism--most notably in his book Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917)--the Communist Party of South Africa was the only party to be founded in sub-Saharan Africa during the whole period of the Communist International (1919-43). In general, the Soviet Union left it to the communist parties of Western Europe to infiltrate European colonial areas. The Bandung Conference of 1955, which revealed a rising nationalist and anticolonialist movement, led the Soviets to question Stalin's assertions that communism would succeed in Africa only when capitalism was defeated in Europe. Interest in Africa was awakened; a few small, indigenous communist parties were founded (in Basutoland, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan); and the Soviet Union courted the continent's nationalist movements. Now, 20 years later, the Soviet Union, conditioned by dogmatic ideological theories, is still trying to come to terms with African political realities. Although Soviet theoreticians have formulated over the years concepts such as "national democracy" (in 1960) and "revolutionary democracy" (1963) to accommodate African reality within a theoretical scheme of eventual transition to communism, they continue to emphasize the crucial roles of the proletariat and its vanguard (or communist) party. This stance has dominated Soviet thinking even though there remains a virtual absence in Africa, particularly south of the Sahara, of effective communist parties or even of a working class or industrial proletariat. Soviet analysis of African political development

has, admittedly, become less rigid over the years, but certain themes have remained constant. An understanding of Soviet perceptions and responses to so-called African Socialism can provide the framework for discussion and forecast of specific aspects of Soviet policy.

#### B. African Socialism

In 1970 the Director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, V.G. Solodovnikov, edited a lengthy volume entitled The Political Parties of Africa.<sup>1</sup> Ten years earlier, his predecessor as Director of the Institute, the late Ivan Potekhin, had published a much shorter study, Africa Looks to the Future.<sup>2</sup> A comparison of the two works offers a valuable insight into Soviet thinking, most notably regarding those themes that have remained constant and that today, five years later, still dominate Soviet theory.

The single major difference between the two studies is in their tone. While Potekhin gives the impression that the emerging African nations are all looking to the Soviet Union for guidance, Solodovnikov appears more hesitant. In contrast to the predetermined pattern forecast by Potekhin, the scene is described as one of political instability and "zig-zag development."

On the question of African Socialism, the two analysts' views remain remarkably similar. Potekhin had reviewed various brands of Socialism, from Thomas More's Utopia to Yugoslav Socialism, and concluded that Marxism-Leninism was the only valid version. He rejected the argument advanced by some Africans that the continent's historical background and

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<sup>1</sup> V.G. Solodovnikov, A.B. Letnev, and P.I. Manchka, Politicheskiye Partii Afriki, 343 pp (Moscow, Nauka, 1970). (This work has been translated by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service as Political Parties of Africa: A Soviet Study, Arlington, Va., 1971, 340 pp.)

<sup>2</sup> Ivan Potekhin, Afrika smotrit v budushchee (Moscow, Oriental Languages Publishing House, 1960). Translated into French as L'Afrique regarde vers l'avenir, 88 pp. (Moscow, Editions de Litterature Orientale, 1962).

present social and economic characteristics made it unsuitable for transition to communism. The Soviet Union's experience in Central Asia, he stated, had shown that "Marxist-Leninist theory can serve as the guiding star in the fight for people's happiness under any socio-economic conditions." Africa was no exception, and African individuality was not due to any special factors which apply only to African peoples: it was due to the interference of European capitalism. Solodovnikov makes reference to the "Utopian" views of certain African leaders, rejects the concept of African exclusivity, and labels as anti-Communists those who argue that Communism has no natural roots in the African continent.

An objection to African Socialism raised by Potekhin was its proponents' refusal to recognize the existence of classes in African society. He accused them of underestimating the degree of class differentiation and pointed to the existence of an embryo working class in the form of a rapidly growing proletariat. He also emphasized that workers organized in trade unions constituted the "most active force in the anti-imperialist and independence movement." Solodovnikov admits that the working class is "immature" and badly organized and that "class contradictions" in urban areas are relatively weak. But he insists that the class struggle is growing, and that class differentiation is taking its normal course in Africa.

Potekhin made little reference to the role of the continent's communist parties, but he claimed that communists would play a vanguard role in the evolving African party system. Solodovnikov devotes considerable space to Africa's Marxist-Leninist movement (see II, below), and he claims that communists are in the forefront both of the liberation movement (in colonial territories) and of all actions aimed at improving the workers' position and countering imperialism (in independent states). He does admit, however, that the communist parties are not "of mass size" and that virtually all of them have been driven underground.



The concept of "revolutionary democratic" parties had not been evolved by the Soviets at the time when Potekhin's book was published. By the time Solodovnikov had issued his study, several parties in Africa had earned (and some, like those in Ghana and Mali, had lost) the title. Considerable space is devoted to the concept (pp. 69-166 in the English translation), which would indicate that the Soviet solution to the relative failure of orthodox communist parties would be to support the transformation of "revolutionary democratic" organizations from mass movements into Soviet-line "Socialist avant-garde parties." The only three sub-Saharan ruling parties described as "revolutionary democratic" were those of Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, and Tanzania. Also listed were the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). One of the principal criticisms reiterated against these parties--which are also described as potentially "reliable detachments" of the world communist movement--is their failure to transform themselves from mass to vanguard organizations. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) is singled out, and Solodovnikov also makes the somewhat surprising assertion that the downfall of Kwame Nkrumah could be in part ascribed to the efforts made by his Ghanaian Convention People's Party to appeal to "all parts of the nation"--a statement which, while not historically accurate, clearly reflects Soviet preference for rule by a small disciplined party rather than by broad democratic participation. By 1975, the only additional ruling sub-Saharan organization to be listed as "revolutionary democratic" was the Somalian Supreme Revolutionary Council. Soviet reaction to President Kerekou's announcement in November 1974 that Dahomey would adopt Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology has so far been cautious. In reporting nationalization measures and the establishment of local revolutionary committees, an article in Pravda (11 February 1975) made no attempt to define the political orientation of Dahomey's ruling National Council of the Revolution.

Solodovnikov's study is vague as to how "revolutionary democratic" and nationalist parties are to be turned into communist-style vanguard

organizations. There is an implication that communists should infiltrate into these parties with the aim of "revolutionizing" them, and the book advises that communists should "rely mainly on the left-wing, more revolutionary elements and overcome the right-wing, nationalist elements," even, in some instances, carrying out purges of "alien and casual elements." A somewhat ambivalent approach is taken with reference to the trend toward single-party rule in Africa. Such a system, it is stated, makes it harder for communist parties to develop, but, at the same time, it is hinted that in the long run single-party government could help communists by giving them a strong and unified state to take over.

The debate over African Socialism and the communists' role in its development has continued into the 1970s. At the end of 1972 and beginning of 1973, The African Communist<sup>1</sup> carried articles by a certain Albert Tshumbe, which were offered in order to elicit comment on "Africa's revolutionary way forward." In its essential stance, the analysis was similar to Solodovnikov's. Although Tshumbe criticized "ultra-leftists" who insisted on the hegemony of the proletariat and rejected administration by army officers and intellectuals, he also attacked those who correlated noncapitalist development with socialism. He admitted that trends in Africa were more varied and complex than had been originally realized. Generally speaking, there were two poles of political development on the continent: "capitalist-oriented" states (such as the Ivory Coast, Malawi and Senegal) and "socialist-oriented" ones (such as Congo-Brazzaville and Somalia) which had "hitched their wagon firmly to the Red Star" even though their socialism was often a blend of scientific and utopian conceptions, as in the case of Tanzania and Guinea. In fact, with reference to Guinea, Tshumbe noted that developments there appeared to be grinding to a halt, with the emergence of a petit bourgeois group closely linked to the state.

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<sup>1</sup> The African Communist, No. 51 (Fourth Quarter 1972) and No. 52 (First Quarter 1973). This quarterly journal is the organ of the banned South African Communist Party. It is published in London "in the interests of African solidarity, and as a forum for Marxist-Leninist thought throughout /the/continent."

States like Zambia were commended for "anti-imperialist" actions, such as nationalization measures, but they could not be classified as revolutionary democratic regimes, and Tshume appeared to find it harder to discern their direction.

As for communist activity, Tshume stated that Marxist-Leninist parties, where they exist, or study groups and individuals elsewhere, should engage in patient political work, not forgetting that the noncapitalist road was one of sharp class warfare. He emphasized that even regimes such as those in Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania could not be expected to become socialist without undergoing transformation and without a communist-led working class coming to the fore either as an independent or as a part of a single ruling party.

The problem for the Soviet Union is that the impact and potential role of Marxist-Leninist organizations in Africa is marginal at best. In a surprisingly candid followup to Tshume's articles, another contribution to The African Communist (No. 54, Third Quarter 1973) by Molefe Mini stated: "In addition to the fact of nonexistence of Communist Parties, it is by and large true that where working class parties have existed, they have not had sufficient strength and authority among the masses of the working people to be able, in practice, to win vanguard positions in the anti-imperialist front." Nonetheless, the Soviets continue to adhere steadfastly to their own blueprint for African political development. With the announcement that a Conference on African Socialism was scheduled to be held in July 1975 in Tunis (under the sponsorship of Tunisia and Senegal), Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress initiated a series of broadcasts in different languages, spread over five days from 27 March. Reiterating oft-expressed Soviet criticisms, the broadcasts dismissed claims that Arabs and Africans had sufficient psychological and national individuality to need a special form of socialism, and condemned the theory of "Third Road Socialism" as "a lie designed to mislead the masses."



## II COMMUNIST PARTIES AND INDIGENOUS INSURGENT GROUPS

### A. Background

Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a fertile area for the development of orthodox pro-Soviet communist parties. Out of the 75 parties that attended the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow on 5-17 June 1969, only five were from sub-Saharan Africa: the Communist Party of Lesotho, the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (from Nigeria), the Reunion Communist Party, the South African Communist Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party. In Solodovnikov's Political Parties of Africa, published in 1970 (see I, above), the same five parties are listed, with the addition of the Senegalese Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (PAI), which, though founded as early as 1957, has been beset by schisms. Solodovnikov noted: "The working class of Africa has its own specific features which distinguish it from the proletariats of Europe and all other regions of the world: non-permanence and the related great fluidity of the working force, the weakness of proletarian traditions, inadequate organization, the considerable influence of tribal survivals, low literacy, etc. These circumstances naturally hamper the working class of Africa at the present stage with respect to becoming a decisive force for social and economic development" (pp. 167-68).

Solodovnikov, while admitting that there were few organized Marxist-Leninist parties, claimed nevertheless that African Marxists were "working as organizers and participants in Marxist circles and groups"; he also stated that Marxists were "doing a large amount of work within the framework of legal and illegal progressive political parties," including the Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG), the Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT), the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar, the Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), the Partido Africano de Independencia de Guine e das Ilhas de Cabo Verde

(PAIGC), the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) of Rhodesia, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), and the Ankoton'ny Kongresi'ny Fahaleovantenan Madagaskara (AKFM) in the Malagasy Republic (pp. 207-08).

B. Current Status of Soviet Influence

Since 1970 the situation has not changed significantly. If anything, the influence of organized pro-Soviet communist parties has decreased. The Sudanese Communist Party, which was the only relatively powerful Marxist-Leninist party in sub-Saharan Africa, suffered a severe reversal as a result of its participation in the abortive coup d'etat of 19 July 1971; pro-Soviet Nigerian communists are being increasingly outflanked by a growing anti-Soviet New Left, and a number of pro-Chinese groups have appeared (in 1970, Solodovnikov noted that pro-Chinese parties had been created in the Malagasy Republic, Senegal, Somalia, Kenya, Congo-Kinshasa, Mauritius, and "in certain other countries"--p. 209). Likewise, the activity of pro-Soviet individuals and groups in noncommunist movements has not, as yet, brought any notable gains for the Soviet Union. Within this latter category, however, the situation is fluid, and Soviet government-to-government activity could, in some instances, bring significant assistance to complement the work of the indigenous Marxist groups.

1. Through Organized Parties

In those countries where the Soviet Union has had acknowledged organized parties and/or groups, the situation in 1975 is as follows:

a. Lesotho

Founded in 1961, in close cooperation with South African Communists, the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) has never played more than a marginal role. In the early 1960s a CPL leader, N. Mefane, was

General Secretary of the small Basutoland Congress of Trade Unions (BCTU), but this union, which only had one affiliate--the communist-inspired Basutoland Workers' Union (BWU)--has apparently been inactive since 1967. The CPL has attempted to form a united front with the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), but with no success. Similarly, approaches made to the conservative Marema-Tlou Freedom Party, which sought increased power for the monarchy, did not bear fruit. The CPL was banned in February 1970, and little has been heard from it since. In fact, since 1973 none of the issues of The African Communist (which used to faithfully report its statements and activities) has made any reference to the party. At one time the CPL issued a journal, Tokoloho (Freedom), but this publication, according to Solodovnikov, was "taken over by an anti-party splinter group." The party then started publishing Majammoho (Communist), but this new journal does not seem to have survived the CPL's banning. The last official reports indicated that J.M. Kena was the party's Secretary-General, and that R. Matji was its Chairman. For the Soviet Union, the CPL's single useful role was its alignment with the Soviets in Sino-Soviet polemics.

b. Nigeria

The Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (SWAFP) was founded in 1963. According to Solodovnikov, it had, at its first Congress (December 1965), 22,000 members in 83 local organizations. U.S. estimates, however, gave the party at that time a membership of less than 1,000.<sup>1</sup> The lower figure appears to have been closer to reality. With the banning of political parties, in 1966 and again in 1970, the SWAFP no longer operated openly. In fact, at the aforementioned International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in 1969, the Nigerian delegation was only listed as "Nigerian Marxist-Leninists."

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Eighteenth Annual Report, p. 127 (January 1966).



The party's principal source of influence has been its control of one of Nigeria's four central labor organizations, the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). The trade union's weekly Advance was initially started in August 1965 as a joint initiative with the SWAFP. The SWAFP has also been operating through the Nigerian Committee of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (NC-AAPSO) and the Nigerian Youth Thinkers' Club (NYTC). The Patrice Lumumba Labour Institute in Lagos has been run by the party.

Since 1972, however, the Nigerian pro-Soviet left has been in considerable disarray. Conflict arose over the use of funds that the Soviet Union had been providing to its supporters. Not only was there mutual recrimination that pitted the SWAFP Secretary-General, Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, against the President of the NTUC, Wahab Goodluck, but the consequent revelations of the extent of Soviet aid engendered notable comments from other Nigerian sectors. Discussing the implications of foreign assistance to political movements, Gani Fawehinwi, publicity secretary of the Nigerian Bar Association, warned that "imperialism cannot be associated only with the Western world. There is also the imperialism of the Eastern world. Nigerian Socialists who scramble for foreign aid to finance their activities become stooges and appendages of the donors and invite imperialism and intervention of East European countries" (Daily Times, Lagos, 15 July 1972). The newspaper Renaissance (Enugu, 19 July 1972) commented: "We should not tolerate foreign material support for ideological causes in Nigeria. It is a corrosive acid that eats deeply into the infrastructure of our national security." The amounts of aid given by the Soviet Union had been sizable. The Soviets had provided £300,000 for a six-story office for the Socialist Publishing House which produces Advance, and had equipped it with £50,000 worth of new machinery. They were reported to have given drugs to the value of £40,000 for use in hospitals with which Dr. Otegbeye was associated. The SWAFP was given an estimated £75,000 for the 1964 elections, and the NTUC received £90,000 in three £30,000 installments from the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Moreover, since independence, scholarships to communist countries had been channeled through the SWAFP/NTUC, bypassing the Nigerian government's selection procedures.

With various factions of the pro-Soviet movement accusing each other of misappropriation of funds for personal gain, the movement itself has become discredited, and a New Left has emerged. In contrast to the pro-Soviet organizations' base in the trade union movement, the New Left draws its support primarily from academics and lawyers. Some of its leaders are Trotskyist in orientation, most notably Dr. Ola Oni, senior lecturer in political economics at the University of Ibadan, and, in the light of published pronouncements, not amenable to Soviet influence or persuasion. An initial letter to the Lagos Sunday Times (16 July 1972), signed by twelve New Left spokesmen, emphasized the irrelevance of "peripheral groups", such as the SWAFP and the NTUC, whose survival depended on foreign assistance. A month later the Sunday Times (13 August 1972) published an article by two of the letter's signators--Dr. Akin Ojo and Dr. Omafume Onoge, both from the University of Ibadan--which rejected the "subordination of tactics and strategy of Socialist struggle of a Third World country to the dictates of some big Socialist Power." In another article in the Sunday Times, the aforementioned Ola Oni expressed even stronger comments: "One of the major obstacles to Socialism in Africa is the nuisance of those so-called Socialists who shout Marxist-Leninist rhetoric only to please foreign money-donors. They ape slavishly and blindly the experiences of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba... African Socialism requires a patriotic, self-reliant mode of struggle which does not take dictation from abroad but looks up to the problems of the masses of the African people for guidance."

Today, the pro-Soviet NC-AAPSO is challenged by a New Left-dominated Nigerian Afro-Asian Solidarity Association (NAASO); the Nigerian Youth Thinkers' Club has few remaining links to the SWAFP/NTUC, and even the relationship between the SWAFP and the NTUC is unclear. Wahab Goodluck is still the Union's President, but the NTUC itself has agreed to merge into the new single central Nigerian trade union, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), and will then presumably cease to exist as an independent body.

Having experienced the Nigerian predilection for public debate, the Soviets are unlikely to reactivate their use of the remnants of the SWAFP and NTUC (in its new role, within the NLC), at least not in the manner previously undertaken. They are more likely to cultivate individual influential agents who can be relied upon to work more discreetly to further the communist cause in Nigeria.

c. Reunion

The Parti Communiste Reunionnais (PCR) was founded in 1959 by the transformation of the Reunion Federation of the French Communist Party into an autonomous organization. The PCR is the only pro-Soviet communist party in sub-Saharan Africa with significant influence, albeit within a French department and not an independent African country. Paul Verges, the party's Secretary-General, is mayor of Reunion's principal city; the party has six seats on Reunion's General Council, and the largest trade union, the Confederation Generale du Travail de la Reunion (CGTR), is controlled by the party and is represented on the WFTU General Council.

Although Paul Verges has at times been a maverick on certain issues involving debate within the international communist movement (most notably at the Moscow meeting of June 1969), in other matters related to Soviet foreign policy the PCR faithfully reflects Soviet views. The party publishes a daily newspaper, Temoignages.

d. Senegal

The Senegalese Parti Africain de l'Independance (PAI) was founded in 1957. It was banned in 1960 and has since been plagued by factionalism and splits. Neither the pro-Soviet remnants nor the contending pro-Chinese have any significant support in the country. The combined membership of all the splinter groups that originated from the PAI is negligible, and appears to be mainly comprised of Senegalese working or studying in France.



e. South Africa

The South African Communist Party (SACP) is the oldest communist party in Africa, its origins dating back to 1921. Its long history has not, however, brought it much influence. The party is illegal and it operates mainly from abroad. It has at the most only a few hundred members. On the other hand, the SACP has developed close relationships with other organizations, in South Africa and in neighboring states, that are dedicated to the overthrow of the South African political system. More so than any other sub-Saharan communist party, the SACP could benefit from developments external to its own actions and influence.

The SACP's closest links are with the African National Congress (ANC), which was banned in 1960 and presently operates from exile, with principal headquarters in Tanzania. (The contending Pan Africanist Congress--PAC--which is also banned, is pro-Chinese in orientation.) The party also works through the illegal South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the South African Coloured People's Congress. At the present time, none of these organizations pose any significant threat to South African internal security. The ANC and PAC's adoption of terrorist tactics in the early sixties, which included the formation of a sabotage group, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), by the ANC, and a terrorist organization, Poqo, by the PAC, caused some initial security problems. Since 1963, however, their operational viability within South Africa has, for all intents and purposes, been neutralized. This is partly due to South Africa's well-developed intelligence and counterinsurgency establishment, but is also the result of the fact that until 1974 these organizations had no areas contiguous to South Africa from which they could operate. Moreover, ANC and PAC were well aware that their leverage in South Africa would have to depend on more than their own forces.

The phenomenon of an emerging black nationalism within South Africa, and the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique, have altered the

situation. The question is: to what extent and how? In order to offer an answer one has to first examine the black response to South Africa's policy of separate racial development.

The policy of separate racial development has as one of its basic components the desire to preserve and further the identities of the country's racial groups. This raising of racial consciousness can be a source of both stability and instability. For while it consolidates the white community, it can also do the same for the black majority. The latter is comprised of eight main nations.<sup>1</sup> The South African government's decision to develop independent homelands (that in general correspond to these national divisions) has been interpreted by critics as a reflection of its awareness of the potential threat to the political system posed by a unified black population. Irrespective of the veracity of such assertions regarding government motivation, the fact remains that the issue of black consciousness has become a major topic of debate among opponents of South Africa's constitutional structure. Its advocates adhere to concepts of black pan-Africanism that reject both tribal divisions and multi-racial alliances. With regard to the latter, they point to the repeated failures of the African National Congress (in existence since 1912), which--partly because of the influence of the predominantly white South African Communist Party--had stuck to nonracial opposition. They argue that the only effective way of opposing a political system based on separate racial development is to build an opposition along the same lines.

The issue of black nationalism<sup>2</sup> is not a new phenomenon. The founding of the Pan Africanist Congress originated in the defection of members of the ANC's Youth League, partly in response to the parent body's

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<sup>1</sup> Zulu (4,026,082), Xhosa (3,929,922), Tsawana (1,718,508), Seped (1,603,530), Seshoeshoe (1,453,354), Shangaan (736,978), Swazi (498,708), and Venda (357,875).

<sup>2</sup> The role of South Africa's Coloured (2,018,533) and Asian (640,422) populations is not always clearly defined, although groups such as the Black Peoples' Convention do include members from these two communities.

multiracial approach. Similarly, in the 1920s, the remarkable growth of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, which reached a membership of 250,000 by 1928, was due to its ability to set aside tribal differences and its emphasis on the specific problems of the country's blacks. What is different today is the coming together of a number of factors, which the thread of black consciousness can draw together with more potential effectiveness than ever before:

- The industrial growth of South Africa is forcing the country to rely more and more on its black workers. The government's own figures show that out of a total work force of 8.5 million, nearly 6 million are blacks. Moreover, blacks have been gaining jobs in the main sectors of the nation's economy faster than white workers;
- Following a long period of quiescence, the 1970s have witnessed a remarkable growth of black worker militancy. The most publicized strikes were those that took place in Natal in early 1973. According to the Ministry of Labor, 61,410 black workers were involved in 160 unofficial strikes, affecting 146 establishments.<sup>1</sup> Although the government has since then strengthened communications with black labor by extending the system of elected work committees in each factory, and wages have been increased appreciably, strikes have continued to take place. While they have, in general, not been political in nature, they cannot but help awaken political consciousness;
- Further political awareness is bound to occur if there is a continuing employment of Mozambican labor. The South African mines alone employ some 100,000 immigrant laborers from Mozambique. They will form a transmission belt for FRELIMO's Marxist ideology, and further accentuate black consciousness by the fact alone that they come from a black-ruled state, which mythology is interpreting as having won its independence through revolution--this latter point is worth noting, since it does not apply to immigrant labor from such states as Malawi and Lesotho;

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<sup>1</sup> Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 24 to 27 April 1973, cols. 689-698.



- Whether or not the Bantustans move toward independence,<sup>1</sup> the growing assertiveness of the Bantustan leaders cannot help but have an impact on the self-identity of the black population, two-thirds of whom live outside the homelands. The first summit meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and the Bantustan leaders, in March 1974, was described as "brutally frank", and subsequent pronouncements by the various chiefs--most notably Gatsha Buthelezi of the Kwazulu--have clearly belied their portrayal as "puppets" of the South African government;
- A number of militant black organizations--covering a broad spectrum of activity--have surfaced in the last few years. The most publicized have been student organizations, such as the South African Students' Organization (SASO) and the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC), which joined forces in September 1974 to organize rallies in support of Mozambique's FRELIMO government. Other groups include the Black Workers' Project (BWP) and the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU), which are active among black workers. In the cultural field, which has developed distinct political overtones, one can find such phenomena as the Black Arts Studio (in Durban), the Soweto Black Ensemble and the Mohlothi Black Theatre (in Johannesburg), the Serpent Players of Port Elizabeth and the Theatre Council of Natal. Individually or collectively these phenomena do not pose a significant threat to stability, but, in combination with the above-mentioned factors, their potential contribution to instability should not be minimized.

In and of itself the emergence of black consciousness, within the context of the above-described developments, does not necessarily threaten the political system. What it does, however, is offer new perspectives of maneuverability to subversive groups committed to the overthrow of the system, which, hitherto, have operated under relatively barren conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> So far, only Kaizer Matanzima of the Transkei has clearly opted for independence within the framework of the government's Bantustan policy.

The Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique gives the ANC and the PAC a contiguous area from which they could strike into South Africa. However, although both organizations have a significant number of well-trained military cadres, the development of guerrilla warfare, such as was experienced in Portuguese Africa, is highly unlikely. The South African government has the ability to withstand such a contingency, and the ANC and PAC are well aware of this fact. Despite periodic morale-boosting pronouncements, assessments published in their journals and interviews given by their spokesmen<sup>1</sup> clearly reveal a conviction that armed confrontation with the "military and political forces of the South African state" would be suicidal. Moreover, if they were to operate from Mozambique in such a manner, the South African government could bring into force economic leverage and/or overwhelming military retaliation against the guerrillas' hosts.

A more likely scenario is one in which Mozambique will provide an infiltration route for agitational elements. Their objective would be to exacerbate tensions within the existing black nationalist phenomena, focusing primarily on the black workers' movement. The ultimate goal would be to hold the government to ransom through strike action and, if need be, economic sabotage. That such a strategy is being considered by the ANC, PAC and other related groups, including the South African Communist Party, is clearly indicated by the extensive space devoted to "black consciousness" and black workers' strikes in their respective publications. It should also be remembered that revolutionary strategy tends to be imitative. A large number of South African militants have lived in Great Britain and have close ties with that country's extremist movements. The latter have shown how effective industrial agitation can be, particularly in a developed economy.

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<sup>1</sup> The PAC publishes a bimonthly, Azania News, while the ANC's principal publication is the monthly Sechaba. The two organizations' vies can also be culled from a broad variety of other sources. In North America, for example, the Canadian-based Liberation Support Movement (LSM) has published several so-called "interviews in depth," including one with Alfred Nzo, ANC Secretary-General, issued in 1974. Also, in the same year, the LSM published the 66-page Strategic Problems in South Africa's Liberation Struggle, written by Ben Turok, a participant in Umkhonto we Sizwe's sabotage activity and member of the editorial board of Sechaba.

Such a strategy would have several advantages. It is harder for the government to respond to it. Since strikes are dependent on funds, the Affected Organizations Bill, enacted in 1974, can be extended to cover unions. But, aside from the reaction that this would produce from groups that might oppose open terrorism but that consider union activity (however political) as sacrosanct, mechanisms of control would be hard to impose, and, with coordination, strikes can be crippling even if of short duration. Sabotage activity, which need not be limited to bombings, needs little funding. Finally, by striking at South Africa's industry and commerce, activists can with greatest effectiveness dovetail their actions with those of communist powers and the extensive network of foreign anti-apartheid organizations.

Despite their emphasis on opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies, the communist powers' motivations are based on quite unrelated concerns. Foremost among these is the realization that with its economic and industrial power South Africa has the potential to demonstrate to the rest of the African continent that capitalism can generate wealth and transform aspirations into economic realities. Prime Minister Vorster's policies of detente with black Africa, and the creation of institutions such as the Bank for Economic Development of Equatorial and Southern Africa, can be seen by the communists as a direct threat to the economic and political systems that they have helped to create and have nurtured over a number of years. (China, in particular, has in recent years concentrated heavily on establishing ties with Africa. Thus, in 1973 all of its new aid offers--amounting to \$331 million--were directed at African states.)

Therefore, the two principal thrusts of communist strategy are, and will be, to isolate South Africa--particularly from the rest of the continent--and to disrupt its economy. The two strategies are complementary and can be pursued at regional and international levels. As for the role that will be played by the pro-Soviet South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, it will initially be limited to



increased propaganda and infiltration. A communique issued in December 1974, following a high-level meeting between ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo and Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, claimed that "the downfall of the Portuguese colonial empire is creating favorable conditions for the liquidation of the last breeding grounds of colonial and racist slavery on the African continent."<sup>1</sup> But, within South Africa itself, despite the above-described development of black militancy, the conditions are still not "favorable" enough for either the ANC or the SACP. The two organizations have only relatively recently become aware of the exploitive potential of the developing "black consciousness"--in fact, initially they viewed it with open distrust--and it will take several years before they can build any significant power base.

f. Sudan

Before its involvement in the abortive coup d'etat of 19 July 1971, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) was the strongest and most influential communist party in sub-Saharan Africa. It had as many as 10,000 active members, and it had successfully infiltrated a number of professional, student and labor groups. The return to power of President Ja'far Numairi brought about the execution of numerous SCP leaders, including the party's Secretary-General, 'Abd al'Khaliq Mahjub, and the Secretary-General of the communist-oriented Sudan Workers' Federation of Trade Unions (SWFTU), Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh. (The WFTU still commemorates every year the latter's death.) Thousands of party members were arrested and have been held without trial. There are some indications today that there is a tentative revival of the party's activities. This, however, is denied by the Sudanese government. In an interview given at the end of 1974, Numairi declared that there was no opposition to his regime, "neither

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<sup>1</sup> Pravda (18 December 1974).

strong nor weak." With regard to his own attitude to the communists, he stated: "The conflict between myself and the communists has reached the extent where there will not be communism or communists in Sudan...as long as I am in power."<sup>1</sup>

The extent, if any, of Soviet involvement in the attempted coup is still unclear. Moscow had long been ambivalent in its dealings with the Numairi regime. Prior to July 1971, the Soviets had largely ignored Numairi's efforts to curb the powerful SCP, preferring, as in Egypt, to cultivate the party in power. But when the coup appeared to have succeeded, Soviet sources gave a cautious welcome to the insurgents. This turned to strong protest when Numairi, restored to power within three days, started executing SCP leaders.<sup>2</sup> Pravda, on 31 July 1971, denounced "the mass-scale bloody reign of terror...in particular against the leaders and members of the Sudanese Communist Party," and a meeting of communist party leaders in the Crimea on 2 August 1971, attended by representatives from Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, condemned "the anarchy and acts of repression committed by the Sudanese authorities."<sup>3</sup> However, by the end of the year, the Soviet Union was actively trying to mend its fences. In a speech made to a session of the Czechoslovak party's Central Committee, on 21 October 1971, Vasil Bilak, a member of the Czech party's Secretariat and Politburo and a strong supporter of Soviet views, claimed that 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub had "begun to prepare a military coup of which neither we nor the other fraternal parties knew anything." The coup, he said, had been badly planned, had lacked the support of the masses and had been directed against

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<sup>1</sup> The Arab World, Beirut (15 November 1974).

<sup>2</sup> The Chinese leadership, partly because of the pro-Soviet orientation of the SCP but also for reasons of diplomatic priority, remained silent. The first reference to the events was an NCNA report (26 July) which noted that the "coup clique" had been crushed by government forces (see Milorad Popov, "The International Communist Movement: Conflict of Priorities," in The World Today, London, January 1973).

<sup>3</sup> Moscow Radio (3 August 1971).

"the progressive officers of Numairi." Bilak added: "It would not have been wise willingly to abandon positions acquired with difficulty in Sudan or elsewhere. We would only have played into imperialism's hands."<sup>1</sup>

As long as Numairi remains in power, the Soviet Union is unlikely to support another open bid for power that the SCP might take. (The Sudanese events harmed Soviet influence not only in the Sudan but also in a number of other Arab states, most notably Libya, which has only just recently begun to accept Soviet overtures.) On the other hand, the SCP has remained pro-Soviet in its orientation, which would indicate that it is aware that it can count on Soviet support in the pursuance of a more discreet policy. It is noteworthy that the leading representative of the Soviet-controlled WFTU in matters related to Africa and the Arab world is still Ibrahim Zakaria from Sudan. Although he is repeatedly attacked by the Sudanese government and has to operate from exile, Zakaria is one of the WFTU's five Secretaries. He regularly represents the WFTU at WFTU-AATUF Liaison Committee Meetings (see III, below), at meetings of respective African national unions, and at conferences organized by the ILO and other international bodies.

## 2. Within Noncommunist Organizations

The extent of Soviet influence within the noncommunist organizations mentioned by Solodovnikov is harder to ascertain.

In Southern Africa, the close relationship between the ANC and the Soviet Union has already been examined (see I, e, above). Other groups that have been supported by the Soviet Union include ZAPU (in Rhodesia), MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique), SWAPO (South West Africa), and, on the island of Madagascar, the AKFM. However, indebtedness to the

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<sup>1</sup> Bilak's remarks were first revealed in a report published by Le Monde, Paris (12 February 1972).



Soviet Union does not bring the latter a necessarily corresponding amount of influence. None of these groups have relied entirely on the Soviet Union for their assistance, and, at least in the case of the AKFM, the relationship has been primarily based on a certain ideological affinity. Finally, Sino-Soviet rivalry has brought about the emergence of contending groups and/or the sliding away from one orbit of influence to another.<sup>1</sup>

The history of Southern African "liberation" movements is tortuously complex, and Soviet involvement and influence has waxed and waned from one year to the next. Rather than reexamining the past, the following offers indications of future trends and developments.

a. Angola

The Alvor Agreement which provided for Angola to become fully independent on 11 November 1975 was the product of exceptionally difficult negotiations, primarily because no single nationalist movement represents the majority of the population. The Soviet-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has its origins and main support in the capital city, Luanda. The Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) has a large following among the Bakongo from the north, whose ethnic ties stretch across the Zaire border, and who make up about 20 percent of the Angolan population. The FNLA's leader is Holden Roberto, who is also Zaire President Mobutu's brother-in-law. Zaire has strongly supported the FNLA. Although Chinese assistance has been given to the FNLA, which has some 100 Chinese advisers training its military cadres in Zaire, this has not brought about any commitment to Chinese revolutionary theories. The National Union for the Total

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<sup>1</sup> The Chinese have been primarily aligned with PAC (South Africa), ZANU (Rhodesia), UNITA and FNLA (Angola), COREMO (Mozambique), and SWANU (South West Africa). The latter two organizations have little effectiveness today, and China has been increasing its involvement with FRELIMO and SWAPO. In Madagascar, the Chinese support the small Malagasy Communist Party.

Independence of Angola (UNITA) draws its support from the populous central plateau around Nova Lisboa and in southern Angola. It also has more support than the other two groups among white Angolans, who numbered about 500,000 before the recent mass exodus. Although UNITA was once described as Maoist, there are no indications of significant links with the Chinese, or that its ideology is Marxist-Leninist.

The state of virtual civil war which is raging at present in Angola has pitted the MPLA against the FNLA, with UNITA remaining, as yet, generally uninvolved. Although the Soviet Union is giving strong backing to the MPLA, which traces its origins to a short-lived Angolan communist party, internecine conflicts within the organization, and Zaire support for the FNLA, may bring about the MPLA's demise. With the removal of the MPLA, there is a chance of strife between UNITA and FNLA, but there will more likely be a division of spheres of influence. At any rate, whatever influence the Soviet Union has at present in Angola could be severely curtailed.

b. Mozambique

The Soviet Union used to have significant influence within FRELIMO, which (unlike the situation in Angola) has no serious rivals. But, since August 1971, when the organization's President, Samora Moises Machel, spent six weeks in China, pro-Soviet orientation in FRELIMO has decreased. In fact, the only notable FRELIMO leader to remain strongly pro-Soviet is Marcellino dos Santos. There is a strong likelihood that Santos will be squeezed out of power by Machel. This does not mean, however, that Mozambique will align itself steadfastly with China. As pointed out by the veteran observer of African affairs, Colin Legum:

Although the Marxist intellectuals managed to acquire a strong position in the exile movement during the period of armed struggle, their political strength is likely to decline when FRELIMO confronts the realities of independent Mozambique. One may predict that,

once FRELIMO has assumed power, it will draw more upon the perspectives of Tanzania's President, Julius Nyerere, than upon any non-African political influences. Nyerere served as the patron of the Mozambique struggle, and his marked aversion to foreign ideologies and his championing of a non-Marxist African socialism have strongly influenced Machel.<sup>1</sup>

c. Rhodesia

In the 1960s the Soviet-supported Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) worked in close cooperation with the South African ANC, even engaging in joint guerrilla operations in 1967-68.<sup>2</sup> Its orientation was clearly pro-Soviet, but as a result of defections, reunifications, rivalry with other guerrilla groups, and most importantly the pressure of the Rhodesian insurgents' principal supporters--the neighboring African states that could provide operational sanctuaries--African nationalism appears to have developed as the dominating ideological orientation. With the greater involvement of Mozambique in Rhodesian insurgent affairs, this tendency will be further compounded.

d. South West Africa

Although the Soviet Union has supported the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), one of the characteristics of this group is the degree of its nonalignment with any major world power centers. It courts support from all sides, probably because--despite numerous assertions to the contrary by various commentators--it enjoys only limited

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<sup>1</sup> Colin Legum, "'National Liberation' in Southern Africa," in Problems of Communism, U.S.I.A., Washington, D.C., p. 9 (January-February 1975).

<sup>2</sup> For a recent detailed treatment of the Rhodesian situation, see Anthony R. Wilkinson, Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment, Adelphi Paper No. 100, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Autumn 1973).



support within South West Africa itself. In fact, support for SWAPO is limited essentially to the Ovambos, and even in Ovamboland it is not without challenge; in January 1975, 55 percent of the Ovambos voted in an election despite SWAPO's call for a boycott.

e. Malagasy Republic

The Ankoton'ny Kongres'ny Fahaleovantenan Madagaskara (AKFM) is a strongly pro-Soviet party but not, strictly speaking, a communist one since it includes in its membership a sizable number of noncommunists. Although it has had only three members in the National Assembly, its influence is considerably enhanced through its control of the country's central trade union, the Firaisan'ny Sendika Eran'i Madagaskara (FISEMA). The AKFM has consistently urged a buildup of Malagasy's ties with communist countries. Both the AKFM President, the Rev. Richard Andriamanjato, and Secretary-General Gisele Rabesahala regularly attend meetings organized by Soviet-controlled international front organizations such as the World Peace Council, of which Andriamanjato is a Presidential Committee member.

The principal function of the AKFM in serving Soviet policy is in its support for Soviet foreign policy objectives. Thus, even though it remained in opposition, the AKFM offered its support to General Ramanantsoa on his accession to power in 1972. The party's stance was explained by Gisele Rabesahala in an article she contributed to the World Marxist Review (No. 7, July 1974): "The present stage of the class struggle in Madagascar is primarily a national struggle for liberation from imperialist domination; and this is precisely what the Ramanantsoa government is striving to bring about. Any underestimation of the contradictions between our country and imperialism would put the liberation movement on the wrong road."

The AKFM's support for Ramanantsoa and for whoever should emerge as his successor in the present political turmoil was and will be determined by the extent to which it serves Soviet priorities in the area. This line has, however, engendered significant alienation of support for the AKFM, particularly among youth. A growing challenge from the left is emerging, including such groups as the militant Maoist-oriented Parti pour l'Avenement d'un Pouvoir Proletarien. There are already signs that the AKFM's claimed membership of 25,000 is being seriously eroded. For the Soviets, the AKFM's sacrifice has not been in vain. Madagascar's position in the Indian Ocean is of considerable strategic interest to the Soviet Union. A former Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, Aleksandr Ivanovich Alekseev, was appointed resident Ambassador in March 1974. The World Peace Council held a conference, "Africa versus Racism and Colonialism for National Independence and Development," in Madagascar in July 1973, and in the same month the TASS agency opened an office in Tananarive. Educational and information agreements have been signed and a Soviet economic delegation has visited the island. Soviet trawlers and hydrographical ships now use its harbor facilities.

### III INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS

Although trade unionism in Africa dates back to the beginning of the century, its development was slow. Union activity evolved within a context of relatively marginal industrial activity, and it reflected the continent's colonial status. In French-speaking West Africa, for example, a number of unions were established by expatriate workers, and, even after the unions had attracted sizable local memberships, they continued to have close links with the metropolis, including ties with France's largest union, the communist-controlled Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT). Of greater significance to present reality, however, has been the relationship between African trade unionism and the individual countries' nationalist movements: both during the colonial period and since independence. African unions have from the outset assumed the role of an extraparlimentary political pressure group in cooperation with the nationalist parties--against the colonial power and, after independence, in support of the new government. Thus, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the trade unions have evolved into little more than adjuncts of single-party-ruled states.

This phenomenon holds true for both French and English-speaking Africa. In a speech in Dar es Salaam in 1960, President Nyerere of Tanzania described the trade union movements and the party as "two legs of the same nationalist movement." A few years later, in a booklet called Humanism in Trade Unions, President Kaunda of Zambia stated: "Every worker should be a member of the national party as well as his trade union.... The worker owes his prosperity to the party. But for the UNIP's freedom struggle, workers would still be colonial slaves. The worker gets the benefit of what the party fought for, so it is his duty to support it." An article in Nairobi's East African Standard (19 September 1970) reported on a trade union seminar which covered the role of unions in Africa since independence, their relations with the government and the contribution they could make in development. The conclusions reached were: "In



general there are now very few countries in Africa where trade union activities are not subject to close government surveillance, the degree of control which follows on from this surveillance varying, of course, from country to country. The trade union movement in developing countries and particularly in Africa cannot stand in opposition to the government."

In the first six months of 1975 alone, developments restricting trade union autonomy took place in five sub-Saharan states. In Ethiopia the Minister of National Resources Development, Ato Mebrate Mengiste, was reported as stating that Ethiopia's "new socialist orientation" would "require a change in the role of the CELU [Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions]." He pointed out that under the former regime CELU was primarily concerned with negotiating collective agreements between labor and management and airing workers' grievances. The change to worker participation meant, however, that the rights of workers were "no longer in question." As a result, he concluded, CELU should primarily be concerned with educating workers "in the running of factories along socialist lines."<sup>1</sup> In June it was reported that CELU had been "temporarily" closed down.<sup>2</sup>

In Zaire, at a mass pro-government demonstration organized by the Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Zaire (UNTZA), the trade union's Secretary-General was reported as stating that the orientation of the union would have to change in order to be "adapted to the present situation." The UNTZA, he noted, "has an important role to play in business and industry. Not only must it mold the attitudes of workers, but it must also insure progress in industry and business by helping workers to increase production."<sup>3</sup> In the neighboring People's Republic of the Congo, President Marien Ngouabi was quoted as having censured members of the central organs of the ruling Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT) for failing to defend PCT decisions in the mass

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<sup>1</sup> Ethiopian Herald (5 and 6 February 1975).

<sup>2</sup> African Trade Union News, Lome, No. 13 (1 June 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Elima, Kinshasa (1 February 1975).

organizations in which they have parallel responsibilities. "In the case of trade unions especially," he emphasized, "party cadres must advance the party line...the trade unions must increasingly become auxiliary organs of the state."<sup>1</sup> In Gabon, the country's ruling party announced on 12 April that the Federation Syndicale Gabonaise (FESYGA) would become a specialized organ of the party. It was explained that FESYGA's activity had less and less to do with struggling for workers' rights and that the union would have to find a new orientation which would involve training, educating, and informing workers.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, in Dahomey, the National Executive Committee of the Union Nationale des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Dahomey (UNSTD) called an extraordinary council meeting, on 17 April, to define the principles of a new orientation for Dahomean trade unionism. The declaration adopted at this meeting eliminated, in particular, article 17 of the UNSTD statutes. This article had stated that holding a trade union office on the national level was incompatible with national political activities. In the 17 April declaration, the UNSTD "declares that the criterions for correct political orientation of any organization must include: (a) support of the new policy of national independence; (b) true belief in Marxist-Leninist ideology for the construction of a socialist society; (c) on this basis, total involvement in the present revolutionary movement which implies effective participation in all the political institutions of the country." The UNSTD also indicated that it would do all to foster the political and ideological training of its members.<sup>3</sup> At a 29 May Executive Committee meeting of the UNSTD, the union's Secretary-General, Thimotee Adanlin, was relieved of his duties. Believing in trade union autonomy, he had reportedly made a series of declarations in conflict with the new political orientation adopted on

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<sup>1</sup> West Africa (5 May 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Moniteur Africain (17 April 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Daho-Express (28 April 1975).

17 April.<sup>1</sup> Adanlin was replaced by Roman Vilon Guezo, a member of the Bureau of the communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions since 1969 and a graduate of the international trade union school run by the WFTU in Czechoslovakia.

This phenomenon of close relationship between African governments and their trade unions played an important role in determining Soviet modus operandi. In cooperation with East European governments and the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions, the Soviet Union has provided training, primarily of a political nature, to selected African trade unionists. A complementary approach has been to support radical governments in their striving to extend their influence through pan-African organizations, most notably the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF).

The Soviet Union and its allies have taken several approaches in training African trade unionists. Since the late 1950s a number of schools have been founded in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for foreign trade unionists. The main center is in East Germany, where the Fritz Heckert College at Bernau held its first two-year course in November 1958. Candidates were recruited by the East German Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund--FDGB) and the WFTU. About 20 percent of the students were from African countries. In May 1960 a 12-month course, this one mainly for Africans, was initiated at the Leipzig Trade Union College. The curriculum was in three sections: fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, political economy, and trade unionism. Students were taught that they formed "the vanguard of the African working class" and that they would have to pass through three phases to attain "true Socialism": (1) work with the bourgeoisie, (2) cessation of cooperation with the bourgeoisie, and (3) assumption of leadership and control in paving the way to Socialism. Since then, several other schools have been opened in Bulgaria, Prague, Budapest and Warsaw. In Moscow the All-Union Central Council of Trade

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. (2 June 1975).



Unions set up a training center for the benefit of students from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Its first course--from October 1961 to June 1962--was attended exclusively by Africans. Shorter seminars have also been organized. Thus, the Central Council of Czechoslovak Trade Unions has courses of six months' duration that are held in Prague, Potstejn and Zbenice Na Sazawa, which strive to acquaint "participants with scientific Socialism, complemented by lectures on the most important political, economic and current problems facing the international workers' movement." A center at Jiloviste runs courses for officials of national cooperative movements from developing states.

The training centers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have had mixed results. Conflicts have arisen, including student dissatisfaction with the excessive time devoted to political indoctrination, racial tensions, and disciplinary problems. In November 1962, it was reported that 40 out of 115 African students at Bernau in the previous year had asked to return to their own countries prematurely. Moreover, African countries are becoming increasingly cautious over the question of training in communist countries, and have on a number of occasions canceled scholarships offered to trade unionists. Although the centers are still active, the Soviet Union appears to be complementing their role by sponsoring, mainly through the WFTU and the AATUF, numerous seminars and conferences of a short duration on the African continent.

The WFTU, which had its own centers in Prague and Budapest (where courses last about four weeks), became involved on the African continent as early as 1960, when it helped Guinea's Sekou Toure to establish a "Workers' University" near Conakry. Run under the sponsorship of the Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire (UGTAN), this center was formed to "train African anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist cadres." It was later taken over by Guinea's national trade union, the Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs de Guinee (CNTG), but the WFTU continued to provide finance and teaching staff, while East Germany and Czechoslovakia contributed teaching materials and furniture. The center was quite active

till 1965, but little has been heard from it in recent years. Plans to establish similar "universities" elsewhere in Africa have not materialized, but the WFTU has been closely associated with the Patrice Lumumba Labour Institute in Lagos (Nigeria).

The WFTU has tended to concentrate on sponsoring short seminars and conferences. Although a few multiweek seminars were organized in the 1960s (i.e., in Nigeria, in 1968, and in Dahomey, in 1969), the trend appears to be one of conference-sponsorship. In the last three years the WFTU has organized, cosponsored, or actively participated in a whole series of conferences and seminar/meetings related to African trade union affairs. Some have been held in the Soviet Union, and others have been hosted by the French communist-controlled CGT at its school in Courcelle, near Paris. But most of the meetings took place in Africa, most notably in Dahomey, which is increasingly becoming a leading center for Soviet penetration into the continent (as Ghana was in the early 1960s--see below). A number of the conferences have focused on particular sectors of the trade union movement, offering significant opportunities to the WFTU's eleven industry-based Trade Unions Internationals (TUIs--see below). A listing of some of these conferences is revealing:

- The WFTU supported and was represented at an All-African meeting on Economic and Trade Union Problems, held in Dahomey in March 1972 and sponsored by the then Union Generale des Travailleurs du Dahomey (UGTD). The Secretary-General of the UGTD, and now of the new UNSTD (see above), was the communist-trained Roman Vilon Guezo.
- The WFTU's Chemical, Oil and Allied Workers' TUI cosponsored with its Dahomean affiliate a seminar in Cotonou from 9 to 14 November 1972 on vocational training for West African unionists of these industries. The 26 participants set up a Coordinating Committee of Trade Unions in Chemical and Allied Industries of Africa, made up of representatives from Dahomey, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
- The WFTU provided lecturers at a trade union seminar, held in Cotonou, Dahomey, on 22-31 January 1973. Under the auspices of the UGTD, the seminar was attended by delegates from the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Upper Volta, and observers from the Ivory Coast.

- The WFTU's Building, Wood and Building Materials Industries' TUI cosponsored with its Dahomean affiliate the First Seminar of African Building, Timber and Building Material Workers, held in Cotonou from 7 to 12 January 1974. In addition to the cosponsors, delegations from six African countries, the French CGT, and the East German FDGB were present. It was decided to set up a Permanent Liaison Committee, made up of representatives from the Congo, Dahomey, Ghana and Senegal.
- On 4-12 February 1974, the First Pan-African Seminar of Working Women was held in Cotonou. It was organized by the UGTD, in conjunction with the WFTU and UNESCO.
- The WFTU's Commercial, Office and Bank Workers' TUI sponsored a First Conference of Pan-African Commercial Workers, held in Brazzaville (Congo) on 9-11 July 1974. The participants agreed to set up a Steering Committee for an All-African Federation of Commercial Workers' Unions.
- On 17 September 1974, Togo Presse reported that the WFTU was represented at a seminar on trade union training in Togo "held within the framework of Togolese trade union cultural activities in collaboration with the WFTU."
- From 27 March to 7 April 1975 the Gambia Labour Union (GLU), one of the country's two central unions, organized together with the WFTU a trade union seminar on "Labour and Trade Unionism in Gambia's Ten Years of Independence." The Secretary-General of the GLU is M. Ceesay. He has been a member of the WFTU General Council since 1969.
- Fifteen African delegates to the Sixth Congress of the WFTU's Food, Tobacco and Catering Workers TUI (held in Budapest in May 1974) conceived of the idea of a Pan-African Central Organization for Food Industry Workers. The First Pan-African Conference of Food Industry Workers' Trade Unions was held in Dakar (Senegal) on 13-14 April 1975.

As can be seen from the above examples, the Soviet Union is courting pan-African unionism with similar approaches to those undertaken in the early 1960s. It has extended its net to encompass industry-based unions, using the WFTU's TUIs to further its goals. As in the 1960s, when Ghana was used as a spearhead for penetration, selected countries (most notably Dahomey) are encouraged to pave the way.



Soviet relationship to Ghana and the Ghanaian-dominated All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) in the period up to the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah (in 1966) reveals the other side of the coin of Soviet policy vis-a-vis African trade unionism: that of courting governments in order to influence union developments. Although Ghana has ceased to be a center of subversion, the AATUF still exists. An examination of the AATUF's role under Nkrumah and its subsequent activities offers a useful view of Soviet modus operandi, its successes and limitations.

The first attempt to establish a pan-African trade union federation was taken in 1957 by Guinea's Sekou Toure, who set up the aforementioned Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique Noire (UGTAN). As noted earlier, the WFTU quickly established relations with the UGTAN, helping to found Conakry's "Workers' University." Proposals for an All-African Trade Union Federation were discussed at the First All-African People's Conference (AAPC), held in Accra in December 1958, at an UGTAN conference in Conakry in January 1959, and by the AAPC Steering Committee in October 1959. Abdoulaye Diallo, a Guinean with communist connections, who was then Secretary-General of the AAPC, convened a meeting a month later to further the project. The proposal was endorsed at the Second AAPC in January 1960, when Ibrahim Zakaria from Sudan (then, as today, one of five WFTU Secretaries) offered the WFTU's support. The inaugural conference of the AATUF was held in Casablanca on 25-30 May 1961. Its principal sponsors were the Guineans and Ghanaians, together with the Moroccan Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT).

To retain control of the AATUF, the sponsors ensured that seven of the eight members of the preparatory committee were elected to the Secretariat. Mahjoub ben Seddik, Secretary-General of the leftwing UMT, was elected President, a post which he still holds today. The Ghanaian John Tettegah, who was to play an important role in the AATUF's development, was elected as one of the Secretaries. Most of the Africans invited to the inaugural Congress were communist sympathizers and included a number of Africans resident in communist countries.

At the AATUF's Second Congress, in Bamako (Mali) in June 1974, ben Seddik was reelected President. Tettegah became Secretary-General. Among the Vice-Presidents were Wahab Goodluck (Nigeria), Kaba Mamady (Guinea), Mamadou Sissoko (Mali) and Thauley Ganga (Congo-Brazzaville)--all of whom had connections with the WFTU. A former committee member of a WFTU TUI, Lazare Coulibaly (Mali), became Treasurer. The Congress decided to establish a permanent Secretariat in Accra, to be headed by Tettegah and staffed by six Secretaries. Although the AATUF was not officially allowed to affiliate with any international trade union organizations, the Charter provided for "friendly relations" between individual AATUF unions and other similar organizations, whether African or not, national or international.

WFTU and Soviet links with the AATUF were also enhanced by Ghanaian domination of the AATUF Secretariat. Tettegah gained complete control of the administration and policies of the AATUF in the furtherance of Nkrumah's pan-African ambitions, which the Soviets, in turn, supported. The investigations of the Apaloo Commission following the overthrow of Nkrumah revealed that the AATUF had received considerable sums of money from Nkrumah's "contingency fund" set aside for purposes of subversion. Tettegah became Ambassador Extraordinary and sat in the Ghana Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. His view of the AATUF and its role in Ghanaian ambitions was exemplified by a memorandum to Nkrumah dated October 1974 in which he described the AATUF as a "pseudo-political-cum-trade union front organization which combines trade union agitation with clandestine political indoctrination." Before the OAU summit meeting in Accra, in October 1965, Tettegah informed the now dissolved Ghanaian African Affairs Committee: "We shall continue with our underground operations in consolidating the countries in which we are already in full control, and also winning over countries where our influence is already at work clandestinely.... Other methods must be found to infiltrate, our representatives into national [OAU] delegations."

The overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 took away a convenient Soviet proxy. The Ghana Trade Union Congress announced its disaffiliation from the AATUF, which it described as an "agent of an external force which is being manipulated

to cause strife and disarray among the various trade union centers." Similar responses and comments came from other unions. But the leftward trend in the AATUF was, if anything, accelerated.

An extraordinary Congress of the AATUF, held in Dar es Salaam in December 1966, resulted in the removal of its headquarters to Tanzania and the replacement of Tettegah as Secretary-General by Mamadou Famady Sissoko of Mali. Sissoko had previously been a Vice-President of the AATUF and Secretary-General of the Union des Travailleurs Maliens (UNTM). He had also been associated with the WFTU, having been a delegate to its Fifth Congress, held in Moscow in 1961. All the other members of the new Executive Committee were leftwing trade unionists, including Michael Kamaliza (Tanzania), Wahab Goodluck (Nigeria), both of whom were Vice-Presidents. Lazare Coulibaly (Mali) remained Treasurer. The AATUF abandoned any pretence that it might have had about its political orientation. In an interview with the Kenyan Daily Nation (14 April 1967) one of the federation's Permanent Secretaries, Amadou N'Diaye, stated that the AATUF's tasks were to encourage trade unions in "progressive" countries, where they were striving to build socialism, and to pursue and maintain a "revolutionary" spirit. The AATUF also openly admitted its links with the WFTU. On 1 May 1968, delegations from the two internationals met in Prague to discuss cooperation. They agreed to meet periodically and to stage a conference in Africa, at which their "common fight against imperialist monopolies and colonialism" would be the main topic.

This conference was held in Conakry in March 1969, and was used as a forum for promoting Soviet political objectives. Thus, it recommended that an international trade union conference be held to work out steps for the liberation of African countries still under "colonial and racist domination"--a proposal which disregarded the efforts of the OAU Liberation Committee and which was clearly designed to further Soviet efforts to develop influence over the guerrilla movements in southern Africa. The conference also recommended a meeting between trade union representatives of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African states "which



suffer the effects" of the EEC--recalling Soviet and WFTU campaigns against the EEC, and ignoring the fact that at that time the EEC's African associates were negotiating to renew their articles of association under the Yaounde Convention. Finally, the Conakry conference called for closer links between the AATUF and the WFTU. A liaison and coordinating committee was set up to exchange information and develop official links between the two organizations.

The joint liaison committee met in Casablanca in September 1969, and again in Prague in April 1970, when it was decided to organize an international trade union conference in support of African peoples and workers, especially those in Portuguese territories and southern Africa. A somewhat more limited regional seminar did take place in Lusaka on 1-10 September 1971, sponsored by the banned South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), the AATUF, WFTU, and the Zambia Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU). In September 1970 a seminar for AATUF officials and African trade unionists was held in Czechoslovakia under WFTU auspices; in the same month, a WFTU-AATUF seminar on "Trade Union Solidarity and Orientation" was held in Dar es Salaam. The WFTU-AATUF liaison committee met for the third time in January 1971 in Cairo, during the AATUF's Fourth Congress. It has since only met two more times: in Prague, on 14-15 October 1971, and in Casablanca, on 12 December 1972.

The founding in April 1973 of an Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), under the sponsorship of the OAU, affected the AATUF's viability. But it has not diminished the WFTU's role. At the WFTU's Eighth World Congress, held in Varna, Bulgaria, on 15-22 October 1973, there were delegations from the following sub-Saharan countries: Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Upper Volta, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). R. Vilon Guezo (Dahomey) became a newly elected Vice-President (one of four); the WFTU's 28-man Bureau obtained four African representatives (Congo, Dahomey, Madagascar, and Sudan); Ibrahim Zakaria (Sudan)

remained as one of the federation's five Secretaries, and nine African unions were represented on the 71-member General Council (which reserves 11 seats for the TUIs). In 1974 the African Trade Union Congress of Zimbabwe was admitted as a new affiliate, and in early 1975 the Trade Union Center of Upper Volta also affiliated to the WFTU. Finally, at a four-day meeting in Prague held on 24-28 May 1975, delegations of the WFTU and the OATUU, led by their respective Secretaries-General, adopted a communique expressing agreement to establish relations.

#### IV CONCLUSIONS

Soviet potential for exploiting communist parties, indigenous insurgent groups and international labor groups in countries of sub-Saharan Africa will correspond to the degree to which the Soviet Union can adjust its ideological perceptions to African realities. To obtain significant influence, the Soviets will have to demonstrate a sophistication and flexibility of approach that has hitherto been lacking.

The three vectors of influence examined here have differing potentials for exploitation. They all rely to a significant extent, however, on Soviet perception of and response to the challenge of African Socialism. One of the remarkable facets of Soviet attitudes to African developments is the extent to which the Soviet Union has failed to understand (or has been unwilling to accept) that, despite its heterogeneous nature, African Socialism developed as a doctrine to replace the erstwhile unifying influence of anti-colonialism. In the light of its genesis it, therefore, rejected European Socialism, including its Soviet variant, "Scientific Socialism."

The marginal development and impact of communist parties in sub-Saharan Africa is to a significant extent the result of the strictures of imposed Soviet "orthodoxy". As far as one can judge from the history of Soviet relations with communist parties in other parts of the world--most notably the older European ones--these strictures will not be relaxed. The sub-Saharan African communist parties are, therefore, doomed to remain outside the pale of African political development. In fairness to Soviet policymakers, however, it should be noted that the tendency in sub-Saharan Africa toward the establishment of one-party states makes it difficult for any but the ruling party to develop. So even if the Soviet Union were to allow the communist parties greater organizational and ideological leeway this would not necessarily bring them any significant concomitant influence. The Soviet Union would also run the risk of losing its hold over the parties.



In terms of alignment in the factional disputes within the international communist movement, the development of dissidence has often been a product of the adoption of revisionist tactics (usually justifiable in the respective national contexts). Since, in the broad context of Soviet foreign policy, the sub-Saharan communist parties are of only marginal utility anyway, one can understand that the Soviet Union might prefer loyalty, however impotent, that can at least be utilized within the framework of international communist gatherings.

If one excludes the Angolan MPLA, which is no longer strictly speaking an insurgent group, there is only one movement in sub-Saharan Africa that can be classified within this category over which the Soviet Union has any significant control: the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Here, too, Soviet "orthodoxy" transmitted through the South African Communist Party (SACP), with its emphasis on multi-racial opposition, has placed the ANC at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the potentially powerful "black consciousness" movements. While there are likely to be disturbances in South Africa that the ANC will exploit (most effectively if it can integrate itself into the "black consciousness" movements), these will not lead to an overthrow of the country's present political system. For the Soviet Union, the ANC will remain a useful vector for the fomenting of instability within South Africa and a vehicle for indirect contact with international, mainly noncommunist, anti-apartheid organizations. The latter of the two roles can best be carried out if the ANC endeavors to downplay its pro-Soviet orientation. (It should not, for example, automatically support Soviet actions, such as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.) The influence within the ANC of the South African Communist Party and the history of other front organizations, such as the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, can lead one to predict, however, that such a course will not be taken.

On the trade union level, the Soviet Union's maneuverability and influence potential is greater than in either of the two other categories. The nature of African trade unionism, which has been seen to be essentially

an extension of the ruling party apparatus, provides direct links to national policymaking centers. The Soviet Union has taken a combination of approaches in its attempt to influence state policy via the unions: the training of individual union members in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the setting up of centers on the African continent, the support of pan-African unions (using a friendly government as an agent--such as the AATUF and Ghana in the 1960s), the sponsoring of conferences and seminars, contacts between the World Federation of Trade Unions and national unions, and, more recently, the development of ties between the WFTU's Trade Unions Internationals and national and pan-African industry-based unions. The Soviets appear to have learned that heavy-handed political indoctrination (as was practiced at the outset in the Soviet and East European centers) and overt ideological manipulation (as with the AATUF) can be counterproductive. More subtle techniques of propaganda exposure are being undertaken. The use of TUI contacts, industry by industry, can, with time, extend to encompass all the unions of a given African state. The newly created Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) can be exposed to Soviet propaganda without the need for direct or indirect control. Rather than attempting to turn the unions into communist front organizations, the Soviet Union can further its aims with more realistic expectations through tactics of indirect persuasion. Because of the peculiar nature of African trade unionism, influence can best be attained by complementing state-to-state relations and diplomatic moves.

United States policy options in response to the Soviet use of the above three vectors of influence can, and need be, only of a relatively limited nature. The response should be primarily at an informative level. The extreme sensitivity of African states to foreign intervention should not be underestimated. Moreover, as has been shown, it is only at the trade union level that the Soviet Union has any significant operational potential.

Insofar as pro-Soviet communist parties are concerned, U.S. policy should be limited to an exchange of intelligence with the five target sub-Saharan governments and the French government (in the case of Reunion).

As noted, Soviet control of insurgent groups is limited to the African National Congress. The South African government can take care of its own internal problems. As for the ANC's external actions, the United States should limit its role to providing accurate information on developments in South Africa to U.S. business interests operating there and to Congressional investigators. Any more active role, in view of the issues involved, would be counterproductive.

The U.S. Government's response to Soviet use of African trade unions for political goals can be most effective if it is limited to providing information to respective African governments on the strategies used by the Soviet Union and organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions. A more active role that responds to the various Soviet tactics directly should be left to the AFL-CIO and the ICFTU. The U.S. Government can assist these two bodies by making available to them intelligence on Soviet tactics, but it should not directly involve itself in union affairs. To do so would counteract the positive gains that can be obtained by exposure of Soviet Government involvement.



## V BIBLIOGRAPHY

For ongoing coverage of the subject matter treated in this report, the primary sources of information are:

- Pro-Soviet Communist publications, most notably the monthly World Marxist Review and its companion Information Bulletin (issued from Prague, with English editions published in Toronto and London); The African Communist, a quarterly published in London; and the various organs of respective pro-Soviet parties. For annual listings, see Yearbook on International Communist Affairs published by the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) since 1966 (for information on earlier periods, see World Communism: A Handbook, 1918-1965, also issued by the Hoover Institution);
- The publications of the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions, most notably the monthly World Trade Union Movement and its companion, weekly, Flashes;
- Monitoring services, such as the Daily Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, issued by the U.S. National Technical Information Service; also useful are USSR and the Third World, published by the Central Asian Research Centre (London) and issued eight times a year, and the quarterly World Affairs Report, published by the California Institute of International Studies (Stanford);
- Analytical articles regularly published in the Paris fortnightly Est and Ouest and in the bimonthly USIA publication, Problems of Communism;
- Trade union developments in sub-Saharan Africa now systematically reported in the new African Trade Union News, published by the Regional Economic Research and Documentation Center, Lome (Togo) and issued fortnightly.

The Army Area Handbooks (prepared by the American University, Washington, D.C.) are updated from time to time, and are very valuable for background information. Likewise, the French Government's Direction de la Documentation published a series under the heading of Notes et etudes documentaires, which provides background and regular updating on most sub-Saharan countries.

The most useful American publication for ongoing developments in Africa is the bimonthly Africa Report, published by the African-American Institute (Washington, D.C.). For southern Africa, the radical, monthly Southern Africa (published by the New York Southern Africa Committee) reports on the views, activities and publications of all groups that, in one way or another, have bearing on developments in that area.

SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD:  
NIGERIA

by

G. Edward Clark



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SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD: NIGERIA  
SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

As the world's sixth-largest oil producer, the most populous country in Africa, and a powerful military and political influence on the African continent, Nigeria is increasingly important to both the United States and the Soviet Union. A number of factors limit Soviet opportunities to exploit that importance, many of them attributable to the positions and attitudes of Nigeria's former ruler, General Yakubu Gowon.

Gowon, who was essentially anticommunist, took a determined stance of nonalignment with the great powers. As a nationalist who was widely commended for his commitment to solving African problems, Gowon's criterion for relations with East and West was the practical welfare of Nigeria. He did not pledge political allegiance in return for aid. Thus, while Gowon's Federal Military Government (FMG) expressed gratitude for Soviet arms aid in the fight against Biafran secession, weapons did not buy the USSR entree into Nigerian affairs, nor did American nonalignment in the civil war rupture relations with the FMG. Although neither great power is given political preference, the United States enjoys a healthier commercial relationship with Nigeria: U.S. trade with and aid to Nigeria far exceed that of the USSR; Gowon recognized the technical superiority of American goods and services in nearly every field; and the FMG has become increasingly suspicious of the political motives behind Soviet offers of trade and aid.

Gowon also did much to heal the internal divisions which can invite communist incursion. There are 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria, many of

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<sup>1</sup> This paper consists of two parts: a basic paper prepared before the coup which overthrew General Gowon on 29 July 1975, and a post-coup addendum to the basic paper.

which are traditionally hostile to one another. The Nigerian civil war was, at bottom, a product of such hostility. After that war, Gowon pursued a program of national unity, incorporating dissident groups into the governmental system and insisting that ethnic concerns be subordinated to national pride and loyalty. Each measure of success in the unification program curtail's Soviet opportunity to foster internal divisiveness for Soviet advantage.

A further check on Soviet opportunities is the absence of any effective indigenous communist organization. Neither the currently banned Social Workers and Farmers Party nor the Nigerian Trade Union (through which the Russians have worked) has sufficient funds or support to influence the government.

Certain contingencies might enhance Soviet opportunities in Nigeria. Gowon's departure may open the way for greater Soviet influence with the new regime. Renewed regional strife might present the Soviets with several weak and tractable states rather than a single united one. Gowon's successor, Brigadier General Maritala Rafai Mohammed, has promised return to a democracy in 1979, but in this long interim period, the Soviets could encourage the impatience of dissidents with left-wing ideology. Similarly, a failure to distribute oil profits equitably or to control corruption might radicalize large portions of the population, possibly in a leftist direction. The USSR could also rouse antagonism toward the United States on Southern African questions, or encourage the breakdown of Pan-African unity.


Whether these or other contingencies can be expected to take place has now become unpredictable as a result of the recent ouster of Gowon by Mohammed. The primary cause of the coup was unrest generated by Gowon's failure to return the country to civil rule, to control conspicuous corruption, and to solve certain economic problems with sufficient speed. If Mohammed's government is equally unsuccessful with these problems, dissident groups may turn to more radical, possibly Soviet-inspired solutions. It is likely that Mohammed will be unable to quell regional



strife as effectively as Gowon, and that the Soviets will encourage such divisiveness. Political agitation may be more strictly suppressed under the new regime, frustrating Soviet-supported dissidents, but the failure to satisfy dissident grievances may provoke more radical action.

Little has been revealed of Mohammed's foreign policy views, although thus far all foreign diplomats have been treated equally. The new regime is militant on South African issues, and the Soviets will certainly remind Nigerians of the more moderate U.S. position in Southern Africa and of American racial problems. Mohammed is personally sympathetic to Arab concerns, and it is possible that he might support the radical Arab tactic of putting pressure on the United States through oil embargos. The Soviets would certainly not discourage such support.

U.S. relations with Nigeria have been quite good and remain generally so in spite of the recent change of leaders. American policy goals for Africa in general and Nigeria in particular should remain unchanged: political stability, freedom from great power intervention and peaceful economic and social development. The great power intervention issue has now been significantly sharpened by the course of events in Angola. The Soviets are apparently making Angola a test case of American will in the still undetermined state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Nigeria's size, strategic location, and great political and economic potential make it a key state in the future of African developments. Although the United States must act with prudence while evaluating the new Nigerian regime, a sound U.S.-Nigerian relationship will be an important element for the support of U.S. interests in Africa.



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## I INTRODUCTION\*

Each year Nigeria becomes increasingly important to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Nigeria is now America's second-largest supplier and the world's sixth-largest producer of crude oil, having risen in ranking one place a year for the past four years.<sup>1</sup> The most populous country in Africa, it now accounts for almost 25 percent of black Africa's population.<sup>2</sup> It is militarily powerful, and increasingly influential in Third World politics. At the same time, under its leader, General Yakubu Gowon, the country has tried to practice what many others preach--positive nonalignment. Nigeria has, as former U.S. Ambassador John Reinhardt puts it, "an independent political stance unmatched in the developing world. In five years there have been no FMG (Federal Military Government) compromises: nonalignment means just what it connotes; neither West nor East has a preferred position, a special relationship. Good relations are sought with East and West, but preferences are given exclusively to African concerns and African nations."<sup>3</sup>

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\* This paper was completed in mid-July 1975. For a post-coup analysis of the situation in Nigeria following the overthrow of General Gowon on 29 July 1975, see the Addendum, A Post-Coup Analysis of the Situation in Nigeria.

<sup>1</sup> Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," Foreign Affairs, p. 314 (Winter 1975).

<sup>2</sup> "Nigeria," Background Notes, Department of State (May 1975). (Hereafter referred to as Background Notes).

<sup>3</sup> Herskovits, op. cit., p. 315.



## II BACKGROUND

### A. Thumbnail

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is approximately the size of California, Nevada and Arizona combined, with an area of 357,000 square miles. Its 79.8 million population (1973 provisional census) is made up of 250 richly heterogeneous ethnic groups. The most significant are the Islamic Housa-Fulani of the north, the Yoruba of the south and west, and the Ibo of the south and east. The country is ruled by a Federal Military Government, which suspended and modified the constitution in 1967 and banned political parties. The GNP is \$18 billion (1974), the annual growth rate is 10 percent and per capita income \$210. Seventy percent of the labor force works in agriculture--cocoa, rubber, palm oil, grain and livestock. Ten percent work in industry--petroleum, cotton, rubber, textiles, cement and lumber. In 1974, exports (largely petroleum) totaled \$9.3 billion, while imports reached a level of \$2.8 billion; the main trading partners are the United States, UK and the European Economic Community (EEC). Nigeria belongs to the UN and its various agencies, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).<sup>1</sup>

### B. History

Signs of culture along the Niger River date from antiquity. Relatively productive agricultural techniques developed about 4,000 B.C. Around the time of Christ, the Nok culture in the present Benue-Plateau state produced sophisticated terra cotta sculpture.<sup>2</sup> The Housa Kingdom

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<sup>1</sup> Background Notes

<sup>2</sup> George P. Murdock, Africa--Its Peoples and Their Culture and History, p. 44 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

in the 11th century and the Benin in the 15th were highly organized and guarded by efficient armies. After early exploration, the British developed trade up the Niger and laid formal claim to the territory in 1885. Nigeria was granted independence in 1960 as a federation of three regions, with a parliamentary form of government. In 1963 it proclaimed itself a federal government, promulgated a new constitution and established a fourth region.

Tribal and regional disagreements threatened the federation from its beginning. Serious distrust existed between north and south; the prominence of Ibos throughout the Federation aroused fears of Ibo domination, and political corruption and stagnation generated frustration. The situation erupted in 1966 when a small group of Ibo army officers overthrew the government and assumed power. Six months later a second military coup occurred, establishing General Gowon as head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. To meet continuing dissension, to settle Ibo apprehensions and to preserve the union, the FMG proposed certain constitutional revisions. However, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. E.O. Ojukwu, refused anything short of autonomy for his area. In May 1967 he proclaimed independence for the region, renaming it the Republic of Biafra. Fighting broke out, continuing until the surrender of Biafra on 15 January 1970.<sup>1</sup>

#### C. Lessons from Recent History

Much can be learned about Nigeria's strengths, weaknesses and vulnerability from its two coups, the Biafran war, and the role played by the military in political affairs.

While the Nigerian civil war ostensibly occurred as a result of inter-regional conflicts and the attempted Biafran secession, its underlying cause was the hostility which had developed between the major ethnic groups of the country. Ethnic differences were in fact far more pronounced than

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<sup>1</sup> Background Notes

in most other African countries, and historical factors exacerbated these differences to a greater extent than elsewhere. Each of the three dominant groups was more populous and the regions they inhabited larger than most states of tropical Africa. The British, through their familiar "divide and conquer" tactics, had encouraged regional differences instead of easing them. Struggle for power among groups, interpersonal competition for office and position, and divergent concepts of the type of modern society to be created all played their part. The continued existence of ethnic divisions of colonial rule, in fact, contains the seeds of future conflict down to the present.<sup>1</sup>

Conflict and disintegration within the army gave the most obvious evidence of the instability caused by tribal and regional rivalries. Political roles were assigned to the military, exposing new officer corps to unaccustomed domestic political demands and pressures.<sup>2</sup>

The new Nigerian military rulers also learned some lessons from foreign involvement in the war. Help to the Federal side by outsider powers was motivated by the double aim of maintaining economic privilege and strengthening political ties with the Federation in case of Federal victory. Both the British and the Russians sold arms to the FMG for cash, although authorities disagree as to whether sale instead of grant was due to the seller's insistence or because the FMG did not want political strings attached to military aid. The British reportedly supplied arms to the FMG mainly out of fear of gains by the Russians and due to apprehensions that British privileges in the secessionist area might be ceded to the French in case of Biafran success. Russian help was apparently motivated by the opportunity for widening the Soviet sphere of influence in Africa, but the Russians

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<sup>1</sup> P.C. Lloyd, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, pp. 1-14 (London: Athlone Press, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 76.



were also clearly sensitive to the stated "anti-imperialist" motives on the Federal side.<sup>1</sup> The United States avoided overt support of either side, although tremendous sympathy existed in America for the suffering of the Biafran people, and some humanitarian assistance was eventually extended.

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<sup>1</sup> Ola Balogun, "The Tragic Years," p. 101 (Benin City, Nigeria: Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1973).

### III NIGERIA TODAY

#### A. Political

##### 1. Internal

Despite the trauma of the Biafran war, Nigeria today enjoys the prospect of becoming Africa's most prosperous and powerful black nation. Furthermore, the country appears more united than at any time in its history, with the Ibos well on their way to reintegration into the nation's political structure. This progress is credited in large part to General Gowon, who decreed a policy of "no victor and no vanquished" after the conflict, which is estimated to have taken at least 1 million lives. He turned his 250,000-man army into a well disciplined reconstruction corps and put it to work helping the Ibos recuperate. To set an example, he hired Ibos who had fought for Biafra and made them his personal pilots and bodyguards. He gave Ibos federal jobs and a reasonable share of senior positions, including posts as army officers. Ibos are now represented on the Supreme Military Council and Federal Executive Council, and in significant numbers on the staffs of public corporations, private companies and universities. The Ibos themselves have reportedly concentrated on reconstructing their region instead of indulging in a vendetta and appear to be relatively reconciled to their new and lesser role in the power structure.<sup>1</sup>

Gowon reportedly intended that neither the Ibos nor any other tribal group should ever again attain a preponderant role. It was to reduce the power of the dominant tribes that Gowon, a Christian belonging to the

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<sup>1</sup> Time (21 January 1974).

small Anga tribe, split Nigeria's four federal regions into twelve states. Although Gowon rose to power as strongman of an army coup, he believed that "you must bring all factions into the [political] process, consult them, advise them, prod them, but above all make them a part of things."<sup>1</sup> The State Department confirms other observers' judgment: "Since the end of the civil war, the FMG has achieved noteworthy success in bringing about internal reconciliation and reintegrating the Ibo people into the fabric of national life."<sup>2</sup>

Political parties, political activity and strikes were formally proscribed after Gowon assumed power, although in October 1970 he outlined a nine-point program to return the country to civilian rule by 1976. Included in the gradual steps were a new constitution, a new census, implementation of a Second National Development Plan, military reforms and the eradication of corruption. However, in 1974, according to State Department records, controversy erupted over the census (a cause of earlier disputes) which reported that over half the population lived in the northern states (Housa-Fulani). The debate also involved heated charges of high-level corruption. The FMG thereupon decided that emerging civilian politics were too reminiscent of the pre-coup era and that "apolitical" soldiers should continue to govern. On 1 October 1974, General Gowon announced that return to civilian rule would be postponed "indefinitely."

This declaration, however, has not ended the internal debate over Nigeria's political future. The most recent flare-up of controversy occurred on 15 June 1975, when for the first time a member of the government, the Federal Commissioner for Finance, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, asserted that the FMG "should set in motion some form of basic machinery" that would lead to "the progressive" return of civilian rule.<sup>3</sup> Nigerians have reacted

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> Background Notes.

<sup>3</sup> T.A. Johnson, New York Times (16 June 1975).



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to the FMG postponement in their characteristic way--watching and waiting. While some with political ambitions are distressed, "the ordinary" Nigerian, who wants mainly a political structure which will facilitate his progress toward a better life, is apparently relieved. Most seem to support General Gowon's goal to build a "truly Nigerian identity," but at the same time accepting Gowon's reservation that the feeling of "one Nigeria" is not yet deep enough to insure stability.<sup>1</sup>

Observers claim that Gowon demonstrated his "genius for government by consensus." "Gowon," wrote Karen De Young, "appears to have hit upon a magically effective combination of trendy African ethnicness and African style. ... Imbued with a sense of his unique, pivotal position in Nigerian history, Gowon likes to think of himself as the country's Abraham Lincoln."<sup>2</sup>

Critics of Gowon and the FMG, however, have charged that they were slow to make decisions and often postponed or tried to avoid the tough ones. They assert that this was caused in part by the Council's determination to make decisions by consensus, which means that almost any senior member who opposes a proposal can block it indefinitely. They also charged that there is ever present an excess of nationalistic fervor and xenophobia.

## 2. Foreign Affairs

In international affairs, Nigeria concentrates on African concerns. Quiet confidence is evident in Nigeria's relations with other countries. "They know they have the biggest, widest, richest economic and resource base of any country in black Africa," says an American observer. "It is their destiny to lead Africa. They don't have to shove. The mantle will fall naturally on their shoulders."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Herskovits, op. cit., p. 331.

<sup>2</sup> Washington Post (15 June 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Newsweek (4 February 1974).



The FMG has resumed diplomatic relations with those African countries which had recognized the secessionist regime (Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia).<sup>1</sup> General Gowon has made many state visits to African capitals and is a powerful figure in the OAU, having served as chairman for one year. Nigeria has recently increased its efforts to stimulate regional economic cooperation through its strong support of a proposed Economic Community of West Africa.<sup>2</sup> Nigeria strongly condemns apartheid in South Africa and is one of the most persistent advocates of majority rule in southern Africa. The home of ancient art treasures, Nigeria this fall will host the second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture, in which more than 30,000 artists from 70 countries are expected to participate.<sup>3</sup>

While Ambassador Reinhardt may have been too categorical in asserting that Nigeria has made no compromises in its independent, nonaligned posture, there is little evidence of ideological tilt or entangling commitments in the world power struggle. "As she grows to a position of Third World leadership," De Young writes, "Nigeria is managing to remain unaligned with any of the ideologically minded superpowers. She is determined, for the present at least, simply to possess the best each has to offer in technology and goods, and sells her oil in the same egalitarian fashion." Within the past two years, General Gowon visited Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the United States (to attend the General Assembly). He was even-handed in these visits, sidestepping ideological alignment to pursue concrete opportunities for aid and assistance and the enhancement of Nigeria's political prestige and influence.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> On 5 June 1975, 15 countries signed an organizing agreement. New York Times (12 June 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Washington Star (19 June 1975).

It is true, as the Ambassador stated, that Nigeria is primarily concerned with African unity and development. And most African countries, including those committed to Pan-Africanism itself, are, according to many scholars, moving toward the political center.<sup>1</sup> Africa must solve Africa's problems, Nigerian leaders believe, and they want to play a role in the solution. African countries look to Nigeria, not only because of its size, wealth and pacific style but also because the civil war in some strange way increased their respect. Nigeria survived as one country and showed magnanimity toward the defeated.<sup>2</sup> Gowon, in fact, has played a useful role in helping mediate disputes between a number of African countries. Although Nigeria has the respect of other African countries, still it doesn't always enjoy unreserved goodwill. Some resent what they feel is a sense of arrogant independence and self-assertiveness, a compulsive desire to lead Africa. Oil-produced prosperity has induced some envy. Nigeria belongs to OPEC, but not the Arab group, and therefore did not join the 1974 boycott. However, most African nations have been hurt by OPEC price policies, and Nigeria feels some of the resentment. Nigeria is not above utilizing its oil resources to apply political pressure, as the British discovered in Rhodesia. And according to Herskovits, "though Americans do not seem to realize it, how Nigeria will handle its growing oil output may be directly connected with how Western countries, notably the United States, treat southern African matters."<sup>3</sup>

B. Economic

Nigeria's economy, having made an impressive recovery from the civil war, now appears to be moving toward self-sustaining growth. Buoyed by the large oil earnings which provide most of the revenue and foreign exchange earnings, national output and income are soaring. With economic prospects better than ever, the FMG claims that it is now primarily

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, A.B. Akinyemi, "Foreign Policy and Federalism," p. 174 (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1974).

<sup>2</sup> Herskovits, op. cit., p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 326.

concerned with improving the standard of living for its citizens and to this end has drafted a third \$50 billion (1975-80) Development Plan.<sup>1</sup> The 1974 budget has been estimated to have a current revenue of \$2.14 billion, current expenditures of \$1.86 billion, and capital expenditures of \$115 million.<sup>2</sup> Although oil contributes 92 percent of export earnings, agriculture still employs 70 percent of the work force. Foreign exchange from agriculture has declined recently and agricultural production for domestic consumption has lagged during the past several years. The manufacturing sector, which contributes only 24 percent to the GNP, is growing at an annual rate of 20 percent.<sup>3</sup>

Nigeria welcomes private foreign investment. However, linking this policy to plans for expanding the role of Nigerians in their own economy, the FMG in 1972 promulgated an "Indigenization Decree." Described as a "buddy system," it requires foreigners who invest in Nigeria to take on local partners, with the understanding that the latter will eventually assume control. Investors will apparently be able to repatriate their profits and an adequate return on their capital investment is said to be guaranteed. Developmental efforts, according to Herskovits,<sup>4</sup> "are taking place without ideological pronouncements, and there are those who wonder how to describe Nigeria's economy." "Many ask," he continues, "who reaps the whirlwind profits. Some say, if the system isn't socialism--and it accurately doesn't claim to be--then it must be capitalism; and that, they often say, is bad. The government, however, doesn't categorize itself or its programs." The FMG's Guidelines asserts that Nigeria has a "mixed economy," with four major participants: the Federal government, the state governments, foreign private interests and indigenous private interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Background Notes

<sup>2</sup> "National Basic Intelligence Factbook" (1975), p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> Background Notes

<sup>4</sup> Herskovits, op. cit., p. 320.



Many large social projects are underway and salaries are being raised by as much as 130 percent for civil servants, but internal grumbling and foreign criticism are still audible. Some Nigerians criticize the scope of present development plans, pointing to the lack of trained manpower to implement them. The scheme for wage increases has incited turmoil over relative rates, back pay and private versus government salaries. Foreign observers believe that sudden wealth in itself is impeding orderly progress. Karen De Young says, "like an aneurism blocking her lifeblood, Nigeria's rush of wealth is clogging the country's veins with a bloat of money that refuses to filter into her vital organs." She points in proof to jammed ports, traffic congestion and overloaded communications systems. "Dash" (bribery) is on the increase and each interest group asserts first claim to the growing pile. The FMG is learning that the problems of prosperity can be as vexing as those of poverty.<sup>1</sup>

#### C. Military

The Nigerian armed forces, which were augmented considerably to meet the Biafran crisis, are by far the largest in black Africa, reportedly four times larger than those of Zaire. Even before its expansion in the late 60s, the army had a size and professionalism adequate to contribute to UN forces in the Congo. Large numbers of troops are now deployed on civil action projects. The I.I.S.S.<sup>2</sup> claims that armed forces in 1974-75 total 210,000, although other observers estimate as high as 250,000. I.I.S.S. lists Defense expenditures for 1974 at \$548 million, out of their GDP figure of \$7.5 billion.<sup>3</sup> The "National Basic Intelligence Factbook" cites a military budget for FY1974 of \$48 million--24 percent of the total budget. It also notes that 13,770,000 males are of military age (15-49), with 6,675,000 judged fit for military service.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Washington Post (15 June 1975).

<sup>2</sup> The Military Balance 1974-1975, p. 43 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies).

<sup>3</sup> However, the author believes that the Background Notes figure of \$18 billion GNP is more accurate.

<sup>4</sup> "Factbook", p. 148.

The Army has 200,000 men in uniform, with 10,000 in reserve.<sup>1</sup> They are organized into three infantry divisions and nine specialized regiments. The Navy has 5,000 men and 2,000 in reserve. They man one frigate and about 12 smaller craft. The Air Force has 5,000 men, with no reserves listed. Its 11 squadrons are equipped with 42 combat aircraft (as of 1974), many of Soviet or Czech origin, although some are American. These countries, plus a few others, help train pilots and technicians. (See the Table for a breakdown of the Armed Forces.)

It was not surprising that the relatively well trained military in Nigeria seized control of the government. In fact Nigeria has provided a classic example of the ingredients involved in the takeover by military coup throughout Africa since 1960. Ruth First observes:

When the political system is no longer able to contain these conflicts (disputes for power and battle for spoils along regional and community lines), it has a final resort to a system of reserve authority. This lies in the bureaucracy, the army and the civil service. ... The last reserve of the bureaucracy has been the army, as cohesive and tightly disciplined as the political parties have been diffuse and slack.<sup>2</sup>

William Gutteridge provides a somewhat more altruistic reason:

There is also evidence that there is concern these days for the standing of the State in the eyes of the world, and when things seem to go awry it is natural for the army to step in because it is patriotic by definition and possessed of unusual virtue and rectitude. The point at which the army ceases to be the willing instrument of the government of a newly independent state and takes over the power may come when it feels threatened as an institution or when it is required to carry out policies which are unacceptable on behalf of politicians whose personal or public conduct is distasteful. All these elements could be observed at work in January and February 1966 in Nigeria and Ghana.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I.I.S.S., p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun, p. 412 (London: Penguin Press, 1970).

<sup>3</sup> William Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, p. 151 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969).

Table

The Military Balance 1974-75<sup>1</sup>

NIGERIA

Armed Forces: 210,000  
Defense budget: \$548 million

Army: 200,000  
3 infantry divisions  
3 reconnaissance regiments  
3 artillery regiments  
3 engineer regiments  
garrison troops  
Saladin and 20 AML-60/90 armored cars; Ferret scout cars; Saracen  
APC; 25-pdr, 105mm and 122mm guns; 40mm guns. (Scorpion lt tks  
and Fox scout cars on order.)

Reserves: 10,000

Navy: 5,000  
1 ASW/AA frigate  
2 corvettes  
5 seaward defense boats  
4 patrol craft  
1 landing craft

Reserves: 2,000

Air Force: 5,000; 42 combat aircraft  
1 bomber squadron with 6 Il-28  
2 FGA squadrons with 21 MIG-15/17  
1 COIN squadron with 15 L-29 Delfin  
2 med tpt squadrons with 6 C-47, 6 F-27  
1 lt comms squadron with Do-27  
1 SAR hel sqn with 3 Whirlwind and 4 Bo-105  
3 training/service sqns with 20 SA Bulldog, 5 P-149D, up to 28  
Do-27/28A/B and 4 Piper Navajo.

(No reserves listed)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: The Military Balance, 1974-1975, The International Institute  
for Strategic Studies, p. 43 (London, 1974).



As to the future, Gutteridge writes:

The difficulty lies, it seems, in the process of deliberately organizing the transfer (return) of power and the crux of it is, perhaps, in the revival of political parties. The banning of such parties has generally been seen to be an essential concomitant of military rule, but it is hard to see how without them genuine political life can be recreated. At the same time, the essentially "holding" nature of a military government's function makes it unlikely that the process will begin again at a point of development very much different from that at which it was forcibly suspended.<sup>1</sup>

In the case of Nigeria, however, this last observation may just not prove to be true for two reasons--the discovery of oil since the coup and the national unity and prestige developed by Gowon's unique style of ethical leadership. Meanwhile, it is true, as indicated earlier, that Gowon has postponed a return to civil government, believing that the military have a better chance of achieving economic stability and insuring tranquility for the present.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid. p. 152.

#### IV U.S.-NIGERIAN RELATIONS

##### A. General Relations with Africa

Having encouraged the new African nations in their struggle for independence during the 50s and 60s, the United States felt an obligation to help them grow toward national maturity. In part America was fulfilling its tradition, but the impulse also coincided with an increased interest in Africa on the part of American blacks. The need was also felt to meet what was perceived as a threat of aggressive competition from communist powers. However, Americans exaggerated their ability to solve many of Africa's problems and influence national policies, as well as overestimating communist capacity to do the same.

American policy goals in Africa remain unchanged: political stability, freedom from great power intervention and peaceful economic and social development.<sup>1</sup> However, the United States perceives a different and less aggressive role for these days and has come to accept certain realities, as identified by former President Nixon:<sup>2</sup>

Given underdevelopment, ethnic rivalries and the arbitrary boundaries left by the colonial powers, the political cohesion and stability achieved by Africa's 41 nations [is] a testimony to African statesmanship.

Moreover, African states [have] proven to be the best guarantors of their own sovereignty. The continent [has not been] divided into great power spheres of influence nor has it become an arena of great power confrontation.

While the United States [has been] able to maintain the level of its governmental assistance, the most promising

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<sup>1</sup> Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace, p. 154 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 3 May 1973).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

sources of capital to finance African development [are] now trade and private investment.

The great social issue of the Continent--racial justice in the southern half of the Continent [remains] unchanged.

B. Bilateral Relations with Nigeria

U.S. relations with the Federal Republic are quite good. Historic ties and associations (cultural and commercial) are remembered. The United States is linked by various agreements on legal and economic relations, carried over as originally stipulated between the United States and the U.K. The American presence in Nigeria numbers about 4,500, with about 10 percent of that total representing U.S. officials and dependents; the remainder are businessmen, missionaries and their dependents. The Nigerians have a fairly large diplomatic mission in Washington and over 5,000 students studying here.

U.S. political and military abstention from involvement in the civil war has come to be overlooked, if not quite forgiven, by the FMG. Thus, for instance, the United States has not been penalized by Nigeria in oil sales, despite the policies of fellow OPEC countries. There are no major current bilateral problems, although there are occasional irritants and some differences which could become more serious. Rapport with overworked top FMG officials is difficult to establish, but Americans suffer no more severe handicaps than any other foreign representatives accredited to Lagos. Ultrnationalism following the war and a growing sense of economic power contribute to a somewhat imperious attitude in foreign relations, but again U.S. officials are received as well as others. The latest incident in our relations has involved an attempt to implement forcefully an FMG demand that the U.S. Embassy return a government building which was rented as a chancery annex for 10 years.<sup>1</sup> Unhappiness has also been expressed recently about our Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) radio monitoring facility in Nigeria, because of alleged CIA connections.

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<sup>1</sup> Baltimore Sun (10 July 1975).



From their side, the Nigerians are critical of a lack of American zeal on southern African issues, believing the charge that Secretary of State Kissinger endorses a "tilt" toward the white regimes as specified in National Security Memorandum 39.<sup>1</sup> They assert that with its wealth and power the United States could do more to induce change in southern Africa and that there is still some racial bias. Nigerians were also angered in the fall of 1973 when during the U.N. session repeated efforts by General Gowon to see President Nixon failed completely. Nigeria, like almost all other African countries, was also highly critical of the appointment in the spring of 1975 of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, replacing the highly sympathetic Donald Easum, who did, in fact, go on to Lagos as Ambassador.<sup>2,3</sup>

U.S. AID help to Nigeria in 1974 amounted to \$5.4 million--\$.7 million in development loans and \$4.7 million in technical assistance grants for food production, nutrition, population and health, education and human resources. The United States has provided over \$456 million of economic assistance through 1974, of which over \$300 million was in grants.<sup>4</sup> Current U.S. policy expects to replace ongoing projects with assistance in providing technical services and training. This, in fact, is what Nigerians have repeatedly said is now their greatest need. They will obtain it where they can, but recognize U.S. preeminence in almost every technical sphere.

Commercial trade has steadily increased: in the first nine months of 1974 the United States exported \$203.6 million of goods and services to Nigeria and imported \$2,387.3 million, for trade of \$2,590.9--an estimated annual total of \$4 billion. Americans sell machinery, appliances, grain

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<sup>1</sup> Herskovits, op. cit., p. 333.

<sup>2</sup> New York Times (15 June 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Davis has since resigned indicating that the atmosphere he encountered was not conducive to carrying out his mission. Davis' resignation was at least in part attributed to pressures brought to bear by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

<sup>4</sup> Background Notes.

and consumer goods. Their sales to the United States consist principally of petroleum, but also include considerable quantities of cocoa and rubber.

U.S. private investment in Nigeria now approaches \$1 billion, mostly in the petroleum industry. Nigeria has exhibited interest in increasing American investment, subject of course to provisions of the "Indigenization" decree. Although welcoming foreign investment and being fairly responsive to negotiation on individual contracts, the FMG has designated certain commercial, manufacturing and service fields where foreign ownership will be restricted in order to encourage greater economic participation by Nigerians. A U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantee program agreement was signed last year.

From 1964 to 1973 the United States sold a total of \$11 million in military equipment to Nigeria (as compared to \$30 million for the USSR).<sup>1</sup> Very little was given in the way of military aid, although the United States provided some training.

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<sup>1</sup> "World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade--1963-1973", p. 68 (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1973).

## V SOVIET-NIGERIAN RELATIONS

### A. General Relations with Africa<sup>1</sup>

As Edward T. Wilson has pointed out, Imperial Russia's commercial and strategic interest in India and the Far East, together with its efforts to win allies against the Ottoman Empire, was largely responsible for Russia's initial interest (17th century) in the African continent.<sup>2</sup> When Russia became a naval power, it began to search for warm-water ports and found likely possibilities in Africa.

After 1917 the Bolsheviks perceived equal importance in establishing footholds in Africa, approaching their objectives through use of classic communist tactics. They attempted to exploit European colonial rivalries on the continent and discontent within the colonies. The Fourth and Fifth Comintern Congresses developed action programs for penetration into Africa.

There were a number of ways, according to Wilson,<sup>3</sup> in which Russia's pre-World War II contacts, despite their very limited scope, did have a bearing on black Africa's political development, and possibly may still have implications for future penetration into various nations, including Nigeria. Moscow was able to impart radical attitudes, if not a pro-Soviet orientation, to a number of African leaders. The communists also helped fuel the flames of various independence movements. Africans learned important lessons from their Soviet teachers in the political action and propaganda field. The Comintern experience was also instrumental in familiarizing

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<sup>1</sup> Early Russian efforts to penetrate Africa are discussed briefly, because these created attitudes and conditions which might possibly provide new opportunities for influence.

<sup>2</sup> Edward T. Wilson, Russia and Black Africa, p. 1 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1974).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 280.



African leaders with the political utility of international conferences. Africans also learned to use trade unionism as a political instrument. According to Wilson,

Although on the surface Russia's rewards do not seem commensurate with the energy expended, in a broader sense its prewar experience can be viewed as essential preparation for subsequent Soviet involvement in the politics of independent Africa.... This advantage may not have been enough to ensure the success of communist revolution in Africa, but it was sufficient to provide Russia with a valuable entre in the postindependence African political scene.<sup>1</sup>

Waldemar Nielsen<sup>2</sup> also pointed out that the Soviets, without qualified personnel of their own or an indigenous communist apparatus or cadres of any consequence to work through, were at a serious disadvantage in relation to a massive Western presence, pervasive and long established. The new nations of Africa remained heavily--and willingly--dependent on West European advisers, technicians and administrators. Their leaders, although familiar with the vocabulary of Marxism, had also been deeply infused with Western concepts and their economies were heavily dependent on Western sources of supply and outlets for their products. The Soviets, moreover, according to Nielsen, began with a set of rigid doctrinal concepts that only impeded their understanding of Africa and African problems: "Particularly in their initial ventures in Africa, the Soviets manifested their inexperience by misjudging certain situations and by over-reacting and mishandling others."<sup>3</sup>

G. Mennen Williams stated that during his five and a half years as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, he was constantly asked the question, "How are you doing in Africa as compared with the communists?"<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>2</sup> Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa, p. 218 (New York: Praeger, 1969)

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>4</sup> G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans, p. 71 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1969).

Governor Williams believed that our relations with Africa were better and much more solidly based than those of communist countries. He pointed to the traditional political and cultural relationship between Africa and the West, as well as important commercial ties. He felt that the United States and the West do a better job than the communists, both in helping African development and in winning friends. Citing various examples, the governor asserted that the communists have overplayed their hand and blundered on a number of occasions in recent years, outraging the Africans. Becoming more sophisticated about the quality of communist aid, Africans are now increasingly aware of the disparity between the feigned and real objectives of the communist powers. Furthermore, Africans now realize that communist goals conflict with African desires to develop independently.<sup>1</sup>

The communists, especially the Russians, however, do not and will not stop trying, although they seem unwilling to commit major resources, are frustrated in many relationships, and often evidence lack of a consistent, coordinated policy toward the continent. As part of their efforts to expand into the Indian Ocean, the Soviets have intensified their efforts to acquire bases along the east African coast, reportedly with some success in Somalia.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union and China have been providing arms to opposing Angolan liberation movements in an apparent bid to win favor with the mineral-rich territory after it becomes independent in November.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet strategy also presumably aims at gaining access to Angolan ports and establishing a sphere of influence in southwestern Africa. The Russians have also supplied arms, MIG-21 planes and amphibious tanks to Uganda,<sup>4</sup> whose mercurial ruler, Idi Amin, has shocked other African leaders, including Gowon, by his excesses and irrationality.

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<sup>1</sup> Two African chiefs of state have told the author that they are not about to trade one form of colonialism for a new communist brand.

<sup>2</sup> Los Angeles Times (11 June 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. (18 July 1975).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. (7 July 1975).

B. Bilateral Relations with Nigeria

Nigeria has diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and most Eastern Bloc countries. Its associations with Russia have varied in inverse ratio to the state of relations with Western countries, such as the U.K. and the United States. For a time in the early 60s, the communists thought that an indigenous communist party was unnecessary to the takeover of countries like Nigeria. As Soviet influence failed to grow, indigenous cadres were organized;<sup>1</sup> in March 1963, for example, TASS announced the creation of a new Nigerian Socialist Workers and Peasants Party, guided by the principles of "scientific Socialism." The Soviet attitude and policy toward Nigeria in the late 60s is described by Robert Legvold in the following terms:

The Federal Government captured the Soviet interest because it controlled one of black Africa's most important countries, not because it was one of black Africa's most progressive regimes. In Africa, the Soviet Union was beginning to focus attention on key countries, irrespective of regime. Before, the Russians had concentrated on the progressive states of Africa because they believed revolutionary forces to be sweeping the continent. Later when these revolutionary forces turned out to be weaker than anticipated, the Soviet leadership made peace with less progressive regimes and intensified its involvement with a wider range of countries. Now again [1970] Soviet leaders were restricting the scope of their African policy. Quite unlike the earlier experience, however, and precisely because of the failure of revolutionary democracy (the surrogate for the unrealized spontaneous revolutionary process), Soviet policy chose to emphasize states more because of their intrinsic importance than because of their revolutionary merit. On a continent of diminishing significance, where revolution remained too improbable to be worth pursuing for its own value, the Soviet stake shrank to only the larger and more vital countries. Nigeria came closest to representing the India of Black Africa.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Africa and the Communist World, ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. 42 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963)

<sup>2</sup> Robert Legvold, "Soviet Policy in West Africa," p. 329 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).



In recent years the Russians have worked through the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Gowon has been suspicious of the NTUC and it lacks popular support, although it can exert a certain degree of negative pressure on government policies. The now banned Social Workers and Farmers Party, which also possesses some potential for trouble, lacks funds, has no substantial following and exerts no influence on the government.<sup>1</sup>

In general, then, it can be concluded that the Soviets have no particularly favored position in Nigeria today. Some goodwill exists as a result of Soviet help during the civil war, but this is balanced by a deep distrust of Russian political motives and actions. The activities of Russian nationals in the country are severely limited by careful police and security surveillance. Nigeria, for the moment at least, is not a particularly close friend of the USSR.

In 1961 the USSR offered economic and technical aid to Nigeria and indicated a willingness to accept Nigerian students in Russian schools and universities. Actually the Russians have never supplied much in the way of grant aid to Nigeria. All communist countries, including China, have furnished only an estimated \$48 million between 1954 and 1973, with the Soviet Union's share being less than \$7 million (as compared to U.S. economic assistance of \$456 million for the period and \$5.4 million in 1974).

The USSR had virtually no trade with Nigeria prior to 1957. Discussion of a trade agreement began in 1961, but proceeded cautiously because Nigeria was regarded at that time as one of the most conservative of the new African countries. What trade developed involved sale of capital goods, tractors, pharmaceuticals, cement and textiles. The Soviet supply of arms to the FMG during the war constituted a fairly major commercial transaction.

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<sup>1</sup> "Factbook," p. 148.

Soviet-Nigerian trade in 1974 totaled 91.9 million rubles, or approximately \$123 million (as compared to the U.S.-Nigerian total of around \$4 billion). Of the Soviet 91-million-ruble trade with Nigeria, 11 million went for exports and 28.9 million for imports. Actually Russian trade with Nigeria is larger than with any other black African country,<sup>1</sup> but the other amounts are minuscule in relation to world trade figures. Nigeria, with its new wealth, now has money to buy manufactured goods, so the 1974 figures are actually higher than those of the Biafran period when Soviet trade ran between 18 and 37 million rubles.

One of the most recent Soviet deals involves an agreement (signed on 29 March 1975) for Russian construction of a steel mill at Ajaokuta in central Nigeria.<sup>2</sup> This project is part of the Third Development Plan, under which \$1.3 billion has been budgeted for blast furnaces and related facilities. The plant will be expected to produce 1-1/2 million metric tons of steel per year by 1980.

In the military sphere, the Nigerians in 1967 bought from the Russians at least six MIG-15s or MIG-17s and from the Czechs six or seven L-29 jet trainers.<sup>3</sup> Additional quantities continued to be supplied thereafter. The Soviets have also provided military training, particularly for pilots and aircraft technicians, but it is not clear if all or part of this has been reimbursable. In total, Nigeria has purchased about \$30 million of arms from the Soviet Union between 1964 and 1973 (as compared to \$11 million from the United States).<sup>4</sup> When General Gowon visited Moscow in May 1974, discussions were held concerning the sale of additional Russian planes to Nigeria. A commercial contract was reportedly signed shortly thereafter.

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<sup>1</sup> Vneshnia Torgovlia, (Moscow, various issues). Current rate of exchange used: 1 ruble = \$1.34.

<sup>2</sup> Presumed to be a commercial transaction, with perhaps some training and technology supplied on a grant basis.

<sup>3</sup> Nielsen, op. cit., p. 214.

<sup>4</sup> A.C.D.A., p. 68.

The contract is supposed to provide the sale of at least 20, and perhaps as many as 36, MIG-21 planes, plus radar, spare parts and pilot training. Official sources believe that the Nigerians are buying the planes because of familiarity with similar Russian types acquired during the Biafran war. Thus, they contend, motivation is more a matter of availability and convenience than any ideologically-based military alliance.



## VI SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES

### A. General

Opportunities (or lack thereof) for Soviet penetration into Nigeria have been influenced by many of the historical factors and contemporary conditions discussed in previous chapters. While directed toward Africa as a whole, a comment by Nielsen is particularly applicable to Nigeria:<sup>1</sup>

Although the Soviets have now learned to avoid some of the amateurish errors of which they were guilty earlier, the results of their policies have not yet noticeably improved. Throughout Africa, the countries and leaders on whom they have gambled have frequently faltered and defected, while those they opposed have in many cases survived and prospered.

Forced to face the intractability of African realities to their theories of history and development, the Soviets have had to profoundly reexamine their own policies and priorities in the context of the general difficulties of their foreign policy over the past decade.... As a result Africa has been downgraded. The Soviets have shifted to a policy of dealing indiscriminately with all elements, radical or reactionary.... They are investing some resources in the training of civilian and military youth; they are conducting a few cultural programs and some organizational activity; they are giving a small amount of economic assistance and are encouraging the development of trade; they are delivering some military aid to existing governments and limited assistance to revolutionary groups of the south. But being ideologically in a state of some confusion..., they are doing nothing with conviction or serious commitment. Above all, they seem determined to avoid major costs or the risk of serious confrontation with the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Nielsen, op. cit., p. 219.

In independent Africa, therefore, the Soviet Union has suspended any immediate revolutionary objectives and shifted essentially to a policy of "wait and see." In the words of a Chinese proverb, it now appears to have accepted the view that the best cure for muddy water is time.

#### B. Opportunities and Contingencies

Current relations with Nigeria, then, certainly do not endow the Soviets with a wealth of opportunities. Therefore, in considering "opportunities" one must talk primarily about "contingencies" or hypothetical situations which could conceivably give the Soviets a future possibility to gain favor with the existing regime or help create a more pro-Russian one. Some of these potential Russian opportunities are discussed below, along with their inherent costs and risks.

##### 1. Elimination of Gowon

General Gowon and most of the members of the Supreme Military Council have been essentially anticommunist. Their removal, whether by coup, assassination or political action, could conceivably, but not necessarily, make way for a more pro-Soviet regime. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Russians give support to anti-Gowon movements and forces. However, considerable risk to Russian relations with the rest of the Third World could be encountered if the Soviets appeared to be too obviously involved in internal politics, particularly in a deliberate effort to overthrow the government. It should also be noted, however, that perpetuation of an autocratic or totalitarian military government, disdainful of democratic rights, could also produce conditions conducive to agitation and possible communist exploitation.

##### 2. Rebirth of Regional Strife

The Balkanization of Nigeria might serve Russian interests, because it would obviously be easier for them to deal with several weak states than

with one large united one. The Soviet Union did, of course, aid the FMG in its efforts to put down the Biafran secession and to restore the union. But having failed to capitalize on any goodwill which it might have gained with the FMG as a result, or noting that a strong, wealthy Nigeria has grown even less dependent on Russian support, the USSR might wish to encourage renewed schisms. Should it be in a particularly pro-Arab mood and attempt to build credits in the Moslem world, Russia might be able to excite new Housa-Fulani agitation in the north or a move by the Housas against the south. Once again, this might have to involve the commitment of immense quantities of arms and subversive efforts to defeat the FMG and its armed forces. It might also require the agitation of tribal rivalries and personal jealousies within the forces, which seem to be well under control at the moment.

### 3. Rebirth of Political Strife

If the restoration of democratic institutions and processes does not proceed steadily, radical elements might capture one or more of the dormant (banned) political parties. The Soviets would certainly encourage leftist radicals. They appear to be doing this presently with certain student elements, as evidenced by student agitation in March 1975 and the closure of the universities for a time. The Nigerian is a political animal and many old warhorses, as well as fresh young-bloods, are straining at the bit. Some of the old-timers and quite a few of the younger aspirants have been trained by leftwing Europeans and accept certain Marxist assumptions. At the same time, perhaps a far greater number place African values ahead of any foreign ideology, believing that Nkrumah's ideal of "the African personality" and Senghor's concept of "Negritude" run contrary to Marxist-Leninist assumptions. Here again, one wonders how much the USSR would be willing to contribute, either in terms of funds or prestige, to local movements which might produce only marginal benefits for Russian global objectives.



#### 4. Mishandled Economy

The Government of Nigeria, whether the FMG or some successor civilian regime, could make major economic mistakes or undertake certain actions in the economic sphere which would benefit Soviet objectives. The most obvious would be a failure to share Nigeria's new-found wealth with the mass of the population. Labor unions are expressing this fear. While the government has increased wages, there is squabbling over civil service versus other salary scales. Farmers were arrested in Ibadan in May 1975 for protesting that government revenues were not being used adequately to benefit the agricultural sector. The economy could fail because the FMG is unable to obtain technical expertise or rapidly train skilled manpower to meet the next 5-Year Development Plan goals. There is danger also in government failure to control "dash," graft and middle level corruption. The USSR has natural allies in some potentially dissident groups (labor, farmers, students) and could exacerbate festering grievances at relatively little risk or cost.

#### 5. Southern African Issues

While rather low-key on most foreign affairs issues, Nigeria is militant on the subject of apartheid and related questions in southern Africa. Nigeria has been highly critical of our position on many of these issues and the Soviets will lose no opportunity to exploit them in the future. It could and does use this tactic continually in international bodies--at virtually no cost, and with the risk of antagonizing very few countries. A full-scale conflict in southern Africa might lure Nigeria and other independent African countries into open support of liberation forces--a development the Soviets would encourage with the hope that they would find the United States supporting the other side. There would be some costs and risks, but the gains could be enormous.

6. Breakdown of Pan-Africanism

Gowon has seen himself as something of a mediator, having restored unity to his own country. He offered his services and has been helpful in a number of disputes involving neighbors or other African brothers. There is a danger in this, however, in that Nigerian resources might be committed to one side or the other in an ideological rift, thus endangering Pan-Africanism, reducing the ability of the continent to give priority to African concerns, and weakening the determination of African nations to present a united front against outsiders. Here again, the "Balkanization" of Africa could present the Russians with new opportunities, either to win Nigerian appreciation or embarrass the FMG as the case might be. The Soviets might also be able to alienate some African states from the FMG by charging that the government has misused the country's wealth or by exploiting envy. The Russians could accomplish some of this mischief cheaply, but further involvement in fighting for liberation causes or in intra-African warfare could be very costly.

## VII U.S. ACTIONS AND OPTIONS

Possible U.S. policy in relation to Nigeria should be considered in three contexts, each of which bears to some degree on (but should not necessarily be motivated by) the triangular relationship with the USSR. In the first place, U.S. activities should be consistent with the basic precepts of general policies toward Africa. Secondly, reinforcement of bilateral relations with Nigeria and general support of current Nigerian development efforts would tend to neutralize Soviet machinations. Finally, the United States might examine what specific steps can be taken in order to help avoid the six contingencies discussed in chapter VI or how to react to them with appropriate options if they do occur.

### A. Basic Precepts

The United States seeks a cooperative and equal relationship with all African countries. U.S. actions are governed by the following precepts:<sup>1</sup>

- To oppose the continuation in Africa of systems based on racial discrimination.
- Not to seek involvement in African internal affairs.
- To recognize special obligations to assist in the economic development of Africa.
- To be concerned with keeping the continent free of great power rivalry.

### B. Bilateral Actions

The United States believes that Nigeria, like other African countries, has the right to chart its own future free from outside interference. It

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<sup>1</sup> "Africa: U.S. Policy," GIST, Department of State (April 1972).



must be accepted (a doctrine arrived at belatedly by many U.S. policymakers) that the ability to control or even influence the actions of most countries is strictly limited. In the case of Nigeria, the United States can in good conscience support the present Nigerian government, on the basis that its actions are not inimical to U.S. interests. Continuation of general support, encouragement of moderate and progressive trends, and reinforcement of bilateral relations would appear to be conducive to orderly development, the maintenance of stability and frustration or avoidance of the kinds of conditions which the Russians could exploit. The United States should therefore endeavor to do the following:

1. Political - Bilateral

- a. Maintain and if possible improve rapport with Nigerian leaders, in order to make known U.S. views on international and bilateral issues.
- b. Facilitate official visits by both Nigerian and U.S. officials at as high a level as feasible.
- c. Make clear publicly that great importance is attached to bilateral relations with Nigeria, in deference to their sensitivity and their feeling that the United States has failed to acknowledge Nigeria's significance to America.
- d. Continue U.S. information programs in order that the Nigerian people may be kept aware of U.S. positions on world problems, particularly as they pertain to issues and actions on which the USSR has different perspectives.
- e. Build on traditional U.S.-Nigerian relations through educational exchanges, cultural exchanges, etc.

2. Political - Multilateral Actions Affecting Bilateral Relations

a. Demonstrate that U.S. actions (political, commercial, military) involving South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia and the residue of Portuguese territory clearly support ultimate self-determination for all races in southern Africa.

b. Convince the Nigerians, especially the Moslem majority, that the U.S. position in the Middle East is even-handed and does not unduly favor Israel.

c. Continue giving evidence of our humanitarian concern for drought-stricken areas of the Sahel and east Africa.

d. Show U.S. concern for Nigerian and African attitudes on problems existing between the "have" and the "have not" nations.

e. Demonstrate that the United States does not relegate Africa to the bottom of its list of priorities, as Secretary Kissinger is sometimes accused of doing.

f. Encourage moderate Africans to refuse support of irresponsible leaders, such as Amin in his bid for the presidency of the OAU.

g. By diplomatic intercourse, try to persuade the FMG that stability and eventual security can best be served by an eventual, orderly return to democratic institutions.

h. Encourage the British and other Western allies to support the FMG and to encourage it to follow moderate, progressive policies.

3. Economic

a. Find ways in which the United States can best help provide technical assistance. The element most needed in Nigerian development

today is guidance as how best to utilize Nigeria's resources and manpower. This can be our contribution under the "buddy system" envisioned in the "Indigenization" decree.

b. Follow through on any remaining AID grants and loans.

c. Search for compromises in international commodity debates to refute charges of insensitivity or special interest, at the same time encouraging FMG commodity policies (as well as trade and investment practices) which are liberal and nondiscriminatory.

d. Help Nigeria achieve the goals of its 5-year Development Plan through private investment, utilizing OPIC.

e. Assign proper recognition to Nigeria for the importance of its oil to American needs and credit it for a degree of aloofness from some extreme OPEC pricing efforts.

f. Funnel U.S. aid to regionally oriented development projects and encourage Nigeria in its efforts to form a West Africa Economic Community, sharing its resources with poorer neighbors.

g. Do more to assist in strengthening African economic institutions: the OAU, ECA, ADB (African Development Bank).

#### 4. Military

a. Continue such military assistance and training as still is authorized under the Federal Military Sales Program.

b. Encourage American munition manufacturers to be responsive (strictly under the Control Guidelines<sup>1</sup>) to Nigeria's continuing search for sources of normal commercial military purchases.

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<sup>1</sup> "World Arms Trade," GIST, Department of State (July 1975).



c. Encourage resort to the U.N. as the forum for settling international (African) disputes and strengthen multilateral peace-keeping capabilities.

d. Accept opportunities to demonstrate the resourcefulness, readiness and willingness of U.S. military facilities to help in civic action or disaster relief (such as the USAF did in the Sahel drought).

C. Contingencies and Options

In order to reduce the possibility of adverse developments in each of the contingencies discussed in chapter VI, U.S. national security planners could and should utilize actions listed above in B, grouped into various combinations for each contingency, plus certain individual actions designed to meet specific circumstances. Special options are included here for implementation under extreme circumstances, but most of them would be very costly and often risky.

1. Elimination of Gowon - Gowon's chances of remaining in power depend on FMG success in achieving the goals of the 5-Year Plan, social progress, national unity and freedom from intra-African entanglements. We can assist in this process by continuing or implementing the following:

- a. Credit importance we attach to our relations with Nigeria.
- b. Facilitate exchange of high-level visits.
- c. Devise efficient technical transfer arrangements.
- d. Encourage U.S. investment in Nigeria.
- e. Encourage trade with Nigeria.

We could perhaps better assure the continuance of Nigeria's present stable government by considering options of greatly increasing our resource allocation to the following:

- a. Raise Nigeria on list of countries important to us.
- b. Increase military sales to Nigeria.
- c. Increase military training for Nigerians.

- d. Subsidize substantial technical transfer systems.
- e. Back the Nigerian Government on as many U.N. issues as do not disastrously interfere with U.S. national interests.

2. Rebirth of Regional Strife - While the Russians can attempt to inflame tribal and regional differences, a U.S. policy of noninterference in local affairs limits the capacity for positive action in helping the FMG prevent a deterioration in national unity. The United States can, however:

- a. Commend the ongoing policies of restoration, forgiveness and reintegration of former dissidents begun by Gowon.
- b. Refrain from exhibition of any post-Biafran favoritism of Ibos in regard to scholarships, trade or investment.
- c. Avoid exciting Moslem sentiments on Middle East or other issues.
- d. In U.S. military training of Nigerians, emphasize concepts of professionalism and avoidance of political bias.

Should the Russians or others succeed in inflaming regional sentiment and another secession threaten, the United States could employ the following options (at considerable cost and perhaps risk):

- a. Provide strong diplomatic endorsement of the FMG position (which was not done in the Biafran crisis).
- b. Provide substantial arms sales or grants.
- c. Offer expanded levels of military training.
- d. Champion the FMG cause, if the issue went to the U.N.

3. Rebirth of Political Strife - Again, while the Russians could meddle here, U.S. options are limited. The United States is committed to accepting African solutions for African problems. However, it may be possible to help with the following:

- a. Encourage American labor unions to urge moderation on Nigerian workers groups.
- b. Through VOA and USIS demonstrate how Americans solve political differences.
- c. Emphasize U.S. willingness to invest in, trade with and support a stable, unified Nigeria.

4. Mishandled Economy - Obviously, U.S. actions in this regard would include the seven actions suggested in VII, B, 3.

To step up involvement and commitment to Nigeria's development and stability, the United States could undertake the following additional options:

- a. Subsidize massive technological transfers.
- b. Offer extensive new AID grants and credits.
- c. Offer Nigeria major trade concessions and preferences, especially with regard to agricultural commodities.
- d. Give Nigerian oil purchase preference over that from other suppliers.

5. Southern African Issues - In order to neutralize Russian efforts to alienate Nigeria from the United States over southern African issues, the following could be undertaken:

- a. Support U.N. measures directed toward self-determination in South Africa.
- b. Urge American companies to set examples in their South African plants of nondiscrimination.
- c. Refrain from military cooperation with South Africa or use of South African military facilities.
- d. Continue the Rhodesian embargo and avoid chrome purchases.
- e. Give special support to black enclave countries within the borders of the Republic of South Africa and to black neighbors.
- f. Send more black FSOs to South Africa and encourage the mission to increase multiracial contacts.

Should Nigerian-U.S. relations seriously deteriorate over southern African issues, the following extreme options could be considered:

- a. Break diplomatic relations with South Africa.
- b. Impose a trade embargo on South Africa.
- c. Urge American firms to withdraw investment in South Africa.
- d. Actively support liberation movements.



6. Breakdown of Pan-Africanism - Because it is in America's as well as Nigeria's interest to see peace and cooperation on the African continent, the United States should continue to do the following:

- a. Encourage African international organizations.
- b. Urge Africans to take major disputes to the U.N.
- c. Encourage regional economic cooperation and sharing.
- d. Urge a general reduction of indigenous forces throughout the continent.

In the event that there might be a need to utilize U.S. military personnel on the continent, for either humanitarian or other reasons, it would be prudent to consider the following:

- a. Endeavor to have agreements with a few countries for contingency use of facilities as staging areas. (A few do exist.)
- b. Maintain expertise on Africa and some quick-reaction capability within the responsible unified command.

In the event of a serious breakdown between Nigeria and other African countries, the United States could:

- a. Support militarily the more moderate regime or regimes.
- b. Provide massive economic support to the more moderate.
- c. Strongly back the more moderate regime in the U.N.

Another conceivable option, in this era of detente, might involve negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union whereby both great powers would work together to help create a strategically stable environment on the continent.

D. Overall Policy Approach

Nigeria at the moment appears to be a strong, confident nation which is developing in a satisfactory manner. Relations between the United States

and Nigeria are relatively good, as good perhaps as those of any other non-African power, but the future should not merely rest on the past. Because of past actions in Africa the Soviets tend to be regarded with suspicion. It is true that African politics are unpredictable, and that the situation could change rapidly. Barring radical change, however, the United States should continue present policies and actions, applied with as much vigor, resources and understanding as it can muster. The United States should also be prepared to meet seriously threatening emergencies with carefully conceived contingency plans and judiciously applied resources. However, the U.S. approach should not be based just on a sense of competition with the Soviet Union, but rather on the intrinsic value of U.S. relations with the people and the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Addendum

SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD:  
NIGERIA

by

G. Edward Clark



NOTE

This paper is intended to update the analysis of "Soviet Opportunities in the Third World: Nigeria" (completed 23 July) in light of the coup d'etat which overthrew General Gowon on 29 July. It examines the causes and implications of the coup in relation to possible changes in Soviet opportunities and requirements for U.S. actions and options.

While source annotations are made in a few specific instances, it is sufficient to say that both new factual material as well as some opinions and portions of the analysis are drawn from or based on conversations with a variety of government officials and other experts and from current publications.

## I THE COUP

While General Yakubu Gowon was attending an OAU conference in Kampala on 29 July, his government was overthrown in a bloodless coup by other military officers, and he was replaced as head of state by a former colleague, Brig. Gen. Muritala Rufai Mohammed.<sup>1</sup> A curfew was imposed for the first day only, as the city of Lagos and the country as a whole remained calm. None of the estimated 3,000 Americans in Nigeria was reported by the Embassy to have been harmed. Five senior appointments were announced on the 29th, including Brigadier O. Obasanjo who was named chief of staff at supreme headquarters.

On the 30th, General Gowon, who had reacted calmly to the news, stated in Kampala that he pledged his full support to the new government in Lagos. Meanwhile, in a national broadcast, General Mohammed announced the dismissal of all 12 state governors, all military officers above the rank of brigadier (including all chiefs of staff in the various services) and all federal ministers. He also stated that he was cancelling the controversial 1973 census and would return to the 1963 count for revenue and other computations. Asserting that Gowon would be free to return home "when conditions permit," Mohammed promised that he could then do so "with full benefits in recognition of his past services to the nation." A new, third, organ of the Federal government was established, a National Council of State. Finally, Mohammed reaffirmed Nigeria's "friendship" with all countries and pledged protection to foreign nationals and investments.

On the 31st, Mohammed swore in 10 of the 12 new provincial governors. Since then, there has been little hard news, either from official reporting or press sources. Tom Johnson, in the New York Times of 4 August, said that there was neither great sadness nor happiness over Gowon's departure and a similar lack of interest in Mohammed's accession to power. Johnson

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<sup>1</sup> Subsequent to the preparation of this study, General Mohammed himself was the victim of an aborted coup attempt. Assassinated on 13 February 1976 in an ambush, the chief of state was replaced by General Olusegun Obasanjo, his former second-in-command. Since Obasanjo was installed by the Supreme Military Council, and seems committed to the course of his predecessor, few observers expect major changes in government policy.

reports that the average person was more concerned with the high cost of living than what he called "the army boys fighting among themselves." The public view seems to be that the members of the new regime will "build their own strengths" and put off return to civilian rule "for perhaps longer than the last government."

The Nigerian press has generally been editorially favorable to the new government, hoping that it will produce positive change. However, editorials call on Mohammed and his associates to consult more with qualified and knowledgeable civilians. A few speculate that this may not be in Mohammed's nature.



## II CAUSES

Initially the press interpreted the coup as a "palace revolution with one military faction replacing another, rather than an ideological revolution or a tribal dispute." It seems to be true that the coup resulted in part from jockeying within the ranks and experts say that there is little evidence so far of common ideological motivation. However, tribal rivalries, along with other contributing factors, do appear to have been involved. The main causes appear to be those discussed below.

### A. Gowon: Lack of Decision, Wrong Decisions

The coup was followed by a plethora of tributes to General Gowon's good qualities. The New York Times in an editorial "Loss for Nigeria," said: "Nigeria will be forever in the debt of the modest officer who never aspired to great power but rose to a formidable challenge."<sup>1</sup> The Washington Post, observing that any country has a long list of grievances, observed that in the face of huge problems he "had been doing a darned good job."<sup>2</sup> An American official spoke of his "almost unbelievable goodness." Karen De Young, talking of his graceful departure, noted that he was not only calling on his fellow Nigerians to support their new military government but also "pledging his loyalty to his betrayers."<sup>3</sup> She added, however, that his problem "was that perhaps he was too good--a Platonic philosopher-king in a country that needs a tough talking, head-cracking administrator."

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<sup>1</sup> New York Times (31 August 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Washington Post (31 August 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Governing by consensus, Gowon was reluctant to deal squarely with issues that might provoke confrontation; he wanted to heal the scars of civil war at any price. This determination for tranquillity rather than any hunger for personal glory motivated Gowon's decision of last October to continue military rule indefinitely. Only military government, he believed, could avoid the kind of political strife which preceded the first coup in 1966 and the Biafran secession.

His refusal to prepare for a return to civilian rule inflamed some sectors of public opinion. At the same time, Gowon failed to rout corruption, particularly among provincial governors, and to act on demands to create new states in the federation. Isolated and insulated from social conditions around him, Gowon also did not initiate adequate measures to control rampant inflation and improve delivery of goods and services.

Mohammed said shortly after his takeover that Gowon is free someday to return to Nigeria, but he has not done so. General Gowon is now (late 1975) an undergraduate student at Warwick University, near Birmingham, England. A graduate of Sandhurst, he reportedly intends to major in the Department of Politics.

#### B. Social Conditions

Despite Gowon's personal popularity, he and his FMG failed to attack increasingly serious social problems. While the average Nigerian was growing more and more unhappy with inflation and his inability to derive any direct benefits from the country's new-found wealth, discontent was increasingly expressed by students, intellectuals, labor groups and farmers.

The most severe economic problems were triggered early in 1975 by extremely large pay raises for civil servants. This angered sectors of the economy not receiving wage increases, and provoked strikes and walk-outs. These strikes, especially the ones in key public service areas, including power, water, communications and customs, created universal

frustration. Ships clogged the principal harbor; gas and kerosene deliveries bogged down; and produce as well as durable goods could not be moved to consumers. Lagos' legendary traffic jams became unbelievable. In total these conditions demonstrated the shocking inability of the government to deliver essential services to the average man. De Young's article quoted earlier, entitled "Gowon's Nigeria: So Rich It Hurts," dramatically described the wealth itself as "an aneurism blocking Nigeria's lifeblood."<sup>1</sup>

While the labor unions seeking wage increases were not heavily financed by Soviet funds or controlled by outside powers, it is possible that they were encouraged in their protests and actions by leftist elements who saw opportunities to create problems. Farmers also began to protest and to take political action, which resulted in some arrests. Here again a few may have received encouragement from the small Social Workers and Farmers Union which reportedly receives a little Soviet support.

Students were most vocally irate over economic and social inequality, inflation and corruption, their political idealism offended by richly prospering officials and businessmen, last winter students staged demonstrations that led to numerous arrests and the closure of three universities for a month. Although they are considered "radical," these students have been described by Nigerian experts as "secessionists, not communists."

#### C. Corruption

Graft and "dash" are not new to Nigeria. However, the country's sudden prosperity dramatically enlarged the till and most who were able to profit did so. Corruption spread throughout the civil service and the military. There are two theories as to the role of corruption in the decision of the Mohammed group to instigate a new coup. Some observers believe that a growing number of officers wanted to share in the largesse.

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid.



Others accept the view that some of the new leadership, reflecting views of the average man, resented lack of FMG action to end corruption. Students were particularly angry over Gowon's failure to replace the 12 provincial governors who were most conspicuous in their sudden affluence.

It should be noted here that the new leaders have been cautious in using the term "corruption" when speaking of their predecessors, although the inference is there. To label would be dangerous, because almost every official is tainted to some degree and in an open exchange of charges no reputation would emerge unmarked. Americans should not be too smug, because even American businessmen are suspected of paying "dash." Ashland Oil Company, for instance, on 27 June admitted in a Senate hearing that it had made payment to government officials in three countries "and possibly Nigeria."<sup>1</sup>

#### D. Land Problems

Problems of land ownership and the sharing of its produce certainly have contributed to discontent throughout the country. Among these are old issues, which have manifested themselves in different ways in various regions. According to Ruth First:<sup>2</sup>

In the Moslem north, the tradition of emir control and use of patronage still elicits a degree of acceptance, even though it means that agriculturally the north lags far behind the rest of the country in producing crop exports. In the south, traditional authority, status and wealth have been overtaken and integrated with new forces thrown up by trade and business, economic and social ferment. New classes of entrepreneurs have arisen: cocoa and rubber farmers, growers of other export crops, produce buyers, traders, lorry owners, money lenders. Side by side with them have emerged the clerks, artisans and laborers in the employ of the large export houses,

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<sup>1</sup> Washington Post (29 June 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun, pp. 145-6.

government, transport and trade. Each year thousands of school leavers besiege the labor market, in the main unsuccessfully; and these young men, led by the thrustful middle class of trade and professions--especially the lawyers in Lagos and southern towns, groomed in the manner of British law and politics--put the steam behind the rising southern demand for entry into the political kingdom.

It might be noted that the 12 recently departed governors, through graft and corruption, had themselves become like the emirs of old, ruling modern versions of feudal fiefdoms. Through ill-gotten gains they amassed control, power and the ability to defy Gowon in his efforts to oust them.

Each region has different economic attitudes, resources, and the capacity to design and implement development plans. Gowon tried to unify their economic efforts, after spending over \$180 million in relief efforts to reestablish displaced persons from the Biafran war, but his efforts were thwarted by economic complexities and old questions of regional rivalries and ethnic divisions.

One way in which the FMG had proposed to help the little man was to revitalize the country's sagging agriculture.<sup>1</sup> More than 70 percent of Nigeria's population still live on the land, despite urban migration. Many farmers and herdsmen in the north had to flee south from the Sahel drought. Lagos gave \$30 million in emergency aid to stricken areas, but long-range agricultural plans were stymied. Nigeria, a former food exporter, found it necessary to import. For the average Nigerian, imported food was more costly and far less accessible than traditional food crops.

#### E. Inequitable Distribution of Wealth

In addition to politicians, government officials, and military officers who have grown rich, the oil money has also created black Africa's first wealthy merchant elite, members of which appear irrepressible in their zesty

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<sup>1</sup> Newsweek (4 February 1975).

enjoyment of money. Newsweek quotes Chief Henry Fajiemiroku, who has risen from a \$15-month postal clerk to become chairman of a dozen companies: "Every Nigerian wants to be rich. And everyone who believes in the profit motive, as 99% of Nigerians do, is a capitalist."<sup>1</sup> A senior U.S. official observed that Nigerians do not align themselves with ideological causes, because all they really care about is making money for themselves.

Nevertheless, the average Nigerian still remains very poor. Almost none of the oil bonanza has trickled down to the vast majority, although this might be hard to believe in Lagos where conspicuous wealth is concentrated in certain areas. Only one Nigerian child in five, for instance, goes to school because most parents cannot afford fees and uniforms.

While an inequitable distribution of wealth among individuals has been the cause of much personal and social unrest, inequality of a different sort has become a volatile economic and political issue. This has involved the disbursement of government funds and revenues to regions and states. Under the first republic, the federal government disbursed funds to the regions according to a formula of 50 percent by derivation to the region of origin, 50 percent by population. The 1975-80 Development Plan virtually eliminated "derivation," with population becoming its main criterion.<sup>2</sup> Therefore the question of the census became crucial, and the results of the 1973 census extremely controversial. The "provisional" results showed twice the number of people in the north as compared with the smaller, but far more densely populated and productive southern states. And this revived tribal controversy, mirrored in part even in military ranks, and reopened talk of a north-south split. This controversy was one factor in Gowon's judgment that stability and continuity under military rule were

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<sup>1</sup> Newsweek (4 February 1975).

<sup>2</sup> Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," p. 328.



preferable to an early resumption of civilian government, for if Nigeria were not stable there was little chance of attacking the problems of per capita income, distribution of wealth, educational growth, or even corruption.

Finally, the pay raises, mentioned earlier, instead of solving problems, did much to raise resentment and envy between groups.

F. Military Attitudes

General Mohammed and his associates appear to have engineered the coup out of a variety of motives--some in common, some individual. Genuine concern for the country, personal ambition and tribalism all played a part.

Mohammed and his colleagues are aggressive activists, in many ways the antithesis of Gowon who tried to work through compromise and consensus. Junior officers, for example, believe that Gowon's refusal to enforce military edicts against strikes showed weakness and indecision. The paralysis which had seized the FMG and the malaise which enveloped the country obviously called for strong corrective action, which the new ruling group was willing to take.

Personal ambition was also active. At the time of the earlier coup against the Ironsi government, Mohammed allegedly sought the top position, but other officers chose Gowon because he evidently lacked strong tribal, religious or regional biases. It is reported that Mohammed warned Gowon that if he attempted to remain in power beyond 1976 he would be overthrown (although it was not clear whether the reason was to clear the way for Mohammed or to fulfill the national pledge for return to civilian rule). Most observers agree that considerable motivation for the coup came from the desire of the slightly younger officers to advance. In any case, the old hierarchy has been replaced with a new one, essentially through reshuffling within the ranks. It is possible, however, that some of the most ambitious and active junior officers still did not win key jobs, although it is assumed that Mohammed has bought off or placated as many as feasible.

Mohammed, a loyal Hausa, was certainly motivated by some concern for the future of his Moslem north. He had helped overturn Ironsi for this reason and had shown his true colors in his ruthless drive against the Ibos.

Most observers agree that East-West ideology did not directly motivate the coup leaders. Radical thought and certain leftist groups certainly helped generate pressures for change. But the military did not act out of sympathy with student and union views; on the contrary they regarded--and continue to regard--these groups as troublemakers who should be strictly controlled. Some of the new leaders have worked with Russian military advisers and are appreciative of Soviet help during the Biafran war. Some obviously wish to continue to benefit from Russian goods, weapons or services. But their aims appear to be primarily pragmatic and selfish, with strong nationalistic overtones. While some U.S. officials admit that certain individuals appreciate or even admire the USSR, most assert that this coup, in itself, does not signal a shift to the left. They are equally convinced, however, that the Soviets will lose no chance to exploit any opportunity. They see the greatest danger in the form of possible pressure from radical Arab states applied on Mohammed, who is vulnerable, not only because of his Moslem sympathies, but also because of his susceptibility to payoffs.

### III IMPLICATIONS

On the record, U.S. officials reserved comment on the outcome of the coup in terms of Nigerian domestic and foreign policies and actions. Off the record, they have expressed increasing concern about its effect on internal stability and international relations. The New York Times in an editorial of 31 July, said: "...the overthrow of General Yakubu Gowon in Nigeria...is likely to prove fateful both for Nigeria, and for its neighbors." The initial reaction was generally that the change was not good news for the United States, while for the Soviets, it may generate a rebirth of optimism.

#### A. Domestic

Observers have expressed concern about the possible revival of tribal and regional rivalries and their political and economic consequences. Mohammed's elevation might rekindle fears of domination by the Moslem Hausas over the other major tribes and presage an inclination to give the north priority in the allocation of wealth and privilege. The Times editorial described Mohammed as an "incompetent and vindictive division commander" during the war against the Ibos. Another observer stated that if anything approached genocide during the civil war, it was the conduct of Mohammed and his men. Another expert has called him "impetuous and ruthless." The Christian Science Monitor pointed out that northerners are conservative and authoritarian, giving the southerners the impression that they want to run the whole country. Whether Mohammed has this desire or not, the Monitor observed, "...the very fact that he is a northerner could compound problems for the military group if its policy turns out to be continued postponement of a return to civilian rule, and a law-and-order approach to those who cause trouble because of growing dissatisfaction with military government." Again the Times says: "A war on corruption



and a timetable for return to democracy seem highly unlikely under Brigadier Mohammed." Americans who know him charge that he is not incorruptible.

Most of the other new leaders are regarded as professionally competent and relatively honest. Several have proved to be effective military commanders. All are known to be dedicated to Nigerian (and perhaps their own) interests over all other considerations. With one other possible exception, by their own origins at least, they do not disturb the ethnic balance of the previous FMG. They have promised that they will exert the corrective force expected of a military government. They do appear to be action oriented, and perhaps more authoritarian than Gowon. One of their first actions was to replace the 12 state governors. However, there is no assurance that Mohammed will be able or willing to stop the new governors from accumulating wealth, and, in the tradition of the north, becoming latter-day emirs.

Nine weeks after Mohammed seized power, his government listed four goals:

- Return to civilian rule
- Review of number of states making up the Federation
- Review of the controversial census of 1973
- Elimination of corruption

On 1 October 1975 Mohammed announced a four-year program to return the country to civilian rule by October 1979. At the same time he announced that the results of the 1973 census would be disregarded and questions related to political divisions and the number of states be "placed under study." The Government is now convening a new constitutional convention.

As of 23 November 1975, it was reported that 7,000 civil servants had been fired, many on charges of corruption. According to U.S. officials, a similar cleanup is still underway among the ranks of the 250,000 armed forces.

On the economic front, the new government has so far failed to cope with growing pains resulting from oil revenues and problems arising in the sophisticated spheres of international finance and commerce. For example, it was estimated that 5 million tons of cement would be needed for new construction projects this year. Twenty million tons were ordered and as of 4 December 1975 (New York Times) 372 freighters, mostly carrying cement, clog Lagos harbor. Because of this congestion, major exports of cocoa cannot be shipped out. Lagos itself has become so chaotic that the government is now considering moving the capital up-country.

B. For the United States: General

Mohammed's views on international affairs are not well known. He is xenophobic to some extent; however, he has up to now treated all foreign diplomats equally. He is neither anti- nor pro-Western, although he is anti-UK and does criticize the United States on some issues. None of the other leaders is especially anti-American, although occasional complaints against the United States have emanated from them. Brigadier Obasanjo, chief of staff, was responsible for placing troops around the American Embassy annex in late July 1975, but this action reportedly stemmed from a controversy with the then Foreign Minister and Obasanjo's own offended national pride. At least three of the new leaders have displayed varying degrees of friendship for the United States. Newsweek, in contrast to some other publications, predicted that the new regime "will pursue the same kind of moderate, pro-Western course that Gowon espoused."

C. For the United States: Re South Africa, Oil and American Blacks

Soviet efforts to exploit the Angolan situation have obviously been stepped up to a dramatic degree. This in turn does have serious implications for the United States.

For a long time Nigeria avoided taking sides in the Angolan conflict, publicly pledging Nigerian support for any effort of the OAU to end the



fighting between the three rival factions. However, on 27 November 1975 Nigeria announced its recognition of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. According to informed government sources, the Nigerians were prompted to take sides in light of growing evidence of Western (particularly South African) support of UNITA, reportedly not out of political or ideological affinity with the USSR. (Many African leaders in fact are greatly concerned about Soviet meddling in Angola.) As pointed out above, Nigeria (and Mohammed) have long been bitter critics of apartheid and South African domestic and foreign policy. Nigeria also is not happy about alleged U.S. financial support of the FNLA-UNITA factions funded through General Mobutu of Zaire.

Obviously, predictions about Nigerian interest and Soviet involvement in the Angolan strife, and the implications for the United States are difficult to make. For the moment, the Soviets seem to have taken advantage of African bitterness toward any group associated with or supported by South Africa.

While personally sympathetic to Arab concerns, Mohammed may encounter practical reasons to refrain (at least for the moment) from exerting pressure on the United States through a petroleum embargo. Oil revenues have dropped in recent months, due to overpricing and strikes, which resulted in production cutbacks. Nigeria continues to need oil revenues, now perhaps more than ever, so economics may outweigh political aims. It would be hoped that Nigeria might also follow the lead of the recent OAU resolution which urged (despite Arab state opposition) a "peaceful solution" to racial conflict in southern Africa. The black OAU members also refused to recommend Israel's expulsion from the U.N., thus separating themselves further from Arab extremists and demonstrating a degree of resentment against what they consider inadequate Arab compensation for the effects of increased oil prices on their undeveloped economies.

It remains to be seen if the new regime will revive criticism of the United States on civil rights. Naturally, sympathy for American black



causes continues, nurtured by the several thousand Nigerian students in the United States. A few Nigerian officials saw Nixon's failure to meet with Gowon as an indication of racism as well as a general disinterest in African problems. And some see in Kissinger's "tilt" toward South Africa more than economic and strategic pragmatism. Mohammed himself claims that he was the victim of a racial "incident" while visiting America in the late 1960s. Having six hours free before departing New York, he attempted to leave the airport without a visa in order to sightsee. In informing him of U.S. visa regulations, Mohammed claims that immigration officials cast racial slurs.

#### D. Prognosis

Some observers see this future scenario for Nigeria: the action-oriented Mohammed group comes in and crack the whip. The bureaucrats, the civil servants, backed by profiteers, will block reform and positive action. Frustration and dissension will rise again among the populace. Out of genuine impatience for lack of progress on economic and social issues or out of new waves of personal ambition, another still younger group of military officers will trigger yet another coup.

Shortly after the coup, Larry Heinzerling wrote in the Washington Post: "The military coup in Nigeria reflects one of independent black Africa's basic problems: After a decade and a half of independence, most nations south of the Sahara have still not devised a method for a peaceful transfer of political power. Most political observers see no end to a revolving door of coup and counter-coup in Africa for years to come." In another early evaluation, Ruth First observed that the historical sequence in Africa so far has been a succession of military rulers, one group trying, failing, then being replaced by another group of new, eager, ambitious young men. Undoubtedly there are now others in the wings in Nigeria--those who helped engineer the coup, but did not achieve power for themselves. The picture thus painted is not an encouraging prospect, but it may be too pessimistic. Nigeria's potential strengths may yet more than compensate for its weaknesses, but not without severe stresses in the changes which lie ahead; opportunities will arise and very probably will be exploited by the Soviets to extend Soviet influence in Nigeria.

#### IV SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES--REVISIONS

The recent coup may have increased the potential for exploitation of the various contingencies discussed in Section VI, Soviet Opportunities, of the basic paper.

1. Gowon, of course, has been eliminated. He was firmly anticommunist. The desire and ability of the new leaders to maintain determined neutral positions on East-West issues have not been tested. And there is reason to doubt that they can retain the degree of national unity and pride which Gowon tried to develop. Perpetuation of a government disdainful of democratic rights can produce conditions conducive to communist exploitation. Gowon may have let this happen. It remains to be seen whether his successors can achieve the stability necessary for a return to civilian government.

2. Regional strife may be more likely to occur under Mohammed's government than under Gowon. The Soviets will have an opportunity to encourage and support divisive moves. The USSR would hope to gain an ally in the north and a weakened, less resolute country in the south. Such developments would also diminish the capacity of the military establishment to protect the country from incursions from without.

3. Political strife, political maneuvering and agitation may actually be more rigorously suppressed under the new regime than under the old FMG. This could frustrate those groups which have gained Soviet support and encouragement. However, if such groups do not see their own grievances redressed by the new regime, they will have even more incentive to pursue radical action. The Soviet hand might then show through in clearer fashion.

4. Economic problems will continue to present sobering challenges to the new government. If a more authoritarian, determined approach can



unclog channels of distribution, improve social conditions, remove financial inequities, properly utilize the land and reduce corruption, many of communism's opportunities will be erased. If the new regime fails to achieve these goals, dissatisfied groups (workers, farmers, students and intellectuals) will become more frustrated and perhaps seek more radical solutions.

5. Southern African issues, already ripe for Soviet exploitation, may offer the Russians improved entrée with the new group, which is militant on the subject. At the minimum, the USSR and Nigeria may join forces more frequently on extreme resolutions at international conferences. And the Russians will lose no opportunity to remind Nigerians of U.S. divergent interests in southern Africa and the racial problems in America.

6. Pan-Africanism and its generally moderating influence may suffer if tribal or regional strife is renewed in Nigeria. Pro-Soviet Arab countries have already expressed pleasure over Mohammed's ascent. The Russians probably would applaud Arab support of Hausa and Fulani attempts for control or, failing that, secession. The resulting strife would test the loyalties of neighboring states and weaken Africa's ability to withstand outside pressure.



## V U.S. ACTIONS AND OPTIONS--REVISIONS

Just as the coup may have changed some Soviet opportunities for penetration into Nigeria, so also it may affect U.S.-Nigerian relations, actions and options. However, the United States should not institute major policy changes until the situation is clearer. A review of Section VII of the basic paper, however, suggests the reaffirmation of some recommendations and tentative adjustment of others. The sections below refer to the corresponding headings in the basic paper.

### A. Basic Precepts

Unchanged.

### B. Bilateral Actions

While resuming normal bilateral intercourse, the United States should be cautious about embracing the new regime or providing major support. U.S. officials have an uneasy feeling about the present calm, which they describe as out of character for the volatile Nigerians. New considerations and factors may emerge: on the one hand the Mohammed regime may take positions and actions which become increasingly offensive to the United States; or conceivably, there might still be some future accommodation with Gowon. One American expert asserts that no member of any of the big three tribal groups can ever lead the Federation. He sees a succession of coups and finally a desperate call for the return of Gowon, who at least established his credentials as a tribal neutralist.

#### 1. Political Bilateral

- Continue c, d and e.

- Work for the objective of a, without identifying too closely with individuals.
- Limit b, exchange of visits of high officials.

Since "Nigerianism" is likely to grow even stronger as an operating concept of the new regime, the United States should act accordingly, with patience (if possible) and restraint, with respect but not subservience, with directness but not belligerence. While maintaining distance from any clique, Nigerians must be taken as seriously as they take themselves, acknowledging that the country's resource base does make it unique among its Third World peers and that "Nigerianism" is consequently a logical posture for Nigerians to assume in dealing with outsiders.

## 2. Political-Multilateral Actions Affecting Bilateral Relations

- Continue all.
- It is even more important now, however, that the United States strongly and positively implement a, support of ultimate self-determination for all races in southern Africa, and b, maintenance of an even-handed position in the Middle East.

## 3. Economic

- Continue a, c, e, f and g.
- Until the new government has established its credibility, the United States should not press b, implementation of remaining AID grants and loans, and d, help on the Five-Year Plan.

## 4. Military

- Continue c and d.
- Defer action on a, military assistance and training, and b, encouragement of American munition sales to Nigeria.

## C. Contingencies and Options

1. Gowon's Successor---In this transition period, the United States should remain cautious in its approaches to the new regime. Therefore, while many of the normal actions and even stepped-up options listed in C,1 of the basic paper may still be helpful to U.S.-Nigerian relations, they should not be implemented at this stage if they would have the effect of reinforcing Mohammed's personal position.

### 2. Regional Strife

- Continue b, c and d (for any in military training).
- If Mohammed's conduct justifies, then a, applaud policies of integration.
- Action on the stronger options should be deferred.

### 3. Political Strife

- Continue a, b and c.

### 4. Economic Problems

- Continue or delay actions suggested in VII, B, 3 of the basic paper, according to suggestions in B, 3 of this addendum.
- Stronger options should definitely be held in abeyance.

### 5. Southern African Issues

- Continue the general proposals, but with an added sense of urgency and necessity now in light of views of the present regime.
- Although implementation of extreme options may not be called for as new Nigerian attitudes develop, the



United States may be pushed in the direction of considering some of the strong steps suggested in this section.

Contingency planning involving Nigeria and Southern African issues requires consideration of U.S. basic interests and the corresponding options regarding the Angolan situation. The United States could antagonize, not only Nigeria, but many other African states, to an irreparable degree if this country appears to side too openly with South Africa. Would a Soviet controlled or influenced regime in Angola present more of a threat to the United States than pro-Soviet ones in Guinea or Somalia? If Angola is strategically important, what could or should the United States do to block the Soviets and their proxies, the Cubans? Are there restraints available under detente? Will the Soviets themselves realize that they may be heading for their own kind of Vietnam? In any event, the Nigerians will be watching the Americans and the Soviets very carefully as both react respectively to the opportunities, threats and challenges of the Angolan situation.

6. Pan-Africanism

- All actions and options (if ultimately needed) remain valid.

D. Overall Policy Approach

Africa will continue to be unpredictable. As the course of events in Nigeria demonstrates, the wheel will continue to turn, providing the Soviets with new opportunities or new frustrations, and the United States with the need for new actions and contingency plans. The situation in Angola has brought into focus an ominous pattern of superpower confrontation over sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviets already are firmly established in Somalia on Africa's east coast; a strong Soviet presence in Angola would place them in a key political and strategic position on the other side of the continent, enabling them, through the use of Angolan ports

and airfields, to deploy tactical military power in a more nearly complete worldwide pattern than heretofore. Nigeria, as the most populous country in Africa, is strategically located, potentially rich and politically influential. U.S. relations with this key country become **even** more important than in the past. The new Nigerian government has proclaimed practical goals for stabilizing the country and eventually returning it to civilian rule: the United States can and should contribute to the achievement of Nigeria's goals by continuing to stress to Nigerians that the mutual best interests of both countries are the basis for U.S.-Nigerian relations.